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Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Ault, 724 P.2d 545.

144 citing documents.

  • State v. Roberson 225 P.3d 1156 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
  • State v. Roberson 225 P.3d 1156 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
    they are specific in preserving the sanctity of homes and in creating a right of privacy.”) (citations omitted); , (“The Arizona Constitution is even more explicit than its federal counterpart in safeguarding the fundamental liberty of Arizona citizens.”) (citation omitted).
  • State of Arizona v. Ryan Ray Olm Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
  • State of Arizona v. Ryan Ray Olm Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
    Discussion ¶5 The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” “Unlawful entry of homes was the chief evil which the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent.”
  • State of Arizona v. Alexander Joel Huerta Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
  • State of Arizona v. Alexander Joel Huerta Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
  • State v. Guillen 223 P.3d 658 Ariz. 2010
  • State v. Guillen 223 P.3d 658 Ariz. 2010
    However, -65, -24 (1984), which held that Article 2, Section 8 is more specific than its federal counterpart in protecting the home, the court of appeals concluded that “a canine sniff that occurs at the threshold of a
  • State v. Guillen 213 P.3d 230 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
  • State v. Guillen 213 P.3d 230 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
    at 264-65 , 689 P.2d at 523-24 (deciding propriety of war-rantless home entry on state constitutional grounds rather than Fourth Amendment grounds, recognizing “possibility that our interpretation of the Arizona search and seizure constitutional provision more narrowly *87 circumscribes the right of police to make a warrantless entry [into the home]”); , (“Our decision not to extend the inevitable discovery doctrine into defendant’s home in this case is based on ...
  • Howell v. Hodap 212 P.3d 881 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
  • Howell v. Hodap 212 P.3d 881 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
    (“The Arizona Constitution is even more explicit than its federal counterpart in safeguarding the fundamental liberty of Arizona citizens.”); Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 8 (“No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”).
  • State v. Rojers 169 P.3d 651 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
  • State v. Rojers 169 P.3d 651 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2007
    B. The Doctrine ¶ 18 “The inevitable discovery doctrine, which is an exception to the exclusionary rule, provides that illegally obtained evidence is admissible ‘[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the illegally seized items or information would have inevitably been seized by lawful means.’ ” Jones, 185 Ariz. at 481 , 917 P.2d at 210 ( , ).
  • State of Arizona v. Anthony Shariff Gay Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
  • State of Arizona v. Anthony Shariff Gay Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
    ¶11 But Gay argues, P.2d 545 (1986), that any exigent circumstance stemming from concern that Fresby might destroy evidence was created by police because they failed to obtain a search warrant prior to going to the apartment.
  • State of Arizona v. Walter James Mangum Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
  • State of Arizona v. Walter James Mangum Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2007
    Second, the one case Mangum cites, P.2d 545 (1986), is inapposite, and pertinent Arizona case law refutes his position.
  • State v. Gant 143 P.3d 379 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
  • State v. Gant 143 P.3d 379 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2006
  • State v. Watkins 88 P.3d 1174 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
  • State v. Watkins 88 P.3d 1174 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
    -33 , -37 (1989); , (exigent circumstances can permit entry of home without warrant).
  • State v. Davolt 84 P.3d 456 Ariz. 2004
  • State v. Davolt 84 P.3d 456 Ariz. 2004
    Harmless Error ¶39 We assess a trial court’s erroneous denial of a motion to 3 On appeal
  • State v. Reyna 71 P.3d 366 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
  • State v. Reyna 71 P.3d 366 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
    they are specific in preserving the *378 sanctity of homes and in creating a right of privacy.”); , (supplemental opinion).
  • Petersen v. City of Mesa 63 P.3d 309 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
  • Petersen v. City of Mesa 63 P.3d 309 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
    That provision states: “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” ¶ 3 466 , 552 (1986) (Article 2, Section 8 bars admission of evidence seized during illegal search of home), , (rejecting assertion that Article 2, Section 8, although more extensive than Fourth Amendment, requires individuali
  • State v. Mitchell 62 P.3d 616 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
  • State v. Mitchell 62 P.3d 616 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
    1 ¶ 19 We are mindful that several Arizona appellate opinions have stated, when addressing constitutional protections relating to searches and interrogation of suspects, that an arrest is “complete” when the suspect’s “liberty of movement is interrupted and restricted by the police.” , (-48 , -87 (1985)); , (-60 , -77 (1974)).
  • State v. Juarez 55 P.3d 784 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
  • State v. Juarez 55 P.3d 784 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2002
    (deciding “not to extend the inevitable discovery doctrine into defendant’s home”); , (affirming as a matter of state law that “officers may not make a warrantless entry of a home in the absence of exigent circumstances or other
  • State v. Cañez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
  • State v. Canez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
  • State v. Cañez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
  • State v. Canez 42 P.3d 564 Ariz. 2002
  • State v. Adams 5 P.3d 903 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2000
  • State v. DeCamp 3 P.3d 956 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
  • State v. DeCamp 3 P.3d 956 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
    as requiring three elements: (1) that the officer have a prior justification to be in the position to see the evidence, (2) that the discovery of the evidence be inadvertent and (3) that its evidentiary value be immediately apparent.
  • State v. Soto 990 P.2d 23 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
  • State v. Soto 990 P.2d 23 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1999
  • State v. King 984 P.2d 544 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • State v. King 984 P.2d 544 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • State v. Acinelli 952 P.2d 304 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • State v. Acinelli 952 P.2d 304 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
  • Mazen v. Seidel 940 P.2d 923 Ariz. 1997
  • State v. Miller 921 P.2d 1151 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Miller 921 P.2d 1151 Ariz. 1996
    An arrest occurs when “the suspect’s liberty of movement is interrupted and restricted by the police.”
  • State v. Jones 917 P.2d 200 Ariz. 1996
  • State v. Jones 917 P.2d 200 Ariz. 1996
    The inevitable discovery doctrine, which is an exception to the exclusionary rule, provides that illegally obtained evidence is admissible “[i]f the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the illegally seized items or information would have inevitably been seized by lawful means----” , , ,551 (1986), citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 , 104 S.Ct.