Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite Marsin v. Udall, 279 P.2d 721.
- Contreras v. Bourke Ariz. 2025
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Contreras v. Bourke
Ariz. 2025
: Of course, one may with knowledge of the facts, consent that his case be tried before a judge he thinks is biased and prejudiced.
- Nancy Bourke v. Roger H. Contreras 556 P.3d 291 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2024
- Nancy Bourke v. Roger H. Contreras 556 P.3d 291 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2024
- State v. Hon. mahoney/ragsdale Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
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State v. Hon. mahoney/ragsdale
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
(when legislature creates substantive right, court may not diminish that right by procedural rule); ("Any rule of court that operates to lessen or eliminate the right is of no legal force.").
- State v. Mahoney in and for County of Maricopa 442 P.3d 374 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
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State v. Mahoney in and for County of Maricopa
442 P.3d 374
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
See Daou v. Harris , , 358, , 939 (1984) (when legislature creates substantive right, court may not diminish that right by procedural rule); Marsin v. Udall , , 312, , 723 (1955) ("Any rule of court that operates to lessen or eliminate the right is of no legal force.").
- Claudia Patricia Higuera v. State of Arizona 383 P.3d 1150 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
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Claudia Patricia Higuera v. State of Arizona
383 P.3d 1150
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
We concluded this statute “imposes no time limitation,” and that under a 1955 decision, “it is too late to disqualify” a judge if he or she “is allowed to receive evidence which of necessity is to be used and weighed in deciding the ultimate issues.” Itasca State Bank, 8 Ariz. App. at 281, 445 P.2d at 557, P.2d 721 (1955).
- John Munic Enterprises, Inc. v. Laos 326 P.3d 279 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
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John Munic Enterprises, Inc. v. Laos
326 P.3d 279
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
(errors not raised in trial court cannot be asserted on appeal); (untimely to move to disqualify judge when judgment already rendered on pleadings).
- State of Arizona v. Della Lisa Vermuele Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
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State of Arizona v. Della Lisa Vermuele
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
(“[B]efore one can be said to have waived [a] right, he must have had an opportunity to exercise it.”).
- City of Phoenix v. Johnson 204 P.3d 447 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
- City of Phoenix v. Johnson 204 P.3d 447 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
- State v. Hansen 160 P.3d 166 Ariz. 2007
- State v. Hansen 160 P.3d 166 Ariz. 2007
- State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Gordon 144 P.3d 513 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
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State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Gordon
144 P.3d 513
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
State v. Neil, 102 Ariz. at 112 , 425 P.2d at 844
- Denise S., Carlos C. v. State of Arizona 142 P.3d 245 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
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Denise S., Carlos C. v. State of Arizona
142 P.3d 245
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
P.2d 721 (1955), and Newsom v. 8 Superior Court, P.2d 422 (1967).
- Medders v. Conlogue 90 P.3d 1241 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
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Medders v. Conlogue
90 P.3d 1241
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
“A waiver is a voluntary relinquishing of a known right.”
- JV-132324 v. Superior Court 890 P.2d 632 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
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JV-132324 v. Superior Court
890 P.2d 632
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
(timeliness rule is subject to law of waiver, and one cannot waive right to change judge absent an opportunity to exercise it); , (whether a notice of change of commissioner is timely filed depends on the law of waiver)
- Morga v. Superior Court 741 P.2d 1233 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
- Guarrascio v. Fisher 741 P.2d 319 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1987
- Morga v. Superior Court 741 P.2d 1233 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1987
- Guarrascio v. Fisher 741 P.2d 319 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1987
- Rhodes v. Fisher 681 P.2d 928 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
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Rhodes v. Fisher
681 P.2d 928
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1984
The State Bar Committee Note with respect to subsection (D) dealing with waiver points out that the above-quoted portion of the rule expressly includes affidavits as well as other types of evidence concerning the merits of the action and that the remainder of the rule is consistent with existing case law
- Fendler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. 636 P.2d 1257 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
- Fendler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. 636 P.2d 1257 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
- Gant v. Helm 545 P.2d 431 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1976
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Gant v. Helm
545 P.2d 431
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1976
The State Bar Committee Note with respect to subsection (D) dealing with waiver points out that the above-quoted portion of the rule expressly includes affidavits as well as other types of evidence concerning the merits of the action and that the remainder of the rule is consistent with existing case law
- Del Castillo v. Wells 523 P.2d 92 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
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Del Castillo v. Wells
523 P.2d 92
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
315 , 725 (1955), judicially delineated when an affidavit would be considered untimely as follows: “As we analyze the previous pronouncements of this court, it had been ruled that when evidence is taken, the right to challenge the judge on grounds of bias and prejudice is waived, if the eviden
- In Re the Appeal in Pima County Anonymous, Juvenile Action No. J 24818-2 515 P.2d 600 Ariz. 1973
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In Re the Appeal in Pima County Anonymous, Juvenile Action No. J 24818-2
515 P.2d 600
Ariz. 1973
is a valuable substantive right originating in the common law and recognized by statute in both criminal and civil cases.”
- Chalpin v. Mobile Gardens, Inc. 501 P.2d 407 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
- Chalpin v. Mobile Gardens, Inc. 501 P.2d 407 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
- Hofstra v. Mahoney 499 P.2d 735 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
- Hofstra v. Mahoney 499 P.2d 735 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
- State v. Foggy 486 P.2d 789 Ariz. 1971
- State v. Foggy 486 P.2d 789 Ariz. 1971
- State v. Hughes 475 P.2d 511 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
- State v. Hughes 475 P.2d 511 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
- County Attorney v. Superior Court 464 P.2d 666 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
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County Attorney v. Superior Court
464 P.2d 666
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Criminal Rule 200 states: “When an application is made to a judge for a change of judge, he shall proceed no further in the action except to call another judge to preside therein.” In our opinion, , is directly in point.