Cited by

“[T]he preferred method for complying with Rule 609 is a specific on-the-record finding that the probative value of using a prior conviction for impeachment outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.”

¶ 28 (2000) ( aff’d on other grounds sub nom.

l be excused when there is a “reasonable ground to believe that a juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict.” However, a potential juror having “preconceived notions or opinions does not necessarily render him incompetent to fairly and impartially decide a case”; if a juror is willing to “put aside his opinions and base his decision solely upon the evidence, he may serve.” (citations omitted).

See, (holding that photographs of stab wounds in the victim’s chest and the victim’s nude body smeared with blood were properly admitted); (holding that a photograph of a victim’s fully clothed body lying face down was not gruesome, and a close-up photograph of a victim’s torso and decomposed head, although gruesome, was properly admitted because the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect).

Notably, the court distinguished Godoy’s P.2d 183 (1985), on the basis that, “[i]n Poland, the judge did not dismiss the action.” Godoy, 67 P.3d at 703.

See, (holding that photographs of stab wounds in the victim’s chest and the victim’s nude body smeared with blood were properly admitted); (holding that a photograph of a victim’s fully clothed body lying face down was not gruesome, and a close-up photograph of a victim’s torso and decomposed head, although gruesome, was properly admitted because the 6

Thompson v. Better-Bilt Aluminum Products Co., Inc.

(finding no evidence that the victims suffered because “[t]he autopsy revealed no evidence that they had been bound or injured prior to being placed in the water, and there was no sign of a struggle”); ¶ 85, 132 P.

¶14 Chappell also argues that drowning alone is insufficient to support a finding of cruelty, (noting lack of evidence of victims’ suffering or a struggle), (noting, 7 after retrial, absence of evidence that “victims were conscious at the time of death”).

y testify on any subject if the witness’s “specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” This court has interpreted Rule 702 to preclude expert testimony, however, if “the subject of inquiry is one of such common knowledge that people of ordinary education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the witness.” , ( , ).

P.2d 183 (1985), to support his waiver argument.

State v. Poland (Patrick), , State v. Poland (Michael)

¶ 16 The state’s , , is misplaced.

Under the facts of this case, including Greenham’s testimony, the trial judge’s finding is “clearly warranted.”

Although close family ties may be mitigating, -07 , -02 (1985), general statements of support carry little weight.

'If a juror is willing to put aside his opinions and base his decision solely upon the evidence, he may serve.’ The trial court can rehabilitate a challenged juror through follow-up questions to assure the court that he can sit as a fair and impartial juror.” 196 Ariz. at 458 , 999 P.2d at 802 ( , (citations omitted)).

aff'd, 476 U.S. 147 , 106 S.Ct.

In a case involving a challenge to the admission of an inflammatory photograph of a close-up of the victim’s torso and decomposed head, the court declared the evidence admissible “provided it has probative value apart from merely illustrating the atrociousness of the crime.” 5 , ( , aff'd, 476 U.S. 147 , 106 S.Ct.

appeal after re *65 mand, , and , (1985), Kemp argues that the trial court erred in finding that the murder was committed in an especially cruel manner.

aff'd, 476 U.S. 147 , 106 S.Ct.

-97 , -93 (1985), aff'd, 476 U.S. 147 , 106 S.Ct.