Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Carter, 700 P.2d 488.
- State v. Martinez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
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State v. Martinez
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Four factors guide this objective inquiry: (1) “whether the objective indicia of arrest are present,” (2) “the site of the interrogation,” (3) “the length and form of the investigation,” and (4) “whether the investigation had focused on the accused.”6 (citation omitted); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (per curiam) (“[T]he initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the int
- State v. Curtis Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
- State v. Curtis Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
- State of Arizona v. Christopher Mathew Payne 306 P.3d 17 Ariz. 2013
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State of Arizona v. Christopher Mathew Payne
306 P.3d 17
Ariz. 2013
10 STATE V. PAYNE Opinion of the Court ¶39 Payne was not in custody when he attempted to invoke his right to counsel because, other than the presence of police, he had no reason to “feel deprived of his freedom of action.” -06, -93 (1985) (inherently coercive nature of speaking to police is insufficient).
- State of Arizona v. Zachary Samuel Eggers Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
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State of Arizona v. Zachary Samuel Eggers
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
11 In re Navajo County Juvenile Action No. JV91000058, -06, -49 (App. 1995).
- In Re Jorge D. 43 P.3d 605 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
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In Re Jorge D.
43 P.3d 605
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
1602 ); ¶ 4 , (employing an objective test to determine "whether under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person would feel that he was in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way”) ( , ).
- State v. Nordstrom 25 P.3d 717 Ariz. 2001
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State v. Nordstrom
25 P.3d 717
Ariz. 2001
(defining the standard for reckless disregard for the truth).
- State v. Rosengren 14 P.3d 303 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
- State v. Rosengren 14 P.3d 303 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
- State v. Smith 4 P.3d 388 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
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State v. Smith
4 P.3d 388
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1999
An objective test is used to determine whether the defendant was in custody, that is, “whether under the totality of the circumstances a reasonable person would feel that he was in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way.” , see also Spreitz; Stanley.
- State v. McKinney 917 P.2d 1214 Ariz. 1996
- State v. McKinney 917 P.2d 1214 Ariz. 1996
- State v. Valencia 924 P.2d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
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State v. Valencia
924 P.2d 497
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
However, a conversation initiated voluntarily by a defendant does not constitute “custodial interrogation,” , and a spontaneous statement not made in response to interrogation does not violate Miranda
- State v. Spears 908 P.2d 1062 Ariz. 1996
- State v. Spears 908 P.2d 1062 Ariz. 1996
- In Re Appeal in Navajo County Juvenile Action No. JV91000058 901 P.2d 1247 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
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In Re Appeal in Navajo County Juvenile Action No. JV91000058
901 P.2d 1247
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
Miranda applies to “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id.
- State v. Valenzuela 898 P.2d 1010 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1995
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State v. Valenzuela
898 P.2d 1010
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1995
Although we generally review decisions granting or denying a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion, , because this case involves only a question of law, our review is de novo.
- State v. Michael Apelt 861 P.2d 634 Ariz. 1993
- State v. Michael Apelt 861 P.2d 634 Ariz. 1993
- State v. Lopez 847 P.2d 1078 Ariz. 1992
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State v. Lopez
847 P.2d 1078
Ariz. 1992
at 2684 , 57 L.Ed.2d at 682
- State v. Swanson 838 P.2d 1340 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
- State v. Swanson 838 P.2d 1340 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
- State v. Rowland 836 P.2d 395 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1992
- State v. Rowland 836 P.2d 395 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1992
- State v. Buccini 810 P.2d 178 Ariz. 1991
- State v. Buccini 810 P.2d 178 Ariz. 1991
- State v. Stanley 809 P.2d 944 Ariz. 1991
- State v. Stanley 809 P.2d 944 Ariz. 1991
- State v. Paredes 810 P.2d 607 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
- State v. Paredes 810 P.2d 607 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
- State v. Stuart 811 P.2d 335 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
- State v. Stuart 811 P.2d 335 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
- State v. Zimmerman 802 P.2d 1024 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
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State v. Zimmerman
802 P.2d 1024
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
the defendant initially told the interviewing police that he “didn’t want to say anything.” Id.
- State v. Khoshbin 804 P.2d 103 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
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State v. Khoshbin
804 P.2d 103
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
The state contends that “an accused’s spontaneous, voluntary statement that is not made in response to police interrogation does not violate the defendant’s Miranda rights,”
- State v. Wilson 793 P.2d 559 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
- State v. Wilson 793 P.2d 559 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
- State v. Buccini 796 P.2d 910 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
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State v. Buccini
796 P.2d 910
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
Our supreme court has construed Franks to require that, where such knowing, intentional or reckless conduct has occurred, the trial court must not only “redraft the affidavit by deleting the falsehoods” but also by “adding the materially omitted facts.”