Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite Brooks v. State, 636 P.2d 1200.
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Shubhrananda v. Earle
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
¶17 The Guinn ruling was premised on the narrow exception to the “final judgment rule” P.2d 1200 (1981), which treats a premature notice of appeal as timely if it is filed when there are no further substantive decisions to be made by the fact- finder, even though a final order has not been issued.
- Bank of America v. Allen Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
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Kemp v. Kemp
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
at 481, ¶ 19, 296 P.3d at 1017 (-22, -04 (1981) and stating “if the ruling preceding the notice of appeal is a final decision .
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Camasura v. Camasura
358 P.3d 600
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
(referencing Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a) and State Bar Committee Notes to the 1961 Amendment to the Rule).
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Mark S. v. Dcs
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
(premature appeal from minute entry where appellee is not prejudiced and a subsequent final judgment is entered need not be dismissed).
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Phoenix v. Cortes
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
(holding a premature appeal taken from an unsigned minute entry order ruling on post-trial motion need not be dismissed where “no appellee was prejudiced and .
- Daurio v. Daurio Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
- Lopez v. Food City 322 P.3d 166 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
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Stout v. Taylor
311 P.3d 1088
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
Nonetheless, , in which our supreme court held that “a premature appeal from a minute entry order in which no appellee was prejudiced and in which a subsequent final judgment was entered over which jurisdiction may be exercised need not be dismissed.” -81, ¶¶ 13-19 , 296 P.3
- Reeck v. Mendoza 304 P.3d 1122 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
- Baker v. Bradley 296 P.3d 1011 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2013
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Fields v. Oates
286 P.3d 160
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
Smith v. Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n., ¶ 37 , ( , ).
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Ghadimi v. Soraya
285 P.3d 969
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
(referencing Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a) and respective State Bar Committee Notes in the 1961 Amendment to the Rule).
- Atreus Communities Group v. Stardust Development, Inc. 277 P.3d 208 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
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Santee v. Mesa Airlines, Inc. America West Airlines, Inc.
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
P.2d 1200 (1981), our supreme court announced a limited exception to the final judgment rule that allowed premature notices of appeal to be considered “‘after the trial court has made its final decision, but before it has entered a formal judgment, if no decision of the court could change and the only remaining task is merel
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State of Arizona v. Ramon Limon
270 P.3d 849
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
6 but merely note it was filed before the trial court’s order dismissing the action.
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Craig v. Craig
253 P.3d 624
Ariz. 2011
as Craig ________________________________________________________________ H U R W I T Z, Vice Chief Justice ¶1 We stated thirty years ago that appellate courts should “dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the case where a litigant attempts to appeal where a motion is still pending in the trial court.”
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Short v. Dewald
244 P.3d 92
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
*92 -22 , -04 (1981) (premature appeal need not be dismissed when court subsequently enters final judgment).
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Craig v. Craig
240 P.3d 1270
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
419-22, , 1201-04 (1981).
- AKSAMIT v. Krahn 227 P.3d 475 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
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Riendeau v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
225 P.3d 597
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
117— 18, -39 (App.1997) (-22 , -04 (1981)).
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Tripati v. FORWITH
219 P.3d 291
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
¶ 11 , (noting premature notice of appeal should not be dismissed when “only ministerial tasks remained to accomplish the entry of a final judgment”).
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Engel v. Landman
212 P.3d 842
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Father’s Premature Appeal ¶ 11 -20 , -02 (1981), the supreme court held that a notice of appeal filed after the denial of a motion for new trial but before the entry of final judgment was sufficient to secure appellate jurisdiction.
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Dowling v. Stapley
211 P.3d 1235
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
See ARCAP 9(b) (“[e]ntry of an order occurs when a signed written order is filed with the clerk of the superior court.”); , 92 n. 3, ¶ 6, , 610 n. 3 (2006); , Eaton Fruit Co. v. Cal.
- Vasquez v. State 206 P.3d 753 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
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Klebba v. Carpenter
139 P.3d 609
Ariz. 2006
See Barassi v. Matison, 130 Ariz. 418, 420-21, -03 (1981).
- Smith v. Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Commission 132 P.3d 1187 Ariz. 2006
- Henry v. Flagstaff Medical Center, Inc. 132 P.3d 304 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
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State v. Jackson
113 P.3d 112
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
("[A] premature appeal from a minute entry order in which no appellee was prejudiced and in which a subsequent final judgment was entered over which jurisdiction may be exercised need not be dismissed.").
- Primary Consultants, L.L.C. v. Maricopa County Recorder 111 P.3d 435 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
- Arizona State Democratic Party v. State 98 P.3d 214 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
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Schwab v. Ames Const.
83 P.3d 56
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Comeau v. Ariz. State Bd.
- Mezey v. Fioramonti 65 P.3d 980 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
- Nielson v. Patterson 65 P.3d 911 Ariz. 2003
- Decola v. Freyer 6 P.3d 333 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
- Performance Funding, LLC v. Barcon Corp. 3 P.3d 1206 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
- Comeau v. Arizona State Board of Dental Examiners 993 P.2d 1066 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
- State v. Counterman 992 P.2d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
- Joe P. Guinn & State Farm v. Schweitzer 945 P.2d 837 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
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Hill v. Maricopa County
950 P.2d 1179
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
See Barassi v. Matison, *560 , (holding a notice of appeal from a minute entry followed by a subsequent final judgment conferred jurisdiction on the appellate court); , (holding a notice of appeal from a minute entry order dismissing fewer than all claims was sufficient to perfect an appeal
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Mayer v. State
908 P.2d 56
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
Though the Arizona rule is worded differently to permit premature appeals, , both rules refer to the same deadline for filing at issue here.
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Baumann v. Tuton
884 P.2d 256
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
For support, , : “It should be noted that the Arizona appellate courts will dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the case where a litigant attempts to appeal where a motion is still pending in the trial court or where there is no final judgment.” 130 Ariz. at 422 , 636 P.2d at 1204 .
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Matter of Estate of Craig
848 P.2d 313
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
[2] , (premature notice of appeal did not preclude appellate jurisdiction; purpose behind time requirements is still served even when notice is filed too early).
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St. Joseph's Hospital & Medical Center v. Hansgen
848 P.2d 313
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
(premature notice of appeal did not preclude appellate jurisdiction; purpose behind time requirements is still served even when notice is filed too early).
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Devenir Associates v. City of Phoenix
821 P.2d 161
Ariz. 1991
tered in an action or special proceeding commenced in a superior court, or brought into a superior court from any other court____ We require an appeal be taken from a final judgment to “avoid the constant disruption of the trial process, to prevent appellate courts from considering issues that may be addressed later in trial, and to promote efficiency____”
- Bauer v. Crotty 805 P.2d 392 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
- State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Peaton 812 P.2d 1002 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
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People of Faith, Inc. v. Arizona Department of Revenue
791 P.2d 369
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
: The underlying rationale of requiring a final judgment for appealability is to avoid the constant disruption of the trial process, to prevent appellate courts from considering issues that may be addressed later in trial, and to promote efficiency, that is, encourage the consolidation in one appeal of all error
- Hyman v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc. 724 P.2d 63 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1986
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Tempe Life Care Village, Inc. v. City of Tempe
714 P.2d 434
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
that under the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure which were enacted in 1977 a premature appeal is not jurisdiction-ally defective.