Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Porter v. Porter, 195 P.2d 132.

130 citing documents.

  • Cockrill v. Cockrill 601 P.2d 1334 Ariz. 1979
  • Cockrill v. Cockrill 601 P.2d 1334 Ariz. 1979
    See, e. g., , , In re Torrey’s Estate, , Spector v. Spector, 23 Ariz.App.
  • Ohio Farmers Insurance v. Norman 594 P.2d 1026 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1979
  • Ohio Farmers Insurance v. Norman 594 P.2d 1026 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1979
  • Neal v. Neal 570 P.2d 758 Ariz. 1977
  • Neal v. Neal 570 P.2d 758 Ariz. 1977
    Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a), and the trial court did not, sua sponte, make such findings, we are constrained by the presumption that the Superior Court “found every fact necessary to support the judgment, and such presumptive findings must be sustained if the evidence on any reasonable construction justified it.” , -38 (1948); Myrland v. Myrland, 19 Ariz.App.
  • Nelson v. Nelson 560 P.2d 1276 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1977
  • Nelson v. Nelson 560 P.2d 1276 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1977
  • Hatch v. Hatch 547 P.2d 1044 Ariz. 1976
  • Hatch v. Hatch 547 P.2d 1044 Ariz. 1976
    The judgment of the court is to be exercised in accordance with the above statute and not to the end that one party be rewarded or that the other party be punished.” , .
  • Noble v. Noble 546 P.2d 358 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
  • Noble v. Noble 546 P.2d 358 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
  • Hatch v. Hatch 534 P.2d 295 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
  • Hatch v. Hatch 534 P.2d 295 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
    As justified in Honig , “one cannot expect to reap in fields he has never sown.” , which pointed out that it must be exercised in accordance with the mandate of equitableness set forth in A.R.S.
  • Spector v. Spector 531 P.2d 176 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
  • Spector v. Spector 531 P.2d 176 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
    Obviously, the provision is intended to take into account earnings received by each party resulting from separate ownership of income-producing assets, thus avoiding the confusion in ownership arising from “mixed income.” See, for example
  • Burton v. Burton 531 P.2d 204 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1975
  • Burton v. Burton 531 P.2d 204 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1975
    Bourne v. Lord, 19 Ariz.App.
  • Oppenheimer v. Oppenheimer 526 P.2d 762 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1974
  • Oppenheimer v. Oppenheimer 526 P.2d 762 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1974
  • Myrland v. Myrland 508 P.2d 757 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1973
  • Myrland v. Myrland 508 P.2d 757 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1973
    Once the character of property as separate has been determined, it does not change except by agreement or operation of law, , and it remains separate during marriage even though it may be sold and other property purchased with the proceeds.
  • Bourne v. Lord 506 P.2d 268 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1973
  • Bourne v. Lord 506 P.2d 268 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1973
  • Musker v. Gil Haskins Auto Leasing, Inc. 500 P.2d 635 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
  • Musker v. Gil Haskins Auto Leasing, Inc. 500 P.2d 635 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
  • Witherspoon v. Witherspoon 498 P.2d 233 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1972
  • Witherspoon v. Witherspoon 498 P.2d 233 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1972
    In the face of this apparent 4 to 1 disparity, we find the language of the court in Reed, supra, appropriate: “We have said that the power of division of community property must not be exercised to the end that one party is rewarded and the other is punished, , , and we have also said that on dissolution of the community by divorce the disposition must be one which in the absence of some reason requiring a contrary action is substantially equivalent in the parts received by each of the spouses,
  • Becchelli v. Becchelli 497 P.2d 396 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
  • Becchelli v. Becchelli 497 P.2d 396 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
  • In Re Estate of Sims 475 P.2d 505 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
  • In Re Estate of Sims 475 P.2d 505 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
  • Hofstra v. Hofstra 474 P.2d 869 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
  • Hofstra v. Hofstra 474 P.2d 869 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
    We have reviewed a , ; , ; , ; , and it is our opinion that under the facts before us the Arizona case law does not ■ compel á conclusion which differs from the on
  • Armer v. Armer 463 P.2d 818 Ariz. 1970
  • Armer v. Armer 463 P.2d 818 Ariz. 1970
  • Proffit v. Proffit 462 P.2d 391 Ariz. 1969
  • Proffit v. Proffit 462 P.2d 391 Ariz. 1969
  • Schock v. Schock 461 P.2d 697 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
  • Schock v. Schock 461 P.2d 697 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
  • Davis v. Davis 449 P.2d 66 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
  • Davis v. Davis 449 P.2d 66 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
    ertheless, is presumed to be community property, , In re Torrey’s Estate, , and that appellee did not overcome this presumption, , , , 29 A.L.R.2d 518 (1951); , Arizona Central Credit Union v. Holden, 6 Ariz.App.
  • Nace v. Nace 448 P.2d 76 Ariz. 1968
  • Nace v. Nace 448 P.2d 76 Ariz. 1968
  • King v. Uhlmann 437 P.2d 928 Ariz. 1968
  • King v. Uhlmann 437 P.2d 928 Ariz. 1968
  • Nace v. Nace 432 P.2d 896 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
  • Nace v. Nace 432 P.2d 896 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
  • Arizona Central Credit Union v. Holden 432 P.2d 276 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
  • Arizona Central Credit Union v. Holden 432 P.2d 276 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
    at page 279, at page 136 (1948), held that this presumption is not dispelled upon the production of any evidence to the contrary and stated, “The Court must be satisfied that the property really is separate before it can state that the presumption has been dispelled.” The burden of rebutting this presum