Cited by

and render a fair and impartial verdict.’” ().

See § 13-203(A); (explaining it was proper for the trial court “to give a ‘but for’ test for causation with a proximate cause instruction”; the trial court acted properly “in defining both standards to the jury”); see also Torres, 252 Ariz. at 31 ¶ 12 (noting that “[p]roximat

See Payne, 233 Ariz. at 501, ¶¶ 40-41 (holding that the defendant’s statement that he did not “wanna talk anymore” followed by a request to call family “and then I’ll talk” did not unequivocally invoke the right to silence); (finding that the statement “I’ve got nothing to say” did not invoke the right to remain silent where “a fair reading” indicated it was “no more than a response” to an officer’s questions).

See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614-15 (2015) (holding a seven minute delay caused by a dog sniff after traffic stop was completed required reasonable suspicion); (noting an arresting officer need not “personally be in possession of all the facts” to form probable cause, as long as collective knowledge exists).

Thus, after Deputy Watson saw Lincourt’s suspected traffic violation and stopped her, the deputy’s subsequent confirmation of her identity, combined with his knowledge that she was the target of a drug investigation, (applying the collective knowledge doctrine), and his observation of her numerous nervous behaviors, which suggested that criminal activity might be afoot, established the necessary reasonable suspicion to conduct the dog sniff.

See State v. Lawson , , 553, (arresting officer need not "personally be in possession of all the facts" so long as collective knowledge of all officers sufficient); State v. Keener , , ¶ 14, ; see also United States v. Sutton , 794 F.2d 1415 , 1426-27 (9th Cir. 1986) (suspicion just

Moreover, nothing in the record shows the joint trial rendered the jury unable to “‘keep separate the evidence that is relevant to each defendant and render a fair and impartial verdict’ as to each.” () (noting mere introduction of evidence concerning only one defendant is generally insufficient to establish prejudicial rub-off).

In criminal cases, “both ‘but for’ causation and proximate cause must be established.” ().

“[W]hether probable cause exists depends on all of the facts and circumstances known at the time of the arrest,” including “the collective knowledge of all of the officers involved in the case.” Id.; (explaining it is “not essential that the arresting officer personally be in possession of all the facts as long as probable cause exists from the collective knowledge of all the law enforcement agents involved”).

(internal citations and punctuation omitted).

Severance on such a basis is rare and is required only if the jury is unable to “keep separate the evidence that is relevant to each defendant and render a fair and impartial verdict as to him.” ().

involvement in the conspiracy at the time most of the statements by Tucker, Diaz, and Cuttler were made.” ¶42 “Rub-off” occurs when “‘the jury’s unfavorable impression of the defendant against whom the evidence is properly admitted influence[s] the way the jurors view the other defendant.’” (alteration in Van Winkle).

-55, -74 (1985) (finding that statement, “I’ve got nothing to say,” made in response to the question – “You got anything to say to that?” - could fairly be read as a refusal to talk about that specific question and not a general invocation of the right to remain silent).

¶¶ 17-18, -52 , -71 (1985).

Therefore, Van Winkle argues, the trial court should have severed the trials to avoid “rub-off’ or “spill-over,” which occurs when “the jury’s unfavorable impression of the defendant against whom the evidence is properly admitted influenced the way the jurors view the other defendant.”

at 1621-22 ; (2) evidence admitted against one defendant has a harmful “rub-off effect” on the other defendant, -56 , -75 (1985); (3) there is a significant disparity in the amount of evidence introduced against each of the two defendants, see Lawson, 144 Ariz. at 556 , 698 P.2d at 1275 ; or (4) co-defendants present defenses that are so antagonistic that they are mutually exclusive, see State v. Kinkade