Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Bly, 621 P.2d 279.

158 citing documents.

State v. Carlson 48 P.3d 1180 Ariz. 2002
State v. Christian 47 P.3d 666 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
State v. Christian 47 P.3d 666 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
§ 13-604.02(B) (a person convicted of a felony offense committed while on probation “shall be sentenced to a term of not less than the presumptive sentence authorized for the offense”); , (“Unless the punishment is so severe as to be disproportionate to the crime, the judiciary has discretion only to the extent provided by the legislature.”) (citation omitted).
State v. Tschilar 27 P.3d 331 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
State v. Tschilar 27 P.3d 331 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
State v. Wagner 976 P.2d 250 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
State v. Wagner 976 P.2d 250 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
In adopting this procedure the legislature in effect pronounced its belief that such sentencing would reduce “disparity and inconsistency in sentencing.”
State v. Musser 977 P.2d 131 Ariz. 1999
State v. Musser 977 P.2d 131 Ariz. 1999
(“Power resides with the legislature to define that conduct which will not be tolerated in an ordered society and to provide punishment for those who violate public policy.”) Id.
State v. Jackson 924 P.2d 494 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
State v. Jackson 924 P.2d 494 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
State v. Williams 898 P.2d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
State v. Williams 898 P.2d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
-73 , -82 (1980) (weapon properly used to elevate seriousness of the offense, to enhance the sentence for dangerousness and to aggravate a sentence).
State v. Magana 874 P.2d 973 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
State v. Carbajal 868 P.2d 1044 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
State v. Carbajal 868 P.2d 1044 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
State v. Pitts 870 P.2d 1155 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
State v. Pitts 870 P.2d 1155 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
in which our supreme court considered whether the defendant’s sentences violated the fifth amendment right against double punishment when the trial court considered the use of a deadly weapon to raise the offense from robbery to armed robbery and also considered and weighed the same factor as an
State v. Snead 854 P.2d 1183 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
State v. Snead 854 P.2d 1183 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
that the use of a weapon may be used to increase the charge 2 , to enhance the sentence under A.R.S.
State v. Lopez 847 P.2d 1078 Ariz. 1992
State v. Lopez 847 P.2d 1078 Ariz. 1992
State v. Moore 841 P.2d 231 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
State v. Moore 841 P.2d 231 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
“It is the public policy of [Arizona], as reflected by the criminal code, to condemn, correct, or deter transgressions which harm either individual or public interests.” , see also Ariz.Rev.
State v. Gillen 830 P.2d 879 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1992
State v. Lara 830 P.2d 803 Ariz. 1992
State v. Gillen 830 P.2d 879 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1992
where enhancement was permitted because the aggravating factor was among those specified by the legislature, , limiting Bly by precluding en *360 hancement when the aggravating factor, although among those legislatively specified, is “an e
State v. Lara 830 P.2d 803 Ariz. 1992
The court of appeals affirmed, , to hold that the state could properly *283 use the weapon to: (1) increase the charge from robbery to armed robbery pursuant to A.R.S.
State v. Fagnant 839 P.2d 430 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
State v. Fagnant 839 P.2d 430 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
Our supreme court first upheld the sentencing scheme that would allow an element of a
State v. White 815 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1991
State v. White 815 P.2d 869 Ariz. 1991
As we noted in State v. Carriger, “when an individual is murdered for the pecuniary gain of the assailant, we think the legislature can properly punish this more severely than other first degree murders, and we abide by their decision.” , ( , cert.
State v. Perez Lara 823 P.2d 70 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
State v. Perez Lara 823 P.2d 70 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
State v. Malone 830 P.2d 842 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
State v. Malone 830 P.2d 842 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
State v. Garcia 799 P.2d 888 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
State v. Garcia 799 P.2d 888 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
(not double jeopardy to use a deadly weapon both to classify the crime as a more serious felony and to enhance the sentence); , (not double jeopardy or double punishment to consider an element of the crime for more than one purpose when determining punishment); , (not double punishment for gun to support both underlying crime and enhanced sentence).
State v. Wideman 798 P.2d 1373 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
State v. Wideman 798 P.2d 1373 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
State v. Stidham 791 P.2d 671 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
State v. Stidham 791 P.2d 671 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
State v. Webb 793 P.2d 105 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
State v. Webb 793 P.2d 105 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
State v. Whitney 768 P.2d 638 Ariz. 1989
State v. Whitney 768 P.2d 638 Ariz. 1989
State v. Orduno 769 P.2d 1010 Ariz. 1989
State v. Orduno 769 P.2d 1010 Ariz. 1989
P.2d 1 (1980) (not double jeopardy to use a deadly weapon both to classify the crime as a more serious felony and to enhance the sentence); P.2d 279 (1980) (not double jeopardy or double punishment to consider an element of the crime for more than one purpose when determining punishment); , (aggravated assault; not double punishment for gun to support both underlying crime and enhanced senten
State v. Olsen 760 P.2d 603 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
State v. Olsen 760 P.2d 603 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MANDATORY SENTENCING STATUTE In the introduction to this argument, , which sustained mandatory sentences in Arizona.