Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Williams, 800 P.2d 1240.

42 citing documents.

  • State v. Griffin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
  • State v. Griffin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
    To show that the admission of pretrial identification testimony violated the defendant’s due process rights, the defendant must establish that “(1) that the circumstances surrounding the pretrial identification ‘created a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,’ and (2) the state bore sufficient responsibility for the suggestive pretrial identification.” (citing Simmons v. U.S., 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)).
  • State of Arizona v. Allyn Akeem Smith 475 P.3d 558 Ariz. 2020
  • State of Arizona v. Allyn Akeem Smith 475 P.3d 558 Ariz. 2020
    (finding ten seconds insufficient); State v. (Ronald T.) Williams, (finding approximately five seconds insufficient).
  • State v. Brents Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • State v. Brents Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74, 82-83 (1985) (holding that a defendant's right to a psychiatric evaluation arises if the defendant makes a preliminary showing that sanity at the time of the offense will be a significant factor at trial); (holding that due process clause requires the appointment of a mental health expert only when reasonably necessary following a minimal showing of insanity).
  • State v. Green Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • State v. Green Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    -40 (1987) (finding evidence sufficient to support pecuniary gain as an aggravating factor when the defendant killed a witness during a home burglary because “[n]o explanation for the killing exists other than that [the victim] was killed because he discovered a burglary in progress”).
  • State of Arizona v. Aaron Brian Gunches 377 P.3d 993 Ariz. 2016
  • State of Arizona v. Aaron Brian Gunches 377 P.3d 993 Ariz. 2016
    ixon, ¶ 62, ¶ 56, Dann, 220 Ariz. at 358 ¶ 10, 207 P.3d at 611; ¶ 44, State v. Henry (Henry II), State v. Henry (Henry I)
  • State of Arizona v. Mark Goudeau 372 P.3d 945 Ariz. 2016
  • State of Arizona v. Mark Goudeau 372 P.3d 945 Ariz. 2016
    But “the due process clause does not preclude every identification that is arguably unreliable; it precludes identification testimony procured by the state through unduly suggestive pretrial procedures.” accord Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 726 (2012) (“The due process check for reliability .
  • State of Arizona v. Shawna Forde 315 P.3d 1200 Ariz. 2014
  • State of Arizona v. Shawna Forde 315 P.3d 1200 Ariz. 2014
    132 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2012) (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification was not procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement.”)
  • State v. Garcia 226 P.3d 370 Ariz. 2010
  • State v. Garcia 226 P.3d 370 Ariz. 2010
  • State of Arizona v. Nathan Andres Leyvas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
  • State of Arizona v. Nathan Andres Leyvas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
  • State v. Prion 52 P.3d 189 Ariz. 2002
  • State v. Prion 52 P.3d 189 Ariz. 2002
  • State v. Nordstrom 25 P.3d 717 Ariz. 2001
  • State v. Nordstrom 25 P.3d 717 Ariz. 2001
    To establish that the admission of identification testimony violated his due process rights, a defendant must show “that the circumstances surrounding the pretrial identification ‘created a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification’ ” and that the state was “sufficiently] responsible[ ] for the suggestive pretrial identification to trigger due process protection.” , (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 , 88 S.Ct.
  • State v. Djerf 959 P.2d 1274 Ariz. 1998
  • State v. Djerf 959 P.2d 1274 Ariz. 1998
  • State v. Mann 934 P.2d 784 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Mann 934 P.2d 784 Ariz. 1997
    720 , 133 L.Ed.2d 673 (1996); Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. at 65 , 859 P.2d at 175
  • State v. Gonzales 892 P.2d 838 Ariz. 1995
  • State v. Gonzales 892 P.2d 838 Ariz. 1995
    967, 971 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), and that the “state bore sufficient responsibility for the suggestive pretrial identification.”
  • State v. King 883 P.2d 1024 Ariz. 1994
  • State v. King 883 P.2d 1024 Ariz. 1994
    (holding that execution by lethal gas is not cruel and *274 unusual punishment prohibited by either 8th and 14th amendments to United States Constitution or article 2, § 15 of the Arizona Constitution); see also Ariz. Const, art. 22, § 22 (approved by electors in November 3, 1992 gene
  • State v. Scott 865 P.2d 792 Ariz. 1993
  • State v. Scott 865 P.2d 792 Ariz. 1993
  • State v. Lopez 857 P.2d 1261 Ariz. 1993
  • State v. Lopez 857 P.2d 1261 Ariz. 1993
    660 , 116 L.Ed.2d 751 (1991); , cert.
  • State v. Runningeagle 859 P.2d 169 Ariz. 1993
  • State v. Runningeagle 859 P.2d 169 Ariz. 1993
  • State v. Herrera 850 P.2d 100 Ariz. 1993
  • State v. Herrera 850 P.2d 100 Ariz. 1993
    (execution by lethal gas not cruel and unusual punishment), cert.
  • State v. Greenway 823 P.2d 22 Ariz. 1991
  • State v. Greenway 823 P.2d 22 Ariz. 1991
  • State v. Fierroa 804 P.2d 72 Ariz. 1990
  • State v. Fierroa 804 P.2d 72 Ariz. 1990
    To determine whether a defendant was denied due process because of an improper pretrial identification procedure, the trial court must determine whether the identification procedure “created a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,” and whether “the state bore sufficient responsibility for the suggestive pretrial identification.”