Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite Eldridge v. Jagger, 317 P.2d 942.
- Cockerham v. Zikratch 619 P.2d 739 Ariz. 1980
- Cockerham v. Zikratch 619 P.2d 739 Ariz. 1980
- Peters v. M & O Construction, Inc. 579 P.2d 72 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
- Peters v. M & O Construction, Inc. 579 P.2d 72 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
- Wright v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 569 P.2d 821 Ariz. 1977
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Wright v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
569 P.2d 821
Ariz. 1977
Modla v. Parker, 17 Ariz.App.
- State v. Nettz 560 P.2d 814 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1977
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State v. Nettz
560 P.2d 814
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1977
.” We must follow the rule that “an application to open, vacate or set aside a judgment is within the sound discretion of the trial court and its action will not be disturbed by this court except for a clear abuse of discretion.”
- Modla v. Parker 495 P.2d 494 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
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Modla v. Parker
495 P.2d 494
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
Rule 60(c), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S.
- Mayhew v. McDougall 491 P.2d 848 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1971
- Mayhew v. McDougall 491 P.2d 848 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1971
- Fridena v. Palmer 489 P.2d 265 Ariz. 1971
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Fridena v. Palmer
489 P.2d 265
Ariz. 1971
“We have repeatedly held an application to open, vacate or set aside a judgment is within the sound discretion of the trial court and its action will not be disturbed by this court except for a clear abuse of discretion.”
- State v. Hogue 479 P.2d 417 Ariz. 1971
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State v. Hogue
479 P.2d 417
Ariz. 1971
[Emphasis added] at 340 , at 623 (1970); , State v. Horn, 9 Ariz.App.
- Phoenix Airport Travelodge v. Dolgin 470 P.2d 506 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
- Phoenix Airport Travelodge v. Dolgin 470 P.2d 506 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
- In Re Estate of Cohen 464 P.2d 620 Ariz. 1970
- In Re Estate of Cohen 464 P.2d 620 Ariz. 1970
- Morgan v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. 463 P.2d 118 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
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Morgan v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.
463 P.2d 118
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Haenichen v. Worthington, 9 Ariz.App.
- Goldbaum v. Bloomfield Building Industries, Inc. 459 P.2d 732 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
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Goldbaum v. Bloomfield Building Industries, Inc.
459 P.2d 732
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
.” In our review of the facts, heretofore, we find that there is conflict in the evidence as to what the parties thought a “ten per cent participation agreement” consisted of, and that there is reasonable evidence in the record to support the trial court’s fi
- City of Tucson v. Melnykovich 457 P.2d 307 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
- Tri-State Insurance Company v. Maxwell 457 P.2d 251 Ariz. 1969
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City of Tucson v. Melnykovich
457 P.2d 307
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
Occidental Life Insurance Company of Cal.
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Tri-State Insurance Company v. Maxwell
457 P.2d 251
Ariz. 1969
.” Of course there are situations where we will not accept the findings of the trier of fact, such as where the record contains no evidence to support such findings, , , or where a detailed examination of the eviden
- Campbell v. Frazer Construction Co. 451 P.2d 620 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
- Haenichen v. Worthington 449 P.2d 319 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
- Haenichen v. Worthington 449 P.2d 319 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
- Occidental Life Insurance Company of Cal. v. Marsh 423 P.2d 150 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
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Occidental Life Insurance Company of Cal. v. Marsh
423 P.2d 150
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
Tonelson v. Haines, 2 Ariz.App.
- Riggs v. HUACHUCA INVESTMENT COMPANY 410 P.2d 149 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
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Riggs v. HUACHUCA INVESTMENT COMPANY
410 P.2d 149
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
Prell v. Amado, 2 Ariz.App.
- Tonelson v. Haines 406 P.2d 845 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
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Tonelson v. Haines
406 P.2d 845
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
our Supreme Court said: “It is a well-established rule of law that the return of service of process can be impeached only by clear and convincing evidence.” , .
- Nordale v. Fisher 380 P.2d 1003 Ariz. 1963
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Nordale v. Fisher
380 P.2d 1003
Ariz. 1963
Daru v. Martin, supra; *347 ; , .
- Gonzales v. Whitney 367 P.2d 668 Ariz. 1961
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Gonzales v. Whitney
367 P.2d 668
Ariz. 1961
Setting aside a default judgment is within the sound legal discretion of the court, , , and is favored so that the party may have an opportunity to litigate his defense on the merits.
- Patzman v. Marshall 363 P.2d 599 Ariz. 1961
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Patzman v. Marshall
363 P.2d 599
Ariz. 1961
Daru v. Martin, 89 Ariz. -, 363 P.2d.
- Daru v. Martin 363 P.2d 61 Ariz. 1961
- Daru v. Martin 363 P.2d 61 Ariz. 1961
- Phelan v. Hightower 360 P.2d 817 Ariz. 1961
- Phelan v. Hightower 360 P.2d 817 Ariz. 1961
- Arizona Securities, Inc. v. Keene 360 P.2d 221 Ariz. 1961
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Arizona Securities, Inc. v. Keene
360 P.2d 221
Ariz. 1961
944: “ * * * We have repeatedly held an application to open, vacate or set aside a judgment is within the sound discretion of the trial court and its action will not be disturbed by this court except for a clear abuse of discretion.
- Lincoln-Mercury-Phoenix, Inc. v. Base 322 P.2d 891 Ariz. 1958