Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Nicholson v. Industrial Commission, 259 P.2d 547.

72 citing documents.

Bergstresser v. Industrial Commission 474 P.2d 450 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Bergstresser v. Industrial Commission 474 P.2d 450 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
But it should be borne in mind that “[a] liberal construction is not synonymous with a generous interpretation.”
Inman v. Industrial Commission 450 P.2d 122 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
Inman v. Industrial Commission 450 P.2d 122 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission 449 P.2d 291 Ariz. 1969
City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission 449 P.2d 291 Ariz. 1969
This was also *124 , , not a “coming and going” case, but one which the petitioner cites as approving the “on premises” exception.
Davis v. Industrial Commission 406 P.2d 866 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
Davis v. Industrial Commission 406 P.2d 866 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
y v. Industrial Commission, supra: “The Workmen’s Compensation Act is remedial, and its terms should be liberally construed in order to effectively carry out the purpose for which it was intended, that being to place the burden of injury and death from industrial causes upon industry as a whole
Jones v. Industrial Commission 401 P.2d 172 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
Jones v. Industrial Commission 401 P.2d 172 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
The Arizona Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Workmen’s Compensation Act is remedial and its terms should be liberally construed in order to effectively carry out the purposes for which it was intended, , ; , and this also applies to interpreting the “Rules of Procedure Before the Industrial Commission of Arizona”, published under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
Reilly v. Industrial Commission 398 P.2d 920 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
Reilly v. Industrial Commission 398 P.2d 920 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
is remedial, and its terms should be liberally construed in order to effectively carry out the purpose for which it was intended, that being to place the burden of injury and death from industrial causes upon industry as a whole
Blattner v. Loyal Order of Moose 117 N.W.2d 570 Minn. 1962
Dunlap v. Industrial Commission 363 P.2d 600 Ariz. 1961
Dunlap v. Industrial Commission 363 P.2d 600 Ariz. 1961
Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Industrial Commission 354 P.2d 28 Ariz. 1960
Peter Kiewit Sons' Co. v. Industrial Commission 354 P.2d 28 Ariz. 1960
110 , , 550: “Generally injuries incurred by the employee while leaving the premises *169 collecting pay or getting his clothes or tools, within a reasonable time after termination of the employment, or within the course of the employment, are normally incidents of the employment relation.
Posey v. Industrial Commission 350 P.2d 659 Ariz. 1960
Estate of Barrett v. Barrett 278 P.2d 409 Ariz. 1954
Estate of Barrett v. Barrett 278 P.2d 409 Ariz. 1954
This court has often defined, delineated and differentiated “arising out of,” and “in the course of,” — see, e. g., , ; , ; McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, supra, — and no useful purpose would be served by repeating what already has been said.
Faidley v. Industrial Commission 259 P.2d 551 Ariz. 1953
Faidley v. Industrial Commission 259 P.2d 551 Ariz. 1953
Mr. Faidley was an employee of Christensen Construction Company, Inc., referred to in the companion case of Nicholson v. Industrial 'Commission of Arizona, , , and killed in the same accident wherein Nicholson lost his life.