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The statute provides that the “additional charge” is that charge “made to cover the tax.” If “additional charge” referred only to any amount that exceeds the TPT owed, as the Randalls maintain, the charge would not be “made to cover the [TPT]” because the TPT would have already been “covered.” See State Tax Comm’n v. Quebedeaux Chevrolet, , (quoting with approval case recognizing that *146 “additional charge” refers to the entire amount collected from customers).

State Tax Comm’n v. Quebe-deaux Chevrolet

Carter v. Carter Coal Co. Since it is a fundamental principle of statutory con *68 struction that a statute should be considered as a whole, , Sorenson v. Six Companies, Inc., , clearly § 34-324(A) was intended to be read as a whole.

3, 1976); Tower Plaza Investments

had held before the enactment of the above statute that the transaction privilege tax, when separately stated and collected, was includible in gross income for purposes of computing the transaction privilege tax.

With this characterization of the luxury tax as being a tax on the privilege of doing business in luxuries, and the incidence of the tax not being on the luxury itself, the Commission logically argues that this case is controlled by the 1951

Collier v. O’Neil, , ; Reichenberger v. Salt River, etc. District, , , , we quoted with approval from Yellowstone Pipe Line Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 138 Mont.

“In conclusion we hold: (1) that the Act does not impose a tax upon the purchaser nor upon sales, but rather places a tax upon the seller for the privilege of engaging in business and fixes the gross *82 income from sales as the base for computing the tax * *

is section and in fact of the entire Excise Revenue Act that the tax imposed is a tax on the privilege or right to engage in business and is not a sales tax: , ; , , on rehearing , ; , ; , , 171 A.L.R.