Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208.

392 citing documents.

  • State v. Nordstrom 25 P.3d 717 Ariz. 2001
  • Coy v. Fields 27 P.3d 799 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
  • Coy v. Fields 27 P.3d 799 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
    (equating abuse of discretion with legally incorrect ruling).
  • State v. Bocharski 22 P.3d 43 Ariz. 2001
  • State v. Bocharski 22 P.3d 43 Ariz. 2001
    ¶ 21 Relevant photographs may be received in evidence even though they “also have a tendency to prejudice the jury against the person who committed the offense.” -288 , -1215 (1983) ( , ).
  • State v. Hoskins 14 P.3d 997 Ariz. 2000
  • State v. Hoskins 14 P.3d 997 Ariz. 2000
    2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977); State v. *139 Chappie
  • State v. Anderson 4 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2000
  • State v. Anderson 4 P.3d 369 Ariz. 2000
  • Logerquist v. McVey 1 P.3d 113 Ariz. 2000
  • Logerquist v. McVey 1 P.3d 113 Ariz. 2000
    297 n. 18, , 1224 n. 18 (1983).
  • State v. Wagner 976 P.2d 250 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
  • State v. Wagner 976 P.2d 250 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
    Rule 401, Ariz. R. Evid.
  • State v. Doerr 969 P.2d 1168 Ariz. 1998
  • State v. Doerr 969 P.2d 1168 Ariz. 1998
    (holding that admissible photographs must have a “tendency to prove or disprove any question which is actually contested,” either expressly or implicitly).
  • State v. Lujan 967 P.2d 123 Ariz. 1998
  • State v. Lujan 967 P.2d 123 Ariz. 1998
    297 n. 18, , 1224 n. 18 (1983).
  • State v. Garza 962 P.2d 898 Ariz. 1998
  • State v. Garza 962 P.2d 898 Ariz. 1998
    Fillmore, 187 Ariz. at 184 , 927 P.2d at 1313 (citing United States v. Wardlaw, 576 F.2d 932, 938 (1st Cir.1978); Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 144 (8th Cir.1973)); -97 , -24 (1983).
  • State v. Tankersley 956 P.2d 486 Ariz. 1998
  • State v. Tankersley 956 P.2d 486 Ariz. 1998
    y because it is based on an assessment of conflicting procedural, factual or equitable considerations which vary from case to case and which can be better determined or resolved by the trial judge, who has a more immediate grasp of all the facts of the ease, an opportunity to see the parties, lawyers and witnesses, and who can better assess the impact of what occurs before him.” , 297 n. 18, , 1224 n. 18 (1983).
  • State v. Magner 956 P.2d 519 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • State v. Magner 956 P.2d 519 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
    297 n. 18, , 1224 n. 18 (1983).
  • State Ex Rel. McDougall v. Superior Court 953 P.2d 926 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • State Ex Rel. McDougall v. Superior Court 953 P.2d 926 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
    297 n. 18, , 1224 n. 18 (1983)
  • State v. Spreitz 945 P.2d 1260 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Spreitz 945 P.2d 1260 Ariz. 1997
    The court reasoned that “we cannot compel the state ‘to try its case in a sterile setting.’” , (-90 , -17 (1983)); see also Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. at 171 , 800 P.2d at 1279 (“In prosecuting [a murder], the state must be allowed some latitude to show what actually occurred.”).
  • State v. Lee 944 P.2d 1222 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Lee 944 P.2d 1222 Ariz. 1997
  • Herrell v. Sargeant 944 P.2d 1241 Ariz. 1997
  • Herrell v. Sargeant 944 P.2d 1241 Ariz. 1997
    But when the exercise of such discretion in a given cause appears to be clearly erroneous under well-settled principles of law, the appellate court is bound to interfere.” , 171 P. 137, 138 (1918); , 297 n. 18, , 1224 n. 18 (1983).
  • State v. Osorio 931 P.2d 1089 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • State v. Osorio 931 P.2d 1089 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
    If the court determines that a lineup is unduly suggestive, it must then determine whether the identification was reliable, considering the “totality of the circumstances.”
  • State v. Dickens 926 P.2d 468 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Dickens 926 P.2d 468 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Doody 930 P.2d 440 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
  • State v. Doody 930 P.2d 440 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
    297 n. 18, , 1224 n. 18 (1983).
  • State v. Blackmore 925 P.2d 1347 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Towery 920 P.2d 290 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Towery 920 P.2d 290 Ariz. 1996
    403 , (“the correct rule is that exhibits which may tend to inflame the jury must first be found relevant”).
  • State v. Roscoe 910 P.2d 635 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Roscoe 910 P.2d 635 Ariz. 1996
  • Burnette v. Bender 908 P.2d 1086 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
  • Burnette v. Bender 908 P.2d 1086 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
    297 n. 18, , 1224 n. 18 (1983).
  • State v. Gulbrandson 906 P.2d 579 Ariz. 1995
  • State v. Gulbrandson 906 P.2d 579 Ariz. 1995
    258 , 126 L.Ed.2d 210 (1993)
  • State v. Murray 906 P.2d 542 Ariz. 1995
  • State v. Murray 906 P.2d 542 Ariz. 1995
  • State v. Walden 905 P.2d 974 Ariz. 1995
  • State v. Walden 905 P.2d 974 Ariz. 1995
    the expert did not give an opinion on the reliability of the particular victims’ identifications or state that eyewitness identifications in general have a certain percentage of inaccuracy.