Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Scott v. Scott, 252 P.2d 571.

42 citing documents.

Robin Roebuck v. Mayo Clinic Ariz. 2025
Robin Roebuck v. Mayo Clinic Ariz. 2025
¶ 23 (App. 2017); DeElena, 121 Ariz. at 566 (explaining that gross negligence “involves the creation of an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to another (simple negligence) together with a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result (wantonness)”
Reyes v. State Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
Reyes v. State Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
It is flagrant and evinces a lawless and destructive spirit.”
Lockerby v. Pima County Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Lockerby v. Pima County Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Here, Lockerby has not alleged facts sufficient to find a “high probability” of an “unreasonable risk” of “substantial harm.” In addition, a claim for gross negligence requires allegations that a defendant’s conduct was “flagrant and evince[d] a lawless and destructive spirit.” ().
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission v. Brewer 275 P.3d 1267 Ariz. 2012
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission v. Brewer 275 P.3d 1267 Ariz. 2012
App. 1990); cf. In re Zawada, 208 Ariz. at 234 ¶ 4, 237 ¶¶ 15, 17, 239 ¶ 25, 92 P.3d at 864, 867, 869 (finding a prosecutor’s appeals to the jury’s fear; disrespect for, prejudice against, and harassment of expert witnesses; and improper arguments were knowing, deliberate, and “clearly gross misconduct”); (gross or wanton negligence “is highly potent, .
Badia v. City of Casa Grande 988 P.2d 134 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
Badia v. City of Casa Grande 988 P.2d 134 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
To establish gross negligence, the claimant essentially must show wanton misconduct that “is flagrant and evinces a lawless and destructive spirit.”
Walls v. Arizona Department of Public Safety 826 P.2d 1217 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
Walls v. Arizona Department of Public Safety 826 P.2d 1217 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1991
as follows: Wanton negligence is highly potent, and when it is present it fairly proclaims itself in no uncertain terms.
Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. 730 P.2d 178 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. 730 P.2d 178 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
it is argued that by the failure of appellants to object to the instruction on negligence, any error as to the propriety of the denial of the motion for directed verdict is waived.
Grant v. Arizona Public Service Co. 652 P.2d 548 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
Grant v. Arizona Public Service Co. 652 P.2d 548 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
Cullison v. City of Peoria 584 P.2d 1156 Ariz. 1978
Cullison v. City of Peoria 584 P.2d 1156 Ariz. 1978
Palmer v. Smith, 147 Wis.
Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Lueck 523 P.2d 1327 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1974
Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Lueck 523 P.2d 1327 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1974
Justice LaPrade said: “Wanton negligence is highly potent, and when it is present it fairly proclaims itself in no uncertain terms.
Harris v. Murch 503 P.2d 821 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
Followed Harris v. Murch 503 P.2d 821 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
Our Supreme Court has stated that the sanctity of a jury verdict increases after it has been approved by the trial court: “After the trial judge has given the verdict his approval by denying a new trial, we must accept the verdict as a final and conclusive finding of the facts, if there is any substantial evidence to support it, and it will not be disturbed on appeal.”
Talbot v. Schroeder 475 P.2d 520 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
Talbot v. Schroeder 475 P.2d 520 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
Kemp v. Pinal County 474 P.2d 840 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
Kemp v. Pinal County 474 P.2d 840 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
our Supreme Court said: “Wanton negligence is highly potent, and when it is present it fairly proclaims itself in no uncertain terms.
Moore v. Maricopa County 466 P.2d 56 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Moore v. Maricopa County 466 P.2d 56 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
209 P. 280 (1922) ; Prosser, Torts, Sec.
Heaton v. Waters 445 P.2d 458 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
Heaton v. Waters 445 P.2d 458 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
a place other than a regular crossing, is a question for the jury.” Similarly, it is stated, in the same authority, § 411, at 957, that “Whether a pedestrian is guilty of contributory negligence in crossing a highway or street is generally a question of fact for jury determination.” The Arizona cases are generally in accord:
Wells v. Tanner Brothers Contracting Company 439 P.2d 489 Ariz. 1968
Wells v. Tanner Brothers Contracting Company 439 P.2d 489 Ariz. 1968
Newman v. Piazza 433 P.2d 47 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1967
Newman v. Piazza 433 P.2d 47 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1967
our Supreme Court said: “Wanton negligence is highly potent, and when it is present it fairly proclaims itself in no uncertain terms.
Coyner Crop Dusters v. Marsh 367 P.2d 208 Ariz. 1962
Coyner Crop Dusters v. Marsh 367 P.2d 208 Ariz. 1962
Busy Bee Buffet, Inc. v. Ferrell 310 P.2d 817 Ariz. 1957
Busy Bee Buffet, Inc. v. Ferrell 310 P.2d 817 Ariz. 1957
Bryan v. Southern Pacific Company 286 P.2d 761 Ariz. 1955
Bryan v. Southern Pacific Company 286 P.2d 761 Ariz. 1955
Conchin v. El Paso & S. W. R. Co., , 108 P. 260 , 28 L.R.A.,N.S., 88.
Southern Pac. Co. v. Baca 268 P.2d 963 Ariz. 1954
Southern Pac. Co. v. Baca 268 P.2d 963 Ariz. 1954
that it is error for a court to instruct on a theory where there is no evidence to support it.