Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite Adams v. Bolin, 271 P.2d 472.
- Arizona Republican Party v. Richer Ariz. 2024
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Arizona Republican Party v. Richer
Ariz. 2024
–23 (1954), the court observed that “a writ of mandamus cannot issue to public officials who have no legal discretion concerning the matter at issue.” But, as noted, § 16-602 can be interpreted as limiting the hand count audit to precincts, thus arguably prohibiting election officials from using voting centers for
- Arizona Republican Party v. Richer Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
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Arizona Republican Party v. Richer
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
¶42 Third, the court found that ARP failed to address the principle that “a writ of mandamus cannot issue to public officials who have no legal discretion concerning the matter at issue.” –23 (1954).
- Patrick McKenna v. Javier Soto 481 P.3d 695 Ariz. 2021
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Patrick McKenna v. Javier Soto
481 P.3d 695
Ariz. 2021
tially comply with the statutory requirements; strict compliance is not necessary “[a]bsent a clear statement that the legislature intended a particular form requirement to be indispensable.” ¶ 10 (2008); accord Adams v. 3 MCKENNA V. SOTO, et al. Opinion of the Court Bolin
- Judith K Lohr v. Shawnna Bolick 471 P.3d 639 Ariz. 2020
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Judith K Lohr v. Shawnna Bolick
471 P.3d 639
Ariz. 2020
Providing an address in the district in which Bolick lives and seeks to represent also fulfills the purpose of the statutory address requirement which is to ensure that a candidate “reside[s] in the county, district or precinct that the person proposes to represent.” § 16-311(A); (explaining the general purpose of statutory nomination requirements is to ensure only bona-fide, eligible candidates are placed on the ballot).
- Arizonans for Second Chances v. Hobbs Ariz. 2020
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Arizonans for Second Chances v. Hobbs
Ariz. 2020
§ 19-122(A) (stating that a party may bring a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary to “accept and file” initiative petitions); (addressing whether to grant mandamus to compel the Secretary to accept a candidate’s nomination petition based on the Secretary’s legal obligation to do so); see also Ariz. R.P.
- Kost v. Aroc Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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Kost v. Aroc
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
- 23, (finding mandamus unavailable to require a state officer to accept and hold prematurely submitted nomination papers in an election case).
- Bee v. Day 189 P.3d 1078 Ariz. 2008
- Bee v. Day 189 P.3d 1078 Ariz. 2008
- Jenkins v. Hale 190 P.3d 175 Ariz. 2008
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Jenkins v. Hale
190 P.3d 175
Ariz. 2008
Adams v. Bolin, 77 Ariz. 316, 320, (observing that it is “the intent and purpose of the law, not the letter, that must control”).
- Lubin v. Thomas 144 P.3d 510 Ariz. 2006
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Lubin v. Thomas
144 P.3d 510
Ariz. 2006
See Adams v. Bolin, 77 Ariz. 316, 320, (stating that the purpose of requiring nomination petitions is to “make the requirements stringent enough to discourage those [candidates] who do not for an instant merit the voter's consideration, yet not keep out those w
- Moreno v. Jones 139 P.3d 612 Ariz. 2006
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Moreno v. Jones
139 P.3d 612
Ariz. 2006
(putting the phrases “hereinafter designated” and “the precinct designated or indicated by my address” in the blank provided to indicate the relevant precinct was legally sufficient to identify elector’s precinct).
- Carl Seel v. Tim Sifert Ariz. 2004
- Carl Seel v. Tim Sifert Ariz. 2004
- Clifton v. Decillis 927 P.2d 772 Ariz. 1996
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Clifton v. Decillis
927 P.2d 772
Ariz. 1996
The nominating petitions were designed to “in some measure [weed] out the cranks, the publicity seekers, the frivolous candidates who have no intention of going through with the campaign.”
- Campbell v. Arnold 590 P.2d 909 Ariz. 1979
- Cohen v. State 588 P.2d 299 Ariz. 1978
- Cohen v. State 588 P.2d 299 Ariz. 1978
- Marsh v. Haws 526 P.2d 161 Ariz. 1974
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Marsh v. Haws
526 P.2d 161
Ariz. 1974
As to defendant Gray, , we agree with the determination made by the trial judge that his petitions are in substantial compliance with the provisions of A.R.S.
- Continental Casualty Company v. Grabe Brick Co. 401 P.2d 168 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
- Continental Casualty Company v. Grabe Brick Co. 401 P.2d 168 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
- Employment Security Commission of Arizona v. Fish 375 P.2d 20 Ariz. 1962
- Employment Security Commission of Arizona v. Fish 375 P.2d 20 Ariz. 1962
- Sines v. Holden 360 P.2d 218 Ariz. 1961
- Sines v. Holden 360 P.2d 218 Ariz. 1961
- Smoker v. Bolin 333 P.2d 977 Ariz. 1958
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Smoker v. Bolin
333 P.2d 977
Ariz. 1958
This court has said that mandamus will lie only to compel the performance of an act, Hertz Drive-Ur-Self System, Inc., v. Tucson Airport Auth., , ; , ; State Board of Technical *173 , , and that the purpose of mandamus is to require public officers to perform their official duties when they refuse to act, Territory ex rel.
- Harless v. Lockwood 332 P.2d 887 Ariz. 1958
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Harless v. Lockwood
332 P.2d 887
Ariz. 1958
we pointed out that “It is fundamental that statutes are not interpreted piecemeal.” , 108 P. 482 , 485: “ ‘In the construction of a statute, it is the intent and purpose of the law, not the letter, that must control, a
- State Board of Technical Registration v. Bauer 326 P.2d 358 Ariz. 1958
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State Board of Technical Registration v. Bauer
326 P.2d 358
Ariz. 1958
§ 12-2021; , ; Adams v. Bolin, *240 , .
- Hertz Drive-Ur-Self System, Inc. v. Tucson Airport Authority 299 P.2d 1071 Ariz. 1956
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Hertz Drive-Ur-Self System, Inc. v. Tucson Airport Authority
299 P.2d 1071
Ariz. 1956
We conclude that since the writ of mandamus is issued only to compel performance of an act which the law especially enjoins as a duty, concerning which a public officer has no discretion, , , , , and.
- State Ex Rel. Morrison v. Thomas 297 P.2d 624 Ariz. 1956