Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite City of Phoenix v. Weedon, 226 P.2d 157.

44 citing documents.

Sanchez v. City of Tucson 953 P.2d 168 Ariz. 1998
Sanchez v. City of Tucson 953 P.2d 168 Ariz. 1998
Beach, 136 Ariz. at 602, 667 P.2d at 1317.
Cooley v. Arizona Public Service Co. 839 P.2d 422 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
Cooley v. Arizona Public Service Co. 839 P.2d 422 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
Carrillo v. El Mirage Roadhouse, Inc. 793 P.2d 121 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
Carrillo v. El Mirage Roadhouse, Inc. 793 P.2d 121 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Board 706 P.2d 364 Ariz. 1985
Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Board 706 P.2d 364 Ariz. 1985
Beach v. City of Phoenix, 136 Ariz. at 604, 667 P.2d at 1319.
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Superior Court 714 P.2d 431 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Superior Court 714 P.2d 431 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
As the Supreme Court pointed out in its Cobum decision, the city’s duty is to conform to the recognized standard of conduct, which is to keep its streets reasonably safe for travel, , , (1950) , 237 P. 168 (1925).
Coburn v. City of Tucson 691 P.2d 1078 Ariz. 1984
Coburn v. City of Tucson 691 P.2d 1078 Ariz. 1984
Beach v. City of Phoenix 667 P.2d 1316 Ariz. 1983
Beach v. City of Phoenix 667 P.2d 1316 Ariz. 1983
237 P. 168, 172 (1925); , , , 19 McQuillin, supra, § 54.11, at 27 (3d ed. 1967); 63 C.J.S.
Matts v. City of Phoenix 669 P.2d 94 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
Matts v. City of Phoenix 669 P.2d 94 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
Beach v. City of Phoenix 667 P.2d 1327 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
Beach v. City of Phoenix 667 P.2d 1327 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
Lowman v. City of Mesa 611 P.2d 943 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
Lowman v. City of Mesa 611 P.2d 943 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
Jensen v. Maricopa County 522 P.2d 1096 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
Jensen v. Maricopa County 522 P.2d 1096 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
City of Phoenix v. Kenly 519 P.2d 1159 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
City of Phoenix v. Kenly 519 P.2d 1159 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
237 P. 168 (1925); Vegodsky v. City of Tucson, 1 Ariz.App.
Arizona State Highway Department v. Bechtold 460 P.2d 179 Ariz. 1969
Arizona State Highway Department v. Bechtold 460 P.2d 179 Ariz. 1969
State v. Watson, 7 Ariz.App.
City of Tucson v. Wondergem 435 P.2d 77 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1967
City of Tucson v. Wondergem 435 P.2d 77 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1967
We believe the test to be, , : “(1) A municipality vested with power to improve and control its streets and sidewalks is liable for injuries sustained because of a failure to keep them reasonably safe for travel.
City of Phoenix v. Camfield 400 P.2d 115 Ariz. 1965
City of Phoenix v. Camfield 400 P.2d 115 Ariz. 1965
“(2) No hard and fast rule can be laid down in such cases as to the character or extent of the defect in the street or sidewalk necessary to form the basis for actionable negligence, but each case must stand upon its own particular facts.” -264 , .
Vegodsky v. City of Tucson 399 P.2d 723 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
Vegodsky v. City of Tucson 399 P.2d 723 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
Sherman v. Arno 383 P.2d 741 Ariz. 1963
Sherman v. Arno 383 P.2d 741 Ariz. 1963
Throop v. FE Young and Company 382 P.2d 560 Ariz. 1963
Throop v. FE Young and Company 382 P.2d 560 Ariz. 1963
strumentality, whether a human being or thing, which the actor knows or should know to be so incompetent, inappropriate, or defective, that its use involves an unreasonable risk of harm to others.” From the proposition “it is well settled that a party is charged with knowledge of those things which he could have found and should have found upon a reasonable inspection” ( , ), plaintiff contends that reasonable men might conclude that the F. E. Young and Company should have required, a physical .
City of Phoenix v. Williams 361 P.2d 651 Ariz. 1961
City of Phoenix v. Williams 361 P.2d 651 Ariz. 1961
Dist., , ; , ; , P.2d 535.
City of Phoenix v. Brown 352 P.2d 754 Ariz. 1960
City of Phoenix v. Brown 352 P.2d 754 Ariz. 1960
for such a length of time that the City or its officers or agents in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence should have discovered a dangerous and unsafe condition therein and remedied it, then notice to the City is implied and the defense of lack of notice has not been sustained by the City.” , , and therein approved by this Court.
Matsumato v. Arizona Sand and Rock Company 295 P.2d 850 Ariz. 1956
Matsumato v. Arizona Sand and Rock Company 295 P.2d 850 Ariz. 1956
229 , 55 N.W.2d 29 ; , .
Taylor v. Roosevelt Irr. Dist. 232 P.2d 107 Ariz. 1951
Taylor v. Roosevelt Irr. Dist. 232 P.2d 107 Ariz. 1951
Such has been the "law" (court made) both before the constitutional amendment under consideration, Schultz v. City of Phoenix, 1916, , 156 P. 75 ; Dillow v. City of Yuma, 1940, , ; and since the constitutional amendment — City of Phoenix v. Weedon, 1950, , .