Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite City of Tucson v. Apache Motors, 245 P.2d 255.

38 citing documents.

Chandler v. Roosevelt Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
Chandler v. Roosevelt Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
¶ 39 & n.12 (1998) (acknowledging Henshaw but “refus[ing] to address questions of the application of the statute of limitations on a separate tort or continuous tort theory”); (statute of limitation for temporary or continuing nuisance accrues on date of successive injury); –33 (1942) (continuing trespass by cattle).
Eisen v. Coonfer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
Eisen v. Coonfer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
Las Ventanas v. Adeq Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
Las Ventanas v. Adeq Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
at 425 ¶¶ 17-18 ( Garcia, 58 Ariz. at 533; and 6 ).
Aguiniga v. Aguiniga Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
Aguiniga v. Aguiniga Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
-08 (1952) (“The rule is that the judge or jury, being the sole judges of the facts and the credibility of witnesses, may or may not believe an interested party.”).
Maricopa v. Rovey Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
Maricopa v. Rovey Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
“In order for a nuisance to be permanent, it is usually necessary that the nuisance be created by the inherent character of a structure or business and that its lawful and necessary operation creates a permanent injury.” (emphasis added) (quoting Shelley v. Ozark Pipe Line Corp., 37 S.W.2d 518, 519 (Mo.
Watkins v. Arpaio 367 P.3d 72 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Watkins v. Arpaio 367 P.3d 72 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
See, -06 , (discussing nuisance claim as a continuing wrong); , (continuing trespass); cf. Mayer Unified Sch.
Van Baalen v. Jones Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Van Baalen v. Jones Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
¶22 our Supreme Court held the measure of damages in a permanent nuisance case “is the difference between the market value of the premises immediately before and its market value immediately after the completion of the structure creating the nuisance.” Plaintiff’s statement as to a possible
Walsh v. Advanced Cardiac Specialists Chartered 258 P.3d 172 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Walsh v. Advanced Cardiac Specialists Chartered 258 P.3d 172 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
“The rule is that the judge or jury, being the sole judges of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses, may or may not believe an interested party.” -08
A Tumbling-T Ranches v. Flood Control District 217 P.3d 1220 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
A Tumbling-T Ranches v. Flood Control District 217 P.3d 1220 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
ffs property and flooding of an “inevitably recurring character”); , (recognizing that just compensation be paid by a city, “regardless of the establishment of a road grade line, where the easement of ingress or egress of a property owner is substantially impaired ”) (emphasis added); , (distinguishing Clausen and finding threat of flooding in a nuisance action was a temporary injury); Bodin v. Stanwood, 79 Wash.App.
Gaveck v. Arizona State Board of Podiatry Examiners 215 P.3d 1114 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Gaveck v. Arizona State Board of Podiatry Examiners 215 P.3d 1114 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
See Estate of Reinen v. N. Ariz. Orthopedics, Ltd., ¶ 12 , (“The court or jury is not compelled to believe the uncontradieted evidence of an interested party.” ( , )); Nystrom v. Mass. Cas.
Kocher v. Department of Revenue 80 P.3d 287 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Kocher v. Department of Revenue 80 P.3d 287 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Estate of Reinen v. Northern Arizona Orthopedics, Ltd. 9 P.3d 314 Ariz. 2000
Estate of Reinen v. Northern Arizona Orthopedics, Ltd. 9 P.3d 314 Ariz. 2000
Myers v. Wood 850 P.2d 672 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1992
Myers v. Wood 850 P.2d 672 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1992
(recurrent water damage from defectively designed water removal system); , (subsequent claim for damages not precluded by earlier claim arising from same tortious conduct); Bruce v. Froeb, 15 Ariz.App.
Graber v. City of Peoria 753 P.2d 1209 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1988
Graber v. City of Peoria 753 P.2d 1209 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1988
See Spur Industries, , , , 296 P. 262 (1931).
Wolk v. Nichols 572 P.2d 1190 Ariz. 1977
Wolk v. Nichols 572 P.2d 1190 Ariz. 1977
466, 467 , 160 P. 482, 483 (1916)
State ex rel. State Community College Board v. Sergent, Hauskins & Beckwith, Inc. 556 P.2d 23 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
State ex rel. State Community College Board v. Sergent, Hauskins & Beckwith, Inc. 556 P.2d 23 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1976
Arkebauer v. Falcon Zinc Co., 178 Ark.
City of Tucson v. Wondergem 435 P.2d 77 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1967
City of Tucson v. Wondergem 435 P.2d 77 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1967
City of Tucson v. O’Rielly Motor Co.
Graham v. Vegetable Oil Products Company 401 P.2d 242 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
Graham v. Vegetable Oil Products Company 401 P.2d 242 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
Clint v. Northern Assur.
City of Tucson v. Koerber 313 P.2d 411 Ariz. 1957
City of Tucson v. Koerber 313 P.2d 411 Ariz. 1957
It has been suggested by counsel for the City and by amicus curiae, in effect, , , and City of Tucson v. O’Rielly Motor Co., , , because the rule announced in the O’Rielly case was based on an incomplete presentation of the facts, which re-examination the majority has done up to a point.