Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Thurlow, 712 P.2d 929.
- State v. Pritchard Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
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State v. Pritchard
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
§ 13- 711 (concurrency); (noting that under the "catch all" provisions of A.R.S.
- State of Arizona v. Della Lisa Vermuele Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
- State of Arizona v. Della Lisa Vermuele Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
- State v. Patterson 218 P.3d 1031 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
- State v. Patterson 218 P.3d 1031 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
- State v. Pena 104 P.3d 873 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
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State v. Pena
104 P.3d 873
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Webb thus holds that it was not error to decline to mitigate on this basis, but states that the judge could have considered this as a mitigating factor, , for that proposition.
- State v. Fell 97 P.3d 902 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
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State v. Fell
97 P.3d 902
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
-20 , -33 (1986) (presumptive term applies to the “vast majority of first offenders”).
- State v. Cazares 72 P.3d 355 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
- State of Arizona v. Ernesto Luis Cazares Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
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State of Arizona v. Ernesto Luis Cazares
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
ng, particularly in a case like this in which, as the presentence report noted, “[t]he defendant comes before the Court with an extensive criminal history vis-à-vis his age.” P.2d 295 (App. 1983) (youth not a mitigating factor per se but only if defendant lacks substantial judgment due to immaturity), disapproved on other grounds, P.2d 929 (1986).
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State v. Cazares
72 P.3d 355
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
ating, particularly in a case like this in which, as the presentence report noted, “[t]he defendant comes before the Court with an extensive' criminal history vis-a-vis his age.” , (youth not a mitigating factor per se but only if defendant lacks substantial judgment due to immaturity), disapproved on other grounds
- State v. Benenati 52 P.3d 804 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
- State v. Benenati 52 P.3d 804 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
- State v. Viramontes 27 P.3d 809 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
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State v. Viramontes
27 P.3d 809
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
-20 , -33 (1986) (presumptive term applies to the “vast majority of first offenders”).
- State of Arizona v. Powers 23 P.3d 668 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
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State of Arizona v. Powers
23 P.3d 668
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
-20 , -33 (1986) (presumptive sentence is sentence “to be imposed on the vast majority of first offenders”).
- State v. Garza 962 P.2d 898 Ariz. 1998
- State v. Garza 962 P.2d 898 Ariz. 1998
- State v. Fillmore 927 P.2d 1303 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
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State v. Fillmore
927 P.2d 1303
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
But within those boundaries, “the ultimate responsibility for fitting the punishment to the circumstances of the particular crime and individual defendant still rests with the judiciary.”
- State v. Anderson 887 P.2d 548 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1993
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State v. Anderson
887 P.2d 548
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1993
“In the sentencing context, if the judge relies on inappropriate factors and it is unclear whether the judge would have imposed the same sentence absent the inappropriate factors, the ease must be remanded for resentencing.”
- State v. King 873 P.2d 641 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
- State v. Elliget 864 P.2d 1064 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
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State v. Elliget
864 P.2d 1064
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
See generally Just, 138 Ariz. at 551 , 675 P.2d at 1370 (remand required when judge relied on improper aggravating factor); , (resentencing required when record unclear whether judge considered a proper mitigating factor).
- State v. Webb 793 P.2d 105 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
- State v. Webb 793 P.2d 105 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
- State v. Ojeda 769 P.2d 1006 Ariz. 1989
- State v. Ojeda 769 P.2d 1006 Ariz. 1989
- State v. Ojeda 764 P.2d 350 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1988