Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Carrillo v. Taylor, 299 P.2d 188.

42 citing documents.

GARDEN LAKES COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC. v. Madigan 62 P.3d 983 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
GARDEN LAKES COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC. v. Madigan 62 P.3d 983 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
P. 39(n) (“The answers shall be only-advisory to the court.”)
Fridena v. Evans 622 P.2d 463 Ariz. 1980
Fridena v. Evans 622 P.2d 463 Ariz. 1980
Jabczenski v. Southern Pacific Memorial Hospitals, Inc. 579 P.2d 53 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
Jabczenski v. Southern Pacific Memorial Hospitals, Inc. 579 P.2d 53 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 38(3).
Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty, Inc. 572 P.2d 1195 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1977
Ness v. Greater Arizona Realty, Inc. 572 P.2d 1195 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1977
Nemec v. Rollo 562 P.2d 1087 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1977
Nemec v. Rollo 562 P.2d 1087 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1977
Standage Ventures, Inc. v. State 551 P.2d 74 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1976
Standage Ventures, Inc. v. State 551 P.2d 74 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1976
Richards Development Company v. Sligh, supra
Cedic Development Corp. v. Sibole 541 P.2d 1169 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
Cedic Development Corp. v. Sibole 541 P.2d 1169 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
Apparently relying on the rule that the parol evidence rule is a rule of substantive law rather than a rule of evidence, , appellant implies that it was not necessary for an objection to have been made at the trial level in order for the issue to be raised on appeal.
Limberopoulos v. Tom Fannin and Associates 495 P.2d 475 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
Limberopoulos v. Tom Fannin and Associates 495 P.2d 475 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
: “[17-21] It is fundamental that the parol evidence rule is a doctrine of substantive law and not merely an exclusionary rule of evidence.
Merrick v. United States Rubber Co. 440 P.2d 314 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
Merrick v. United States Rubber Co. 440 P.2d 314 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
wherein the Arizona Supreme Court stated ( 81 Ariz. at 26 , 299 P.2d at 196 ): “It is fundamental that the parol evidence rule is a doctrine of substantive law and not merely an exclusionary rule of evidence.” '
City of Glendale v. Skok 432 P.2d 597 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
City of Glendale v. Skok 432 P.2d 597 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
Atkinson v. Atkinson 405 P.2d 919 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
Atkinson v. Atkinson 405 P.2d 919 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
Olivas v. Board of National Missions of Presbyterian Church 405 P.2d 481 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
Olivas v. Board of National Missions of Presbyterian Church 405 P.2d 481 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
Kostolansky v. Lesher 387 P.2d 804 Ariz. 1963
Kostolansky v. Lesher 387 P.2d 804 Ariz. 1963
Doss v. Kalas 383 P.2d 169 Ariz. 1963
Doss v. Kalas 383 P.2d 169 Ariz. 1963
Merryweather v. Pendleton 367 P.2d 251 Ariz. 1962
Followed Merryweather v. Pendleton 367 P.2d 251 Ariz. 1962
* * ” , that: “ * * * where a verdict is advisory, the finding made by the trial court, and not the answers given by the jury to interrogatories determines the judgment, and that it is the judgment of the trial court and not the answers of the jury which must be assumed to be correct.” See also
Richards Development Company v. Sligh 358 P.2d 329 Ariz. 1961
Richards Development Company v. Sligh 358 P.2d 329 Ariz. 1961
Bohmfalk v. Vaughan 357 P.2d 617 Ariz. 1960
Bohmfalk v. Vaughan 357 P.2d 617 Ariz. 1960
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 39 (Z); , ; , .
McNeil v. Attaway 348 P.2d 301 Ariz. 1960
McNeil v. Attaway 348 P.2d 301 Ariz. 1960
Smith v. Connor 347 P.2d 568 Ariz. 1959
Smith v. Connor 347 P.2d 568 Ariz. 1959
and see Lawton v. Strong, 6 Cir., 249 F.2d 299 ; Box v. Box, 146 Neb.
National Public Service Insurance Co. v. Welch 302 P.2d 926 Ariz. 1956
National Public Service Insurance Co. v. Welch 302 P.2d 926 Ariz. 1956
A motion for new trial, or, in the alternative, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, was filed (this latter nomenclature is erroneous; , ).
Diamond v. Chiate 300 P.2d 583 Ariz. 1956
Diamond v. Chiate 300 P.2d 583 Ariz. 1956
We have recently said, , , 196: “It is fundamental that the parol evidence rule is a doctrine of substantive law and not merely an exclusionary rule of evidence.