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Opinions in Arizona that cite Jones v. Industrial Commission, 306 P.2d 277.

38 citing documents.

Castillo v. Industrial Commission 538 P.2d 402 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
Castillo v. Industrial Commission 538 P.2d 402 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
In 1957, , which we believe to be dispositive of this cause: “The commission is not allowed to substitute its judgment on matters lying exclusively within the field of medical science.” 81 Ariz. at 358 , 306 P.2d at 281 .
Figueroa v. Industrial Commission 529 P.2d 1188 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
Figueroa v. Industrial Commission 529 P.2d 1188 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1974
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Industrial Commission 514 P.2d 758 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Industrial Commission 514 P.2d 758 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
Garcia v. Industrial Commission 511 P.2d 687 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
Garcia v. Industrial Commission 511 P.2d 687 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
In this case the causal relationship between the disability and the alleged incident or incidents of work is a matter necessarily within the knowledge of medical experts and not,- as petitioner argues, a causation clearly apparent to any layman, cf. Paulley v. Industrial Commission, 91 * P.2d 888 (1962); , , , , Hurley v. Industrial Commission, 20 Ariz.App.
Hurley v. Industrial Commission 511 P.2d 671 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
Hurley v. Industrial Commission 511 P.2d 671 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
Theoharidi v. Industrial Commission, 8 Ariz.App.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Industrial Commission 488 P.2d 490 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1971
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Industrial Commission 488 P.2d 490 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1971
Rutledge v. Industrial Commission 451 P.2d 894 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
Rutledge v. Industrial Commission 451 P.2d 894 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
It is obvious that no hard and fast rule can be laid down that governs all situations, , and the fact that in most compensable “heart attack cases” there is usually testimony concerning “job-related unusual or extraordinary physical or emotional stresses and strain” does not mean that absent these factors there is a lack of legal as well as medical causation between the employment a
Theoharidi v. Industrial Commission 446 P.2d 470 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
Theoharidi v. Industrial Commission 446 P.2d 470 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
This rule was later modified
Carson v. Industrial Commission 439 P.2d 535 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
Neece v. Industrial Commission 439 P.2d 539 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
Neece v. Industrial Commission 439 P.2d 539 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
In Jones v. Industrial Commission, supra, since the fact to be found (cause of death) was such that could be established ■only by medical evidence and that was definitely that the labor was a contributing cause, we ruled in effect that the commission without other evidence could not draw a contrary inference.” , at page 356, , at page 279 .(1957), the Supreme Court stated: “It is obvious from a study of these five decisions, of which three claims were allowed, that no hard and fast rule can be l
Carson v. Industrial Commission 439 P.2d 535 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
However, * * * there must be a recognizable causal connection between an employee’s employment and the accidental injury.”
Kinsman v. Industrial Commission 435 P.2d 52 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
Kinsman v. Industrial Commission 435 P.2d 52 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
Rabago v. Industrial Commission 429 P.2d 14 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
Rabago v. Industrial Commission 429 P.2d 14 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
Sandoval v. Industrial Commission 415 P.2d 463 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
Sandoval v. Industrial Commission 415 P.2d 463 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
As stated in Jones v. Industrial Commission (1957) , , the Commission is not allowed to substitute its judgment on matters lying exclusively within the field of medical science.
Thiel v. Industrial Commission 404 P.2d 711 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
Thiel v. Industrial Commission 404 P.2d 711 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
Paulley v. Industrial Commission 371 P.2d 888 Ariz. 1962
Paulley v. Industrial Commission 371 P.2d 888 Ariz. 1962
(affirmed award for back injury incurred while doing routine lifting) ; , (set aside award denying death benefits to widow of construction worker who died of heat stroke); , (set aside award denying death benefits where coronary occlusion of highway worker resulted from ordinary exertion on the job); , (set aside award of noncompensable claim to construction worker who suffered from pneumonia brought on
Fendell v. Industrial Commission of Arizona 359 P.2d 988 Ariz. 1961
Fendell v. Industrial Commission of Arizona 359 P.2d 988 Ariz. 1961
Revles v. Industrial Commission of Arizona 352 P.2d 759 Ariz. 1960
Revles v. Industrial Commission of Arizona 352 P.2d 759 Ariz. 1960
As we said in Jones *75 v. Industrial Commission, , : “ * * * We submit that the question of the causal relationship between the accident and death was necessarily within the singular knowledge of medical experts; in such case their findings are conclusive upon the commission.
Hudgens v. Industrial Commission 321 P.2d 1039 Ariz. 1958
Hudgens v. Industrial Commission 321 P.2d 1039 Ariz. 1958
Gronowski v. Industrial Commission of Arizona 306 P.2d 285 Ariz. 1957
Gronowski v. Industrial Commission of Arizona 306 P.2d 285 Ariz. 1957
mpensation when the evidence was susceptible of interpretation that the labors were not a contributing factor, , ; and that we would not sustain the commission in denying compensation when the only medical evidence was definitely to the effect that the exercise of decedent’s labors contributed to his death, , .

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