Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Pioneer Constructors v. Symes, 267 P.2d 740.

41 citing documents.

Commerce v. Zinke Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
Commerce v. Zinke Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
¶13 It is impossible to determine how the jury arrived at its verdict, “but, under the evidence presented in this case, the sum obviously can be justified.”
Lee v. State 242 P.3d 175 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Lee v. State 242 P.3d 175 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
[2] See also Phelps v. Firebird Raceway, Inc., ¶ 11 , (relying on Article 18, Section 5, of the Arizona Constitution to conclude that a jury must decide if the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk precludes a plaintiff from recovering damages); -13 , (holding that, in an action on a note, the trial court's refusal to direct a verdict in favor of the plaintiff at the close of the defendants' evidence was proper, as there were issues for the jury regarding what constituted consideration f
Schweiger v. China Doll Restaurant, Inc. 673 P.2d 927 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
Schweiger v. China Doll Restaurant, Inc. 673 P.2d 927 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
Gainok v. Featherson 641 P.2d 909 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
Gainok v. Featherson 641 P.2d 909 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1982
I Wigmore, Evidence, § 13 (3rd ed. 1940).
Grant v. Arizona Public Service Co. 652 P.2d 548 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
Grant v. Arizona Public Service Co. 652 P.2d 548 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
and if error is not raised below, it cannot be raised on appeal.
Pinnacle Peak Developers v. TRW Investment Corp. 631 P.2d 540 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
Pinnacle Peak Developers v. TRW Investment Corp. 631 P.2d 540 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
defendants successfully counterclaimed for fraud.
Cedic Development Corp. v. Sibole 541 P.2d 1169 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
Cedic Development Corp. v. Sibole 541 P.2d 1169 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
he rules established by the courts to govern the admission of evidence, the same as they may waive the rule established by the legislature, that certain contracts must be in writing; and a waiver may be inferred from the failure of the party, for whose benefit the rule was made, to object in due season, or in some way to insist upon compliance with the law.” Accord, P.2d 740 (1954).
Atkinson v. Valley National Bank 526 P.2d 1252 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
Atkinson v. Valley National Bank 526 P.2d 1252 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
orm any wrongful invasion of any security interest that any citizen might have under the possession of the bank and appellee would be entitled to attorney’s fees for defending their tortious conduct.”
American Honda Motor Co. v. Smith 518 P.2d 131 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
American Honda Motor Co. v. Smith 518 P.2d 131 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
Appellants may not stand on one ground of objection in the trial court and urge another on the appellate level, , Sulphur Springs Valley Elec.
Corbin-Dykes Electric Company v. Burr 500 P.2d 632 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
Corbin-Dykes Electric Company v. Burr 500 P.2d 632 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
State v. Martin 410 P.2d 132 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
State v. Martin 410 P.2d 132 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
41 A.L.R.2d 668 (1955), our Supreme Court further stated that if the question is not raised below it cannot be raised on appeal.
Elson Development Co. v. Arizona Savings & Loan Ass'n 407 P.2d 930 Ariz. 1965
Elson Development Co. v. Arizona Savings & Loan Ass'n 407 P.2d 930 Ariz. 1965
41 A.L.R.2d 668 ; , , reversed on other grounds, 292 U.S. 53 , 54 S.Ct.
First National Bank of Arizona v. Otis Elevator Co. 406 P.2d 430 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
First National Bank of Arizona v. Otis Elevator Co. 406 P.2d 430 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
City of Phoenix v. Boggs 403 P.2d 305 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
City of Phoenix v. Boggs 403 P.2d 305 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
Dowdle v. Young 401 P.2d 740 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
Dowdle v. Young 401 P.2d 740 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
“Parol evidence is always admissible to show fraud, even though it has the effect of varying the terms of a writing between the parties.” Lufty v. R. D. Roper & Sons Motor Co. (1941), , ; Pioneer Constructors v. Symes (1954), , , 41 A.L.R.2d 668 ; Lusk Corporation v. Burgess (1958), , ; Bohmfalk v. Vaughan (1960), , .
Smith v. Rabb 386 P.2d 649 Ariz. 1963
Smith v. Rabb 386 P.2d 649 Ariz. 1963
Bohmfalk v. Vaughan 357 P.2d 617 Ariz. 1960
Bohmfalk v. Vaughan 357 P.2d 617 Ariz. 1960
dence Rule, it is sufficient to say that it is settled law that “ * * * whereas evidence of prior or contemporaneous oral agreements and negotiations is inadmissible, to vary the terms of a written contract, nev *41 ertheless parol evidence is admissible to show fraud in the inducement of said contract.” , ; , , 41 A.L.R.2d 668 .
State v. Romero 336 P.2d 366 Ariz. 1959
State v. Romero 336 P.2d 366 Ariz. 1959
Goodman v. Carson 325 P.2d 819 Ariz. 1958
Mayo v. Ephrom 325 P.2d 814 Ariz. 1958
Mayo v. Ephrom 325 P.2d 814 Ariz. 1958
This is a , , 41 A.L.R.2d 668 , is controlling.
Gilliland v. Rodriquez 268 P.2d 334 Ariz. 1954
Gilliland v. Rodriquez 268 P.2d 334 Ariz. 1954
that if the plaintiff sues on a note and the defendant counterclaims, the plaintiff could recover no attorney fees in the event defendant recovered on his counterclaim an amount in excess of the amount due on the note.