Cited by

“[I]n determining whether the evidence was impermissibly tainted, we review for legal error,” but “are deferential to the trial court’s factual findings because that court has ‘an opportunity to see the parties, lawyers and witnesses.’” n.18, n.18 (1983).

See Lindsey, 149 Ariz. at 474 ( (“We believe that the ‘generality’ of the testimony is a factor which favors admission.”) (overturned on other grounds by statute)).

¶154 The autopsy photograph in question was relevant because “the fact and cause of death are always relevant in a murder prosecution.” superseded on other grounds by A.R.S.

‘to prove the corpus delecti, to identify the victim, to show the nature and location of the fatal injury, to help determine the degree or atrociousness of the crime, to corroborate state witnesses, to illustrate or explain testimony, and to corroborate the state’s theory of how and why the homicide was committed.’” -340, ¶ 39 (2005) ().

( n.18 (1983), and citing United Imps.

are clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount to a denial of justice.” n.18 (1983), superseded by statute on other grounds.

A court abuses its discretion when “the reasons given by the court for its action are clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount to a denial of justice.” n.18, n.18 (1983) (citation omitted).

v. Microsoft Corp., ¶ 17 (App. 2006) ( n.18 (1983), and citing United Imps.

A court abuses its discretion when “the reasons given by the court for its action are clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount to a denial of justice.” Mieg, 225 Ariz. at 447, 239 P.3d at 1260 ( n.18, n.18 (1983)) (quotation marks omitted).

v. Microsoft Corp., ¶ 17 , ( , 297 n. 18, , 1224 n. 18 (1983)); ¶ 23 , (“An abuse of discretion exists when the trial court commits an error of law in the process of exercising its discretion.”).

v. Microsoft Corp., ¶ 17, ( n.18, n.18 (1983)).

But this deferential standard of review is inapplicable to the extent a superior court’s ultimate finding constitutes a conclusion of law, Zamora, 220 Ariz. at 67, ¶ 7, 202 P.3d at 532, and we are not bound by a discretionary finding of fact when it is “not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence.” n.18, n.18 (1983).

v. Microsoft Corp., ¶ 17, ( n.18, N.18 (1983)).

A discretionary decision involves assessing “conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations which vary from case to case and which can be better determined or resolved by the trial judge.” ( n.18, n.18 (1983), superseded in part by statute, A.R.S.

13 (permitting generalized expert testimony about behavioral characteristics of sex-abuse victims); -75, -76 (1986) (generalized expert testimony about behavioral patterns common among child victims allowed so long as not commenting on accuracy, reliability, or credibility of particular witness); -93, -20 (1983) (trial court erroneously precluded generalized expert testimony about factors that affect reliability of eyewitness identification).

cretion when the reasons given for its ruling are clearly untenable, Herrera, 307 P.3d at 112, the record does not support its decision, Files, 22 P.3d at 58, or “a discretionary finding of fact is ‘not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence.’” n.18, n.18 (1983).

§ 13-756(A) ¶66 Benson argues that the above-articulated abuse-of-discretion standard is “more deferential” and yields a different result than the abuse- of-discretion standard outlined in a n.18, n.18 (1983).

An abuse of discretion occurs when “the reasons given by the court for its action are clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount to a denial of justice.” , 297 n. 18, , 1224 n. 18 (1983).

A. Applicable standard of review ¶70 Boyston first argues that we should apply a n.18, n.18 (1983).

An abuse of discretion occurs where the court’s reasons for its actions are “clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount- to a denial of justice.” , 297 n. 18, , 1224 n. 18 (1983).

v. Microsoft Corp., ¶ 17 , ( , 297 n. 18, , 1224 n. 18 (1983) ).

11 wrongful convictions”); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (noting pretrial eyewitness identifications arranged by state “peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors,” which contribute to “the high incidence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification”); (“[T]he law has long recognized the inherent danger in eyewitness testimony.”).