Cited by

(encouraging trial courts to state factors on the record along with reasons for accepting or rejecting them).

¶17 Johnson contends the testimony by Officer S.W.

As our supreme court has observed, “[w]hen items are lost or destroyed a defendant is unable to determine whether they would have been helpful in his defense,” and the Willits instruction is designed “to overcom[e] this problem and ensur[e] a fair trial.” State v. Leslie, 147 Ariz. 38, 46-47, -28 (1985).

P.3d 630 (App. 2000); see State v. L eslie, P.2d 719 (1985) (trial court does not err in refusing instructions that d o not correc tly state the law).

Again, , in which this court attempted to provide more precise guidance on this issue.

McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. at 102 , 664 P.2d at 646 .

In support of his argument, , where this court stated: In short, if we cannot determine from the record whether the trial court considered all the relevant mitigating factors, the federal constitution compels us to remand the case for further explanation.

in stating, “if [this court] cannot determine from the record whether the trial court considered all the relevant mitigating factors, the federal constitution compels us to remand the case for further explanation.” He argues that, because the trial court failed to list or discuss any of

that the better practice is for the trial court to place on the record a list of all factors offered in mitigation and then explain the court’s reasons for accepting or rejecting them, so that it is clear to the reviewing court that the trial court has considered all mitigating circumstances pri

207 , 98 L.Ed.2d 158 (1987); , -47 , -76 , cert.

Although the preferred practice is for a sentencing judge to list all factors considered in mitigation, , we have never required a sentencing judge to make detailed, exhaustive findings or cite every claim or nuance advanced by defendant or his counsel in argument.