Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Cruz-Mata, 674 P.2d 1368.

84 citing documents.

State v. Thomas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
State v. Thomas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
State v. Thompson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
State v. Thompson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
¶13 Miranda custody occurs when there is a “’formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” –74 (1983) (citation omitted).
State v. Cutrone Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
State v. Cutrone Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
State v. Headrick Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
State v. Headrick Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
State v. Yug 501 P.3d 246 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
State v. Yug 501 P.3d 246 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
§ 13-712(B) to permit presentence incarceration credit solely for time spent in “actual incarceration in a prison or jail.” -37 (1992); (recognizing that A.R.S.
State v. Jimenez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Jimenez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
See Maciel, 240 Ariz. at 50, ¶ 17 (“[C]oercion is often lacking when a person is questioned in familiar surroundings.”); (noting that questioning occurring in a “coercive environment” does not, without more, require Miranda warnings).
Abelardo Chaparro v. David C Shinn 459 P.3d 50 Ariz. 2020
Abelardo Chaparro v. David C Shinn 459 P.3d 50 Ariz. 2020
See State v. Cruz- 4 376 (1983) (finding before 1994 that a “life sentence without possibility of parole for 25 years” meant that the “minimum term of imprisonment is 25 years [minus credit for pre-sentence custody] before he is eligible for parole”).
State v. Reed Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Reed Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Runnels Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State v. Runnels Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
See State v. Cruz–Mata, (crediting defendant with appropriate amount of credit without remanding for resentencing).
State v. Price Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Price Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Sanders Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Sanders Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
(purpose of presentence incarceration credit is to reduce the number of days served in prison by an inmate by the number of days the inmate spent in presentence custody); (sentencing court may not give double credit for presentence time served when conse
State v. Schaeffer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Schaeffer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
State v. Griego Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Griego Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
When a trial court imposes concurrent terms of imprisonment, the defendant is entitled to presentence incarceration credit on each count, and the failure to give full credit constitutes fundamental error, ¶ 10 (App. 2005) ().
State v. Foster Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
State v. Foster Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
(finding defendant was not in custody during ninety-minute interview).
State v. Strait Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State v. Strait Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
State of Arizona v. Carlos Andres MacIel 375 P.3d 938 Ariz. 2016
State of Arizona v. Carlos Andres MacIel 375 P.3d 938 Ariz. 2016
After an evidentiary hearing, and denied the motion, reasoning that when Maciel was sitting on the curb he was not in custody for Miranda purposes.
State v. MacIel 358 P.3d 621 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. MacIel 358 P.3d 621 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
While the circumstances of each ease will determine whether a suspect is in custody for the purpose of triggering Miranda warnings, being “in custody” is an objective condition with “the ultimate inquiry [being] simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” -73 , -71 (1983) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 , 103 S.Ct.
State v. Sanchez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Sanchez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
Courts look at the objective circumstances of an interrogation rather than a defendant’s subjective believe as to whether he is in custody, and will consider three factors in determining whether an individual is in custody: “(1) the site of the questioning; (2) whether objective indicia of arrest are present; and (3) the length and form of the interrogation.”
State v. Martinez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State v. Martinez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
State of Arizona v. David J. Waller 333 P.3d 806 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
State of Arizona v. David J. Waller 333 P.3d 806 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
(objective indicia of arrest included whether officers had handcuffed defendant or drawn a weapon); (Miranda warnings not required where “none of the usual indicia of arrest— no handcuffs, no locked doors, no drawn guns
State v. Zamora 202 P.3d 528 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
State v. Zamora 202 P.3d 528 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994)
State v. Brooks 953 P.2d 547 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
State v. Brooks 953 P.2d 547 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
State v. Everidge 932 P.2d 802 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
State v. Everidge 932 P.2d 802 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
State v. Pennington 868 P.2d 976 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
State v. Pennington 868 P.2d 976 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
he will not receive additional presentence incarceration credit for both concurrent sentences because the sentences are to be served at the same time.
State v. Chavez 834 P.2d 825 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
State v. Chavez 834 P.2d 825 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
(“A.R.S.”) § 13-709(B) (1989)