Cited by

¶26 While we narrowly apply immunity because it is the exception, not the rule, Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, Arizona law supports qualified immunity for the discretionary decisions made by a school district superintendent in the scope of his job responsibilities.

¶26 The doctrine of sovereign immunity is not sacrosanct: just as dram-shop nonliability was a judicially created common law rule, “the doctrine of sovereign immunity was originally judicially created” and “having been engrafted upon Arizona law by judicial enunciation may properly be changed or abrogated by the same process.” Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n

3 SARKIS v. MARICOPA, et al. Decision of the Court ¶10 To support his argument, Sarkis notes that our supreme court generally rejected “the rule of governmental immunity from tort liability.” Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, (“Employing the spirit of the Stone decision, we propose to endorse the use of governmental immunity as a defense only when its application is necessary to avoid a severe hampering of a governmental function or thwarting of established public policy.”).

4 SPOONER v. PHOENIX, et al. Opinion of the Court Comm’n, ), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Tucson Unified Sch.

“There is perhaps no doctrine more firmly established than the principle that liability follows tortious wrongdoing; that where negligence is the proximate cause of injury, the rule is liability and immunity is the exception.” Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n

Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, , (“[T]he rule is liability and immunity is the exception.”).

P.3d 757 (2001) (3-2 decision); Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, -93, -13 (1963), P.3d 499 (2009) (same); (describing Act’s history).

¶24 Notwithstanding the abolishment of the substantive defense of governmental immunity in Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, P.2d 107 (1963), our supreme court has held that the legislature acted within the power granted to it by Arizona Constitution article IV, part 2, section 18 (the immunity clause) when it enacted statutes, including § 12-820, defining instances in which public entities and employees are entitled to immunity.

¶ 16 The dissent also suggests that because governmental immunity is the exception and not the rule in Arizona, see Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, , the state should be subject to APSA liability unless the legislature expressly excludes it.

3 n. 3, ¶ 9, , 46 n. 3 (2003) ( , ( , 189 P. 631, 632 (1920), for the proposition that "it is well settled by the great weight of authority that the state, in consequence of its sovereignty, is immune from prosecution in the courts and from liability to respond in damages for neg

(citing Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, , overruled in pari by Grimm v. Ariz. Bd.

The act thus codified the holding of Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, that “the rule is [governmental] liability and immunity is the exception.” overruled in part by Grimm v. Ariz. Bd.

It noted that, , a government was to be immune from suit only when necessary to avoid severely hindering a governmental function or thwarting an established public policy.

art. 18, § 5 (making contributory negligence and assumption of risk jury questions); accord Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, (“There is perhaps no doctrine more firmly established than the principle that liability follows tortious wrongdoing; that where negligence is the proximate cause of injury, the rule is liability and immunity is the exception.”), overruled in part by Grimm

See Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, P.2d 107 (1963); (“the parameters of duty owed by the state will ordinarily be coextensive with those owed by others,” subject to legislative regulation); see also Dickey ex rel.

4 ¶ 13 Ten years later, , 239 P. 1030 (1925)

Comm’n, , (citations omitted) (overruled in part on other grounds by Grimm v. Arizona Bd.

the Arizona Supreme Court held that the legislature acted within the power granted to it by the Arizona Constitution Article 4, Part 2, Section 18 (the immunity clause) when it enacted a statute defining instances in which public entities and employees are entitled to immunity, [10] , that abolished the substantive defense of governmental immunity.

§ 41-192.02(A) was adopted in response to Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm’n, , which abolished the doctrine of governmental immunity from tort liability and thus left the state and its employees subject to liability for tortious acts done by state employees in the course and scope of their employment.

convinced that the doctrine had become unjust and outmoded and that its application created many inequities, this court abolished the substantive defense of governmental immunity.

convinced that the doctrine had become unjust and outmoded and that its application created many inequities, this court abolished the substantive defense of governmental immunity.

¶ 12 , abolished governmental immunity in Arizona.