Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Weiner v. Romley, 381 P.2d 581.

34 citing documents.

Tempe Woman's v. Loren Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
Tempe Woman's v. Loren Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2024
US Bank v. Adrian Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
US Bank v. Adrian Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
Even acknowledging that, as US Bank asserts, a lender’s (or a lender’s title insurer’s) negligent failure to discover who truly owned the Property is insufficient to show unclean hands as a defense, that failure is relevant to the connection between Adrian’s purported enrichment and US Bank’s loss.
Sw Fabrication v. Phoenix Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Sw Fabrication v. Phoenix Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
“[I]t is the moral intent of the party seeking relief, and not the actual injury done, that is controlling.” –43 (1963).
HSBC v. Cluff Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
HSBC v. Cluff Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
Jp Morgan v. Mgm Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Jp Morgan v. Mgm Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
Gorman v. Pima County 287 P.3d 800 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
Gorman v. Pima County 287 P.3d 800 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012
With that exception, “promissory estoppel includes all elements of equitable estoppel.”
QUEIROZ v. Harvey 205 P.3d 1120 Ariz. 2009
QUEIROZ v. Harvey 205 P.3d 1120 Ariz. 2009
¶12 For example, the court of appeals reasoned that Weiner v. Romley, 94 Ariz. 40, supported its conclusion.
QUEIROZ v. Harvey 204 P.3d 390 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
QUEIROZ v. Harvey 204 P.3d 390 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
a car owned by a wife as separate property was attached in a third-party’s lawsuit against her husband.
PUEBLO SANTA FE TOWNHOMES OWNERS'ASS'N v. Transcontinental Insurance Co. 178 P.3d 485 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
PUEBLO SANTA FE TOWNHOMES OWNERS'ASS'N v. Transcontinental Insurance Co. 178 P.3d 485 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
(to support estoppel, alleged injury or prejudice “must be actual and substantial, and not merely technical or formal”).
Double AA Builders, Ltd. v. Grand State Construction L.L.C. 114 P.3d 835 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Double AA Builders, Ltd. v. Grand State Construction L.L.C. 114 P.3d 835 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
Chewning v. Palmer 650 P.2d 438 Ariz. 1982
Chewning v. Palmer 650 P.2d 438 Ariz. 1982
Kersten v. Continental Bank 628 P.2d 592 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
Kersten v. Continental Bank 628 P.2d 592 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1981
415 , , and Restatement of the Law of Contracts § 90 for discussions of this doctrine.
Tiffany Incorporated v. WMK Transit Mix, Inc. 493 P.2d 1220 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
Tiffany Incorporated v. WMK Transit Mix, Inc. 493 P.2d 1220 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
Trollope v. Koerner 470 P.2d 91 Ariz. 1970
Trollope v. Koerner 470 P.2d 91 Ariz. 1970
381 * the distinction between the two is that to work an equitable estoppel or “estoppel in pais,” the representation in question must be of some present or past fact, while promissory estoppel rests upon a promise to do something in the future.
Turner v. WORTH INSURANCE COMPANY 464 P.2d 990 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
Turner v. WORTH INSURANCE COMPANY 464 P.2d 990 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
: “ ‘A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promissee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the ' promise.’ Restatemen
School Dist. No. 69 of Maricopa County v. Altherr 458 P.2d 537 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
School Dist. No. 69 of Maricopa County v. Altherr 458 P.2d 537 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
: “A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forebearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forebearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” The doctrine o
Glitsos v. Kadish 418 P.2d 129 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
Glitsos v. Kadish 418 P.2d 129 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
: “A promise which the promissor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promissee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Restatement, C