Cited by

(holding that a defendant is not prejudiced if he has “timely notice” of the prosecutor’s intent before trial).

P. 13.5(a) (authorizing the State to amend indictments to allege prior convictions within Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.1's time limits); (explaining prior convictions "may not be alleged after the verdict is returned").

P. 13.5(a) and 16.1(b), and “may not be alleged after the verdict is returned.” ¶ 14 (App. 2001) (“[F]undamental fairness and due process require that allegations that would enhance a sentence be made before trial so that the defendant can evaluate his options.”).

P. 13.5(a) and 16.1(b), and “may not be alleged after the verdict is returned,” see also State v. Benak, 199 Ariz. 1 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the court’s ruling.

See Freeney, 223 Ariz. at 114, ¶ 27 (finding defendant received sufficient notice from State’s pretrial disclosures, including a joint pretrial statement); (finding no prejudice by statutory non-compliance when the defendant had actual notice of the State’s intent to use prior convictions to seek an enhanced sentence).

State v. (Johnny) Williams, see Manson, 432 U.S. at 99, 106 (considering reliability of an identification where a single photograph lineup was “suggestive and unnecessary”).

§ 13-703(N)] provided he is on notice before trial that the prosecution intends to seek the enhanced punishment provisions of the statute.” (defendant not prejudiced by post-verdict amendment substituting one prior felony conviction for a previously alleged prior conviction); (superior court properly denied post-verdict amendment alleging defendant was on parole on a different case from a diff

¶9 In support of its contention that Smith is not entitled to have his sentences vacated because of the error, in which the superior court erroneously allowed the State to amend the indictment's allegations of prior convictions after the verdict but before sentencing.

Generally, however, one-man show- up procedures are inherently suggestive, and the lineup procedure used by law enforcement in this case does not appear to have been suggestive; accordingly, we find no error, much less fundamental, prejudicial error in law enforcement’s use of the six-photo lineup employed here.

Mother simply speculates that the evaluation “could have provided a professional opinion as to whether the child would now be safe with [M]other.” (decisions regarding continuances will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion and ensuing prejudice).

See Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200; Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); (reciting the Biggers factors as those to “be examined in determining reliability” of a suggestive identification); ¶ 132 (2016) (same); (requiring an identification instruction upon request when court has found pretrial

¶29 Regardless of the waiver, however, although a one-person show-up is inherently suggestive, the show-up identification procedures “are not improper if conducted near the time of the crime or at the scene of the crime and the evidence shows that the identification was reliable,”

See, (well-established that “‘[t]he admission of testimony concerning a suggestive and unnecessary identification procedure does not violate due process so long as [it] possesses sufficient aspects of reliability’”), quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106 (1977); see also Perry, ___ U

thfulness and “must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is a defendant, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to that defendant.” Such a felony-grade conviction is material to credibility because “[t]he perpetrator of a major criminal act has demonstrated such a lack of scruples as to show a willingness to give false testimony.” (citation omitted).

Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (“The practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, has been widely condemned.”), overruled on other grounds by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987); State v. Cañez, (“Single person identifications are inherently suggestive.”); (concluding “one-man show-ups are inherently suggestive”); -68, -71 (1982) (“[S]uggestiveness is inherent in a one-man show-up .

(holding that a suggestive identification is admissible when the circumstances surrounding the identification show the identification to be reliable).

Watkins, 133 Ariz. at 2-3 , 648 P.2d at 117-18 .