Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Hunt v. Norton, 198 P.2d 124.

50 citing documents.

Falcone Brothers & Associates, Inc. v. City of Tucson 381 P.3d 276 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
Falcone Brothers & Associates, Inc. v. City of Tucson 381 P.3d 276 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
6 “Our constitutional and statutory provisions relative to certiorari are comparable to those of California and other neighboring states.”
Ruco v. Acc Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Residential Utility Consumer Office v. Arizona Corp. Commission 355 P.3d 610 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Residential Utility Consumer Office v. Arizona Corp. Commission 355 P.3d 610 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
It is defined and understood as: ‘An unforeseen combination of circumstances which calls for immediate action.’ ”); , (“ ‘Emergency’ does not mean expediency, convenience, or best interests.”).
Ruco v. Acc Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
It is defined and understood as: ‘An unforeseen combination of circumstances which calls for immediate action.’”); (“’Emergency’ does not mean expediency, convenience, or best interests.”).
McNamara v. Citizens Protecting Tax Payers 337 P.3d 557 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
McNamara v. Citizens Protecting Tax Payers 337 P.3d 557 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
(If a “statute is oppressive or unworkable, relief lies with the legislative department.”).
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission v. Brewer 275 P.3d 1267 Ariz. 2012
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission v. Brewer 275 P.3d 1267 Ariz. 2012
¶ 14, 544 ¶ 16, -134 (App. 1998) (when the governor has power to remove an official, the court’s role in judicial review is “narrow and restrained,” not to determine whether evidence warrants the removal, but rather “merely
Roosevelt Elementary School District No. 66 v. State 74 P.3d 258 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Roosevelt Elementary School District No. 66 v. State 74 P.3d 258 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
(If a “statute is oppressive or unworkable, relief lies with the legislative department.”); Commonwealth ex rel.
Arizona Water Co. v. Arizona Department of Water Resources 73 P.3d 1267 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
State Ex Rel. Hyder v. SUPERIOR COURT, ETC. 624 P.2d 1264 Ariz. 1981
State Ex Rel. Hyder v. SUPERIOR COURT, ETC. 624 P.2d 1264 Ariz. 1981
Jay v. Kreigh 518 P.2d 122 Ariz. 1974
Jay v. Kreigh 518 P.2d 122 Ariz. 1974
Wilson, , , 198 * , 5 A.L.R.2d 668 (1948)
East Camelback Homeowners Ass'n v. Arizona Foundation for Neurology & Psychiatry 500 P.2d 906 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
East Camelback Homeowners Ass'n v. Arizona Foundation for Neurology & Psychiatry 500 P.2d 906 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
etermine the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a jurisdictional fact found to exist by an inferior board or tribunal where review is by certiorari, it is necessary to determine whether the order sought to be reviewed is “without any evidence to support it, or is absolutely contrary to the uncontradicted and unconflicting evidence upon which it purports to rest.” , Anno.
Swift & Company v. State Tax Commission 462 P.2d 775 Ariz. 1969
Swift & Company v. State Tax Commission 462 P.2d 775 Ariz. 1969
5 A.L.R.2d 668 , this Court stated: “Chairman Hunt of the Tax Commission practically conceded, at the hearing, that no true emergency existed but nevertheless the petition was thereafter allowed by the Commission.
Warris v. Juvenile Division of Superior Court 447 P.2d 567 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
Warris v. Juvenile Division of Superior Court 447 P.2d 567 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
5 A.L.R.2d 668 (1948): “The general rule is that, in the absence of statute or local practice otherwise, questions or findings of fact, in the inferior tribunal, are not reviewable on certiorari, and that evidence which is made a part of the record cannot be examined to determine whether or no
Mueller v. City of Phoenix Ex Rel. Phoenix Board of Adjustment II 435 P.2d 472 Ariz. 1967
Mueller v. City of Phoenix Ex Rel. Phoenix Board of Adjustment II 435 P.2d 472 Ariz. 1967
State Ex Rel. Pickrell v. Downey 430 P.2d 122 Ariz. 1967
State Ex Rel. Pickrell v. Downey 430 P.2d 122 Ariz. 1967
Further, , , 5 A.L.R.2d 668 the following quote from the Kenney case is dicta to its holding and assuming we were to consider it controlling it would relate only to a collateral attack: “If the law imposes the duty upon the board to ascertain and pass upon the facts conferring jurisdiction upon it, a finding ■ and
State v. Superior Court in and for County of Pima 409 P.2d 750 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
State v. Superior Court in and for County of Pima 409 P.2d 750 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
Miller v. Superior Court 356 P.2d 699 Ariz. 1960
Miller v. Superior Court 356 P.2d 699 Ariz. 1960
5 A.L.R.2d 668 ; , ; , .
Welker v. Stevens 311 P.2d 832 Ariz. 1957
State v. Superior Court 311 P.2d 835 Ariz. 1957
Welker v. Stevens 311 P.2d 832 Ariz. 1957
Civil Service Commission of City of Tucson v. Foley, supra; , , 5 A.L.R.2d 668 .
State v. Superior Court 311 P.2d 835 Ariz. 1957
Lockwood v. Board of Supervisors of Maricopa County 297 P.2d 356 Ariz. 1956
State v. Stevens 288 P.2d 1077 Ariz. 1955
State v. Stevens 288 P.2d 1077 Ariz. 1955
5 A.L.R.2d 668 ; see also other cases cited therein.
Gibbons v. Finley 272 P.2d 610 Ariz. 1954
Gibbons v. Finley 272 P.2d 610 Ariz. 1954
Civil Service Commission v. Foley 257 P.2d 384 Ariz. 1953
Civil Service Commission v. Foley 257 P.2d 384 Ariz. 1953
Vazzano v. Superior Court 249 P.2d 837 Ariz. 1952
Vazzano v. Superior Court 249 P.2d 837 Ariz. 1952
5 A.L.R.2d 668 ; , ; , .
Duncan v. Truman 248 P.2d 879 Ariz. 1952
Duncan v. Truman 248 P.2d 879 Ariz. 1952
Metropolitan Lines, Inc. v. Brooks 220 P.2d 480 Ariz. 1950
Metropolitan Lines, Inc. v. Brooks 220 P.2d 480 Ariz. 1950
*346 126, 5 A.L.R.2d 668 : “Certiorari may be granted only when two facts appear: (a) the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal must have been exceeded, and (b) there is neither an appeal nor a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Parnell v. State Ex Rel. Wilson 206 P.2d 1047 Ariz. 1949
Parnell v. State Ex Rel. Wilson 206 P.2d 1047 Ariz. 1949
* * * ” , , that the above quotation from the Kenney case applied only where a collateral attack was being made upon the findings of the board, and that it did not apply where a direct attack was being made on said findings.