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k 5 STATE v. MALERBA Decision of the Court to apply sanctions that affect the evidence at trial and the merits of the case as little as possible, since the Rules of Criminal Procedure are designed to implement, and not to impede, the fair and speedy determination of cases” (–37 (1986))).

.”); (“When such doubts exist, a hearing should be held to allow the defendant to raise the relevant issues, to resolve the matter, and to make a record for review.” (citation omitted)), ¶ 10 (2016).

A prosecutor’s statement that “naturally and necessarily” draws the jury’s attention to a defendant’s failure to allocute is improper if it (1) “supports an unfavorable inference against the defendant,” and (2) operates “as a penalty for [a] defendant’s exercise of his constitutional right.” see also § 13-117(B).

erroneous,” cannot shrink “the power of the court to entertain [the] action” and cannot be challenged on appeal); -40 (1986) (criminal verdict not void even though received by recused judge in violation of prior version of Rule 10.2, Ariz. R. Crim.

Pandeli, 242 Ariz. at 180 ¶ 4; ¶ 9 (2016)

We will not find prejudice, however, where the judge performed “merely a ministerial duty” and the conduct did not rise to the level of “judicial participation.”

(holding that a defendant is entitled to a hearing when he presents a colorable ineffective assistance claim); see also Ariz. R. Crim.

Taking a prosecutor’s comment in context, such comment is considered improper if a jury would naturally and necessarily perceive it to be a comment on the failure of the defendant to testify at trial, and this includes questions in which the defendant is the only person who could explain or contradict the evidence

See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965)

¶74 In reviewing a PCR petition, we defer to “the sound discretion” of the PCR court and we will not reverse “unless an abuse of discretion affirmatively appears.”

“To determine whether a particular argument is improper, the statements must be examined in context to determine whether the jury would naturally and necessarily perceive them to be a comment on the failure of the defendant to testify.” ¶ 62 (1998) (considering the “cumulative effect” of prosecutor’s statements).

¶4 “A petition for post-conviction relief is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,” and this court reviews “a trial court’s factual findings for clear error.” –48 (App. 1995) ( ).

“In Arizona, a prosecutor is prohibited both by constitution and by statute from bringing to the jury’s attention either directly or indirectly the fact a defendant did not testify.” (citing Ariz. Const., art. 2, § 10; A.R.S.

-39 (1986) (characterizing the argument that a defendant’s statement was a lie as “a proper attack on defendant’s statement”).

The evidence regarding the previous burglary was not relevant, (holding court did not abuse its discretion in precluding cross-examination on an irrelevant issue), and in light of the other evidence admitted at trial, Quiroz was not denied “the opportunity of presenting to the trier of fact information which bears either on the issues in the case or on the credibility

-39 (1986) (characterizing argument that a defendant's 3 STATE v. WEBER Decision of the Court statement was a lie as "a proper attack on defendant's statement").

3 STATE v. NELSON Decision of the Court (1986), ¶ 10 (2016).