Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Trojanovich v. Marshall, 388 P.2d 149.

74 citing documents.

  • Deer Valley Industrial Park Development & Lease Co. v. State Ex Rel. Herman 424 P.2d 192 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1967
  • Deer Valley Industrial Park Development & Lease Co. v. State Ex Rel. Herman 424 P.2d 192 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1967
    Our Supreme Court has not as yet laid forth the complete guide lines as to what may constitute “fundamental error.” , our Supreme Court held that the failure to properly instruct on contributory negligence was fundamental error which would be raised by “the Supreme Court for the first time on appeal, and on its own motion.
  • Wilds v. A. J. Bayless Markets, Inc. 421 P.2d 873 Ariz. 1966
  • Wilds v. A. J. Bayless Markets, Inc. 421 P.2d 873 Ariz. 1966
  • Schmidt v. Gibbons 418 P.2d 378 Ariz. 1966
  • Holtz v. Holder 418 P.2d 584 Ariz. 1966
  • Schmidt v. Gibbons 418 P.2d 378 Ariz. 1966
    “[The plaintiff] may not recover from another for injury suffered.”
  • Holtz v. Holder 418 P.2d 584 Ariz. 1966
    The verdict would be for the defendant Holder in that case, because the plaintiffs have instituted the case and have not established the case.” , , we held, after considering the matter on our own motion, that under the provisions of our Constitution, A.R.S.
  • Fulton v. Johannsen 416 P.2d 983 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
  • Fulton v. Johannsen 416 P.2d 983 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
    Cases have been reversed for fundamental error as for example, , 388 P.2d,149 (1963), wherein an erroneous in *568 struction on contributory negligence had been given contrary to the Arizona Constitutional provision.
  • Schmidt v. Gibbons 412 P.2d 716 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
  • Schmidt v. Gibbons 412 P.2d 716 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
    res you to and it is your duty to return a verdict for the defendant,’ ” “ ‘ * * * the plaintiff cannot recover * * * because contributory negligence constitutes a complete defense to the claim of the plaintiff,’ ” and “ 'One who is guilty of contributory negligence may not recover from another for injury suffered, no matter how negligent the other party may have been,’ ” 147
  • Moore v. Gray 414 P.2d 158 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
  • Moore v. Gray 414 P.2d 158 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
  • Eades v. House 413 P.2d 576 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
  • Eades v. House 413 P.2d 576 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
    Vegodsky v. City of Tucson, 1 Ariz.App.
  • Krek v. Briel 412 P.2d 301 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
  • Krek v. Briel 412 P.2d 301 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
    and that this Court is under a
  • Vegodsky v. City of Tucson 399 P.2d 723 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
  • Vegodsky v. City of Tucson 399 P.2d 723 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
    The trial court instructed the jury, in part: “If you find that it did (that plaintiff’s negligence contributed as the proximate cause of her injuries), your verdict must be for the defendant sfc í¡í sfs » A similar instruction has been held by our Supreme Court to be “fundamental and reversible error in that it deprived appellant of a constitutional right.”
  • Aguilar v. Carpenter 399 P.2d 124 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
  • Aguilar v. Carpenter 399 P.2d 124 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
    Ariz. Const. Art. 18, § 5, A.R.S.; , ; , .
  • Marks v. Goodding 394 P.2d 192 Ariz. 1964
  • Marks v. Goodding 394 P.2d 192 Ariz. 1964
    (decision rendered December, 1963, after this appeal was briefed), that the junction of a private road with a highway is not an intersection within the meaning of a statute prescribing the duties of motorists at intersections (Sec.