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Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite In re Nelson, 357 P.2d 623.

19 citing documents.

  • Dolan v. State Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
    See Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Am., Inc., ("Plaintiff need only present probable facts from which the causal relationship reasonably may be inferred."); ("An inference is a fact which may be presumed from the proof of the existence or non-existence of other facts."); cf. also Matsushita Elec.
  • Haley W., Gary W. v. Dcs Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
  • State v. Carson 391 P.3d 1198 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2017
    something more than “speculation.” Vassell, , 359 P.3d at 1028 ; , (justification instruction required only if “record provides evidence ‘upon which the jury could rationally sustain the defense’ ”), -88 , -94 (App. 1995); , (“An inference is a fact which may be presumed from the proof of the existence or non-existence of other facts.”).
  • Castro v. Ballesteros-Suarez 213 P.3d 197 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
  • Beynon v. TREZZA 211 P.3d 1203 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2009
    “We, therefore, do not consider this issue on appeal.” 6 , (App. *229 sion from a proven fact o[r] facts.’ ”
  • Martin v. Schroeder 105 P.3d 577 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
    It is a conclusion from a proven fact o[r] facts.” , see also Black’s Law Dictionary 793 (8th ed.2004).
  • Lepird v. Pima County Board of Supervisors Ariz. 2004
    Buzard th Griffin, (citing 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 2272 (3d ed. Supp. l957)); see also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976).
  • Wohlstrom v. Buchanan 884 P.2d 687 Ariz. 1994
    1551, 1557-58 , 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976); , ( , ).
  • Montoya v. Superior Court 840 P.2d 305 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1992
  • United California Bank v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America 681 P.2d 390 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1983
    ttorney-client privilege could not be examined directly or indirectly by Prudential “relative to the specific subject matter of that question”; but, on cross-examination by other parties, Prudential could “waive the privilege and permit the witness to answer the question,” in which case the witness could be fully examined by all parties as to that “specific subject matter.”
  • Larson v. MacIas 479 P.2d 439 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1971
  • State v. Johnson 479 P.2d 424 Ariz. 1971
  • Gipson v. ED Babbitt Motor Company 478 P.2d 117 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
  • Fish v. Industrial Commission 472 P.2d 97 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
    Co., , , , In re Schade’s Estate, , , , , Ft.
  • Avechuco v. Awtrey 470 P.2d 451 Ariz. 1970
    that: “ * * * it has long been the rule in Arizona that in order to draw an inference from an inference, the prior inference must be established to the exclusion of any other reasonable theory rather than by a probability.
  • Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Superior Court in and for County of Cochise 438 P.2d 424 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
    Allowance of an adverse inference in a civil action from the invocation of this privilege is sound in theory, see 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2272(e) at 439 (McNaughton Revision 1961) ; Model Code of Evidence, Rule 233; Udall, Arizona Law of Evidence § 91, at 137-139; and McCormick on Evidence § 80, at 163-164, and has been approved in this state, , (though under the “peculiar circumstances” of that case, it was held the adverse inference “vanished and was extinguished” when Buzard took the stand at t
  • England v. Valley National Bank of Phoenix 383 P.2d 183 Ariz. 1963
  • Ray v. Bush 359 P.2d 764 Ariz. 1961
    Co. v. Mc- *180 Neely, supra; , .
  • Buzard v. Brooks 358 P.2d 167 Ariz. 1960
    Pending the determination in this court of the appeal in Buzard v. Griffin, et al., , , W. T. Brooks commenced an action in mandamus to compel A. P. Buzard to relinquish the office of Corporation Commissioner.