Cited by

See Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Action Marine, Inc., ¶ 10 (2008) (noting that this Court “avoid[s] interpretations that render statutory provisions meaningless, unnecessary, or duplicative”); (explaining when interpreting a provision, “each word, phrase, clause[,] and sentence must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant[,] or trivial”).

See, (addressing legislative amendments to the Financial Code of 1922), (noting that “a later valid act of the legislature supersedes all previous acts with which it is in conflict, whether it expressly repeals the earlier provisions or not”); (discussing subsequent acts of legislature); Webb v. Dix

¶ 9 (2007) (“Under the Arizona Constitution, the legislature possesses those powers ‘not expressly prohibited or granted to another branch of government.’” ()); (observing that the legislature exercises the state’s police power).

avoid interpretations that render statutory provisions meaningless, unnecessary, or duplicative.” (internal citation omitted)); 9 VANGILDER, ET AL. V. PINAL COUNTY, (explaining when interpreting a provision, “each word, phrase, clause and sentence must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant or trivial”).

(courts avoid construing statutes to produce untenable result); -74 (1952) (same as to constitutional provisions).

–76 (1942) (to the same effect)

–76 (1942) (citations and quotations omitted), overruled in part on other grounds

gaging or continuing in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail?” While Vangilder’s interpretation is not entirely untenable, it renders the phrase “including at a rate” meaningless, in contravention to the general rule of construction that “each word, phrase, clause and sentence must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant or trivial.” (citing City of Phx.

(noting we construe statutes so as to avoid rendering portions of them superfluous); , (interpreting a statute to give each word, phrase and clause meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant, or trivial).

¶ 7; –85, –28 (1952) (interpreting former Article 4, Section 1(6) of the Arizona Constitution).

Ariz. Sec'y of State 1998 Publicity Pamphlet at 47 (Statement of Legislative Council), available at http://www.azsos.gov/election/1998/Info/Pub Pamphlet/prop105.pdf

11 (article II, § 8 “was adopted for the purpose of preserving the rights which the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution was intended to protect”), P.2d 617 (1952).

The Statute Is Substantive ¶ 13 The Arizona Constitution gives the legislature those powers “not expressly prohibited or granted to another branch of the government.”

B. ¶9 Under the Arizona Constitution, the legislature possesses those powers “not expressly prohibited or granted to another branch of the government.” Adams v. Bolin, 74 Ariz. 269, 283

C. ¶ 9 In construing statutes we “give full effect to the intent of the lawmaker, and each word, phrase, clause and sentence must be given meaning so that no part will be void, inert, redundant or trivial.” , ( , ).

-52 , 143 P. 117, 118-19 (1914).

( , ); see also Pinetop-Lakeside Sanitary Dist.

¶9 Nonetheless, we interpret statutes, rules and charter provisions according to their plain language, giving “full effect to the intent of the lawmaker.” Adams v. Bolin, 74 Ariz. 269, 276

See Bolt, 142 Ariz. at 264 , 689 P.2d at 523 (recognizing need for uniformity between federal and state courts and that our constitution generally incorporates federal protections); State v. Pelosi , overruled in part on other grounds, , (Article 2, Section 8’s purpose is to preserve Fourth Amendment rights); , 246 P. 548, 549 (1926) (although its language may differ from Fourth Amendment, Article 2, Section 8 has “same general effect and purpose” and will be similarly interpreted).

1, § 1 (“The legislative authority of the State shall be vested in the Legislature ...”)

Hurley’s reading of the 1988 amendments accordingly runs afoul of a basic principle of statutory interpretation: words, phrases, clauses, and sentences in statutes are presumed to perform a function and not to be merely “void, inert, redundant or trivial.” , ¶ 35 , (stating that in construing statutes, an appellate court must read the language as a whole and give meaningful operation to each provision).

“Nothing is more firmly settled than under ordinary circumstances, where there is involved no ambiguity or absurdity, a statutory or constitutional provision requires no interpretation.” , see also Pinetop-Lakeside Sanitary Dist.