Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Johnson, 745 P.2d 81.
- Barnes v. Bernini 426 P.3d 313 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
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Barnes v. Bernini
426 P.3d 313
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
The court cited State v. Johnson , , 26-27, , 84-85 (1987), in which the defendant had urged a mistrial and dismissal of a jury that had failed to reach a verdict on prior convictions, and Riley , 145 Ariz. at 421 -22 , 701 P.2d at 1229 -30 , in which the defendant had previously consented to the original jury's discharge by entering an adm
- State of Arizona v. Earl Jefferson Causbie 384 P.3d 1253 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
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State of Arizona v. Earl Jefferson Causbie
384 P.3d 1253
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2016
-25, -83 (1987), a sexual assault case applying “mental disorder” in a prior version of the “without consent” definition.
- State of Arizona v. Miguel Francisco Inzunza 316 P.3d 1266 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
- State of Arizona v. Miguel Francisco Inzunza 316 P.3d 1266 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
- State of Arizona v. Efren Medina 306 P.3d 48 Ariz. 2013
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State of Arizona v. Efren Medina
306 P.3d 48
Ariz. 2013
¶19 “Normally, ‘a retrial following a “hung jury” does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.’” Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 109 (2003) (quoting Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 324 (1984)); (“[A] retrial before a new jury of an issue on which a former jury could not reach agreement does not violate double jeopardy principles.”).
- State v. Zaragoza 202 P.3d 489 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
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State v. Zaragoza
202 P.3d 489
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
Johnson, , 72 P.3d at 347 .
- State v. Johnson 72 P.3d 343 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
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State v. Johnson
72 P.3d 343
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
(‘Where there is the possibility that the defendant was convicted on deficient jury instructions, the conviction must be reversed.”); , (possibility that jury convicted defendant of first degree murder based on deficient instructi
- State v. Gross 31 P.3d 815 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
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State v. Gross
31 P.3d 815
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001
-22 , -30 (App.1985) (believing that the defendant’s sentence enhancement could be retried before a new jury because a retrial after reversal by an appellate court follows as a matter of course and because the defendant had waived any double jeopardy claim); State v. Johnson (Johnson I), , (approving of the court of appeals’ analysis in Riley and allowing the State to retry the defendant after the trial on the enhancement issue resulted in a hung jury, and hence, a mistrial).
- State v. Rodriguez 7 P.3d 148 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
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State v. Rodriguez
7 P.3d 148
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2000
(“[A] retrial before a new jury of an issue on which a former jury could not reach agreement does not violate double jeopardy principles.”); , (dismissal of certain charges pursuant to guilty plea on another charge not a decisi
- State v. Johnson 903 P.2d 1116 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
- State v. Johnson 903 P.2d 1116 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1995
- State v. Kiper 887 P.2d 592 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
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State v. Kiper
887 P.2d 592
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
-27 , , 84r-85 (1987) (when mistrial declared during the prior convictions phase of a trial, appropriate to reschedule new trial.
- State v. Portillo 876 P.2d 1151 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
- State v. Portillo 876 P.2d 1151 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1994
- State v. Witwer 856 P.2d 1183 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
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State v. Witwer
856 P.2d 1183
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1993
g in sexual contact with any person 14 or more years of age without consent of that person.” The defendant argues that the instruction was not adequate, and that the judge should also have given an instruction like the one found in State v. Johnson: “ ‘Without consent’ means that the Defendant was aware or believed that the other person was coerced by the immediate or threatened use of force ...”
- State ex rel. Neely v. Sherrill 815 P.2d 396 Ariz. 1991
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State ex rel. Neely v. Sherrill
815 P.2d 396
Ariz. 1991
allegation: “If the verdict is guilty, the issue of the prior conviction shall then be tried, unless the defendant has admitted the prior conviction.” 2 In State v. Johnson, we recognized that our previous decisions supported a conclusion that § 13-604(K) and rule 19.1(b)(2) “provide that the allegation of prior conviction be tried by the same jury which tried the substantive or current charge.” , , Crumley, , .