Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite McNeil v. Attaway, 348 P.2d 301.

45 citing documents.

Holm v. Gateway Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Holm v. Gateway Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
-32, ¶ 47 (App. 2004); (“In a suit to reform a written instrument a clear and convincing showing of the real agreement of the parties thereto is a requisite.”).
Fields v. Oates 286 P.3d 160 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
Fields v. Oates 286 P.3d 160 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
See, e.g., Scottsdale Mem’l. Health Sys., , (describing the superior court’s discretion regarding attorneys’ fees in quiet title actions); , , (explaining that a judicial act involves the exercise of discretion or judgment, in contrast to a ministerial act in which “the duty to be performed is described by law with such certainty that nothing is left to th
Long v. City of Glendale 93 P.3d 519 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Long v. City of Glendale 93 P.3d 519 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
(admitting parol evidence in reformation action to prove prior express agreement because purpose of action is to conform instrument to actual contract negotiated by the parties); , (admitting parol evidence where prior ag
Scottsdale Memorial Health Systems, Inc. v. Clark 791 P.2d 1094 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
Scottsdale Memorial Health Systems, Inc. v. Clark 791 P.2d 1094 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
(supplemental opinion on rehearing).
United Bank v. Ashland Development Corp. 792 P.2d 775 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
United Bank v. Ashland Development Corp. 792 P.2d 775 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
In an earlier minute entry, , for the proposition that reformation is not available when the parties have never entered into an express agreement that can be reformed.
Isaak v. Massachusetts Indemnity Life Insurance 623 P.2d 11 Ariz. 1981
Isaak v. Massachusetts Indemnity Life Insurance 623 P.2d 11 Ariz. 1981
Even if this court were to allow parol evidence of Pulitzer’s intent to show mistake, P.2d 301 (1959), the mistake here at best would be unilateral.
Furrh v. Rothschild 575 P.2d 1277 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
Furrh v. Rothschild 575 P.2d 1277 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
Standage Ventures, Inc. v. State 551 P.2d 74 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1976
Standage Ventures, Inc. v. State 551 P.2d 74 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1976
Richards Development Company v. Sligh, supra
Kay v. Biggs 475 P.2d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Kay v. Biggs 475 P.2d 1 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Ramsey v. Arizona Title Insurance & Trust Co. 460 P.2d 644 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
Ramsey v. Arizona Title Insurance & Trust Co. 460 P.2d 644 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
ASHTON COMPANY, INC., CONTR. & ENG'RS v. State 454 P.2d 1004 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
ASHTON COMPANY, INC., CONTR. & ENG'RS v. State 454 P.2d 1004 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
and Longshaw v. Corbitt, 4 Ariz.App.
Merrick v. United States Rubber Co. 440 P.2d 314 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
Merrick v. United States Rubber Co. 440 P.2d 314 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
wherein the Arizona Supreme Court stated ( 81 Ariz. at 26 , 299 P.2d at 196 ): “It is fundamental that the parol evidence rule is a doctrine of substantive law and not merely an exclusionary rule of evidence.” ' , [supplemental opinion on rehearing 20 January I960].
Balon v. Hotel & Restaurant Supplies, Inc. 433 P.2d 661 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
Balon v. Hotel & Restaurant Supplies, Inc. 433 P.2d 661 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
Lyon v. Big Bend Development Co. 435 P.2d 732 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
Lyon v. Big Bend Development Co. 435 P.2d 732 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
Chantler v. Wood 430 P.2d 713 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
Chantler v. Wood 430 P.2d 713 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
Hollars v. Stephenson, 121 Ind.App.
Longshaw v. Corbitt 420 P.2d 980 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
Longshaw v. Corbitt 420 P.2d 980 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
It is important here to analyze two Arizona cases—
Peterson v. First National Bank 417 P.2d 728 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
In Re Estate of MacDonald 417 P.2d 728 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
In Re Estate of MacDonald 417 P.2d 728 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
Peterson v. First National Bank 417 P.2d 728 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
*97 (citations) We have held that this is a doctrine of substantive law, not merely an exclusionary rule of evidence.”
Jacobs v. Jacobs 415 P.2d 151 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
Jacobs v. Jacobs 415 P.2d 151 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
We note that there are several cases discussing attorney’s fees as costs in quiet title actions, , and others cited under of West Digest Topic “Quieting Title.” Whether counsel for either side would wish any of these cases cited as authority for their contentions we do not know, though it seems that a reasonable determination of the issue should include some examination of existing case law o
LeBaron v. Crismon 412 P.2d 705 Ariz. 1966
LeBaron v. Crismon 412 P.2d 705 Ariz. 1966
this court said: “The description in a deed of the property conveyed thereby is considered ambiguous and subject to construction only if it is not possible to relate the description to the land without inconsistency.” 87 Ariz. at 109 , 348 P.2d at 305 .
Hammontree v. Kenworthy 404 P.2d 816 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
Hammontree v. Kenworthy 404 P.2d 816 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
McNeil v. Attaway (1960), , .
Komarek v. Cole 381 P.2d 773 Ariz. 1963
Komarek v. Cole 381 P.2d 773 Ariz. 1963
245 P. 360 (1926) ; S. H. Kress & , 189 P. 625 (1920).
Torrey v. Pearce 373 P.2d 9 Ariz. 1962