Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Cocio, 709 P.2d 1336.

90 citing documents.

  • State v. Pry 562 P.3d 885 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • State v. Pry 562 P.3d 885 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
    Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798); Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 532- 33 (2013); (“[T]he Arizona Legislature may not enact a law which imposes any additional or increased penalty for a crime after its commission.”).
  • State v. Axton Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • State v. Axton Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    “The determination of whether to excuse a juror for cause is within the sound discretion of the trial court and should not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse.” –80 (1985), ¶ 11 (2017).
  • Soza v. Marner 430 P.3d 1265 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
  • Soza v. Marner 430 P.3d 1265 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
    ¶ 8 Subsequently, in State v. Cocio , , and State v. Brita , , approved in part, vacated in part on other grounds, , our courts limited the admissibility of blood-draw evidence taken under the implied consent statutes.
  • Diaz v. Van Wie 426 P.3d 1214 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • Diaz v. Van Wie 426 P.3d 1214 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    286, , 1345 (1985) (citing Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct.
  • State v. Don Jacob Havatone 389 P.3d 1251 Ariz. 2017
  • State v. Don Jacob Havatone 389 P.3d 1251 Ariz. 2017
    we held that a formal arrest was not necessary for police to obtain a blood sample from a DUI suspect drawn by medical personnel for treatment purposes.
  • State v. Peltz 391 P.3d 1215 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
  • State v. Peltz 391 P.3d 1215 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
    In State v, Codo, , our supreme court concluded that exigent circumstances existed, for purposes of the medical blood draw exception to the warrant requirement, given that ”[t]he highly evanescent nature of alcohol in the defendant’s blood stream guaranteed that the alcohol would dissipate over a relati
  • State v. Patrick McLeod Nissley 387 P.3d 1256 Ariz. 2017
  • State v. Patrick McLeod Nissley 387 P.3d 1256 Ariz. 2017
  • State of Arizona v. Daniel Alberto Reyes 364 P.3d 1134 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
  • State of Arizona v. Daniel Alberto Reyes 364 P.3d 1134 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
    -84, -45 (1985), our supreme court considered whether the predecessor statute to § 28-1388 violated the constitution.
  • State v. Nissley 362 P.3d 493 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • State v. Nissley 362 P.3d 493 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    The Arizona Supreme Court has restricted the “for any reason” language "to mean that the blood must be drawn by medical personnel for any medical reason.” , (construing statutory predecessor).
  • State v. Hersum Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • State v. Hersum Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
    § 28-1388(E) (allowing law enforcement officer with probable cause to take portion of blood sample collected by another); -84, -45 (1985) (noting U.S. Supreme Court has held “a blood sample may be taken without a search warrant if it is taken in a medically approved manner and based on probable cause to believe the person is intoxicated”).
  • Carrillo v. Houser 232 P.3d 1245 Ariz. 2010
  • Carrillo v. Houser 232 P.3d 1245 Ariz. 2010
    § 28- 1388(E) (2004); -87, -46 (1985) (interpreting this provision).
  • State v. Shriner 751 N.W.2d 538 Minn. 2008
  • State v. Quinn 178 P.3d 1190 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
  • State v. Quinn 178 P.3d 1190 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
  • State v. Stanley 172 P.3d 848 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
  • State v. Stanley 172 P.3d 848 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
    ¶ 12 , see Collins, 158 Ariz. at 146 , 761 P.2d at 1050 (construing § 28-691(D) so that “blood taken solely as a result of a search warrant after the defendant has refused to submit to the taking of a blood sample is inadmissible.”); , (narrowly limiting the scope of then § 28-692(m)); , (same).
  • State v. Shriner 739 N.W.2d 432 Minn. Ct. App. 2007
  • State of Arizona v. Jesus Antonio Aleman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
  • State of Arizona v. Jesus Antonio Aleman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
    -84, -45 (1985); see also State v. Estrada, 209 Ariz. 287, ¶ 11
  • State v. Estrada 100 P.3d 452 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
  • State v. Estrada 100 P.3d 452 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
    Our supreme court has clarified the “for any reason” language of § 28-1388(E) to mean that the blood must be drawn by medical personnel for “medical purposes.”
  • State v. Griffin 58 P.3d 516 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
  • State v. Griffin 58 P.3d 516 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
    (upholding mandatory life sentence for defendant convicted of felony involving use of deadly weapon or dangerous instrument while on probation for prior felony conviction); , (same); , (legislature may alter penalty for future crimes).
  • State v. Newton 21 P.3d 387 Ariz. 2001
  • State v. Newton 21 P.3d 387 Ariz. 2001
    Just as the legislature can make more severe the effect of committing a crime while on release status, , so can the legislature make less severe the impact of committing a crime while on release status.
  • State v. Clary 2 P.3d 1255 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
  • State v. Clary 2 P.3d 1255 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
    See State v. Codo, 147 Ariz., 277, 284
  • Lind v. Superior Court 954 P.2d 1058 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • Lind v. Superior Court 954 P.2d 1058 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
    ¶ 14 The Arizona Supreme Court has examined police use of a blood sample obtained pursuant to statute, for medical purposes
  • Arizona Department of Public Safety v. Superior Court 949 P.2d 983 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • Arizona Department of Public Safety v. Superior Court 949 P.2d 983 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
    1597 , 1602 n. 2, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995); , (“[T]he Arizona Legislature may not enact a law which imposes any additional or increased penalty for a crime after its commission.”).
  • State v. McKinney 917 P.2d 1214 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. McKinney 917 P.2d 1214 Ariz. 1996
  • Allstate Insurance v. Superior Court 875 P.2d 845 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
  • Allstate Insurance v. Superior Court 875 P.2d 845 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
    See, , (Feldman, J., dissenting) (“The facts of this case illustrate clearly that in a predictable number of cases mandatory sentencing covering a broad range of crimes is simply a form of mandatory injustice.”).
  • State v. Freeland 863 P.2d 263 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
  • State v. Freeland 863 P.2d 263 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
    section 28-692(M) (1989)
  • State v. Groshong 852 P.2d 1251 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1993
  • State v. Groshong 852 P.2d 1251 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1993