Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 226 P.2d 147.
- Samaritan Health Services v. Industrial Commission 823 P.2d 1295 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
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Samaritan Health Services v. Industrial Commission
823 P.2d 1295
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
The supreme court specifically overruled McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, , (injury resulting from an accident does not arise out of employment unless employee is subjected to some special risk or danger on the employer’s premises) and expressly disapproved of City of Phoenix v. Industrial Comm’n, , and Inman v. Industrial Comm
- Nowlin v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF ARIZONA 806 P.2d 880 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
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Nowlin v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF ARIZONA
806 P.2d 880
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
Respondents argue that Arizona has clearly adopted the increased risk doctrine, citing McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, P.2d 147 (1950), and Sacks v. Industrial Commission, 13 Ariz.App.
- P.B. Bell & Associates v. Industrial Commission 690 P.2d 802 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
- Hansen v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 685 P.2d 1342 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
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Hansen v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona
685 P.2d 1342
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1984
See McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, -49, -50 (1950) (refused to adopt the “premises” exception to the “going-and-coming” limitation, overruled in Pauley, supra.)
- Driscoll v. Harmon 601 P.2d 1051 Ariz. 1979
- Peetz v. Industrial Commission 604 P.2d 263 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1979
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Peetz v. Industrial Commission
604 P.2d 263
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1979
McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks
- Knoop v. Industrial Commission 589 P.2d 1325 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
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Knoop v. Industrial Commission
589 P.2d 1325
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
Further the Pauley Court acknowledged that McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, , had refused to recognize an exception to the “going and coming” rule for going and coming accidents which occur on the employer’s premises.
- Stoddard v. Industrial Commission 532 P.2d 177 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
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Stoddard v. Industrial Commission
532 P.2d 177
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
Application of Barrett, , McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, , .
- Hunley v. Industrial Commission 531 P.2d 552 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
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Hunley v. Industrial Commission
531 P.2d 552
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
quoting, McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks
- Pottinger v. Industrial Commission 527 P.2d 1232 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
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Pottinger v. Industrial Commission
527 P.2d 1232
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
The difficulty of analogizing or qualifying the paucity of decisions in this precise area is compounded by the fact that Sacks relied heavily on certain legal principles set forth in McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks
- Pauley v. Industrial Commission 508 P.2d 1160 Ariz. 1973
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Pauley v. Industrial Commission
508 P.2d 1160
Ariz. 1973
Petitioner, however, urges that the case should not be controlled by the going and coming rule but rather by what has generally become known as the “on premise rule.” The on premise rule is a limitation on the going and coming rule which, although accepted nearly everywhere in the United States, has been rejected in Arizona commencing with McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks
- Scottsdale Jaycees v. SUPERIOR CT. OF MARICOPA CO. 499 P.2d 185 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
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Scottsdale Jaycees v. SUPERIOR CT. OF MARICOPA CO.
499 P.2d 185
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks No. 536, , Sendejaz v. Industrial Commission, 4 Ariz.App.
- Peterson v. Industrial Commission 490 P.2d 870 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1971
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Peterson v. Industrial Commission
490 P.2d 870
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1971
As noted in McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, , the difficulty lies in applying the above principles of law with the facts especially where the accident is not due to a risk inherent in the nature of the employment but is merely incidental thereto.
- Royall v. Industrial Commission 476 P.2d 156 Ariz. 1970
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Royall v. Industrial Commission
476 P.2d 156
Ariz. 1970
In that case we quoted at length from McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, , which defines the above terms as follows: “An injury or accident occurs in the course of his employment if the employee is injured while he is doing what a man so employed may reasonably do within a time during which he is employed and at a place where he may reasonably be during that time.
- Sacks v. Industrial Commission 474 P.2d 442 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
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Sacks v. Industrial Commission
474 P.2d 442
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
quoting from McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, etc., , see also Whitington v. Industrial Commission, 1
- Boone v. Industrial Commission 472 P.2d 490 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
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Boone v. Industrial Commission
472 P.2d 490
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
e work of his employer is to be carried on, and similarly, when he has finished all the work required by his duties and leaves the place of business of his employer to go to his own home, he has left the employment, and that an accident which may occur to him on his way to or from his work is not in the due course of his employment.” ; -153 (1950).
- Peters v. Industrial Commission 473 P.2d 480 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
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Peters v. Industrial Commission
473 P.2d 480
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
These elements have been defined by the Supreme Court in McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks No. 536, , and reiterated in City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission of Ari *557 zona, , and that definition will not be reiterated here.
- Whitington v. Industrial Commission 468 P.2d 926 Ariz. 1970
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Whitington v. Industrial Commission
468 P.2d 926
Ariz. 1970
we held that there was no workmen’s compensation coverage for a man who fell on his employer’s premises at the entrance to the building in which he was about to start his work.
- Royall v. Industrial Commission 468 P.2d 596 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
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Royall v. Industrial Commission
468 P.2d 596
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
In McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, , our Supreme Court rejected the “on premises” rule as an exception to the “coming and going” rule.
- Inman v. Industrial Commission 450 P.2d 122 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
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Inman v. Industrial Commission
450 P.2d 122
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
The Industrial Commission cites the cases of McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of the Elks, , Sendejaz v. Industrial Commission, 4 Ariz.App.
- City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission 449 P.2d 291 Ariz. 1969
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City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission
449 P.2d 291
Ariz. 1969
We have defined these elements in McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, No. 536, , .
- Rencehausen v. Western Greyhound Lines 444 P.2d 741 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
- City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission 444 P.2d 750 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
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Rencehausen v. Western Greyhound Lines
444 P.2d 741
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, No. 536
- City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission 444 P.2d 750 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
- McKay v. Industrial Commission 433 P.2d 32 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
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McKay v. Industrial Commission
433 P.2d 32
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks
- Sendejaz v. Industrial Commission 420 P.2d 32 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
- Sendejaz v. Industrial Commission 420 P.2d 32 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
- Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Industrial Commission 354 P.2d 28 Ariz. 1960
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Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Industrial Commission
354 P.2d 28
Ariz. 1960
dustrial Commission, 325 , , this Court said that “in the course of employment” refers to the “time, place, and circumstances under which it [the accident] occurred; i. e. coincident with the employment”; whereas the term “arising out of” employment refers to "the origin or cause of the injury.” See also McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, -249 , , where it was recognized that the conditions of both' terms must be satisfied before an award may be sustained.