Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Layton v. Rocha, 368 P.2d 444.

173 citing documents.

  • Kelch v. Courson 447 P.2d 550 Ariz. 1968
    the jury was instructed that if both parties were negligent and that negligence contributed to the accident, the law would “leave them where it finds them,” and the verdict “may” be for the defendant.
  • Spettigue v. Mahoney 445 P.2d 557 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
  • Spettigue v. Mahoney 445 P.2d 557 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
  • Flashberg v. Krebs 445 P.2d 456 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
  • Flashberg v. Krebs 445 P.2d 456 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
  • Bland v. Bock 443 P.2d 704 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
  • Bland v. Bock 443 P.2d 704 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
  • Oana v. Haskell 441 P.2d 259 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
  • Oana v. Haskell 441 P.2d 259 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
    Though we are convinced that decedent’s negligence in failing to observe rules of the road pertaining to stop signs overshadows any negligence on the defendants’ ■part, we cannot say as a matter of law that the jury’s verdict was “incorrect.”
  • Orlando v. Northcutt 441 P.2d 58 Ariz. 1968
  • Orlando v. Northcutt 441 P.2d 58 Ariz. 1968
    You mayr but need not, apply the standards and requirements fixed by the legislature for drivers of motor vehicles.” , and cases following the principle laid down therein.
  • Kelch v. Courson 439 P.2d 528 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
  • Kelch v. Courson 439 P.2d 528 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1968
    Wolfswinkel v. Southern Pacific Com *369 pany, , on rehearing
  • Davis v. Waters 436 P.2d 906 Ariz. 1968
  • Davis v. Waters 436 P.2d 906 Ariz. 1968
    That instruction clearly violat•ed the Arizona Constitution Art. 18, § 5, A.R.S., which reads as follows: “The defense of contributory negligence or assumption of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact and shall, at all times, be left to the jury.” " , where we held that since the •question of contributory negligence is for the jury a “must” instruction violates the jury’s right to decide the issue.
  • Orlando v. Northcutt 430 P.2d 440 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
  • Orlando v. Northcutt 430 P.2d 440 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
  • Evans v. Pickett 430 P.2d 413 Ariz. 1967
  • Evans v. Pickett 430 P.2d 413 Ariz. 1967
    First, plaintiffs contend that it was error to give an instruction on contributory negligence which contained the words “then I instruct you that he was negligent.” , ; , ; , , etc. These cases do not support their contention.
  • Whitly v. Moore 427 P.2d 350 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
  • Whitly v. Moore 427 P.2d 350 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
    which in our opinion does not eliminate the announced rule insofar as there is a duty upon the trial court to instruct on the subject of contributory negligence “ * * * if there is evidence showing, or tending to show, plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence * * * ” Plaintiff’s third questio
  • Wilds v. A. J. Bayless Markets, Inc. 421 P.2d 873 Ariz. 1966
  • Wilds v. A. J. Bayless Markets, Inc. 421 P.2d 873 Ariz. 1966
    A month later we decided, , , that the italicized word in the above instruction was improper and that the preferred word was “should”, but that “may” was acceptable.
  • Gabriel Ex Rel. Gabriel v. Murphy 421 P.2d 336 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
  • Gabriel Ex Rel. Gabriel v. Murphy 421 P.2d 336 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
    A contrary rule would make for uncertainty and confusion, erode away the value of verdicts fairly won, and place a premium on ambush tactics at trial.”
  • Schmidt v. Gibbons 418 P.2d 378 Ariz. 1966
  • Holtz v. Holder 418 P.2d 584 Ariz. 1966
  • Holtz v. Holder 418 P.2d 584 Ariz. 1966
    5, , , a trial court may not instruct the jury as to what its verdict must be, as far as the defense of contributory negligence is concerned.
  • Schmidt v. Gibbons 418 P.2d 378 Ariz. 1966
    which reads as follows: “The defense of contributory negligence or assumption of risk shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact, and shall, at all times, be left to the jury.” , : “Even though the undisputed evidence shows that plaintiff’s negligence did as a fact contribute to the injury the jury may find in favor of the plaintiff and this court cannot direct a new trial.” We further stated therein that a mandatory “must” instruction is in violation of the fore
  • Nichols v. Baker 416 P.2d 584 Ariz. 1966
  • Nichols v. Baker 416 P.2d 584 Ariz. 1966
  • Schmidt v. Gibbons 412 P.2d 716 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
  • Fluor Corporation, Ltd. v. Sykes 416 P.2d 610 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
  • Schmidt v. Gibbons 412 P.2d 716 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
    amplified, , P.2d 1040 (1957); for the latter
  • Fluor Corporation, Ltd. v. Sykes 416 P.2d 610 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
    Appellant has, however, invited the attention of the court to the portion of the opinion dealing with the refusal of its requested instructions Nos. 1 and 1A , paragraphs 9 and 10 of the opinion, 3 Ariz.App.
  • Larriva v. Widmer 415 P.2d 424 Ariz. 1966
  • Larriva v. Widmer 415 P.2d 424 Ariz. 1966
  • Eades v. House 413 P.2d 576 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
  • Eades v. House 413 P.2d 576 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
    the plaintiff is permissible irrespective of the strength of the evidence concerning plaintiff’s negligence, and the jury under the law as announced may decide the issue for plaintiff even though the evidence clearly shows he was guilty of contributory negligence, we cannot say that the court committed reversible error by phrasing the instruction permissibly with the word ‘may’.” at 371 , at 445 (1962).
  • Rogers v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. 412 P.2d 272 Ariz. 1966
  • Krek v. Briel 412 P.2d 301 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
  • Rogers v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. 412 P.2d 272 Ariz. 1966
    Ariz. Const., Art. 6, § 12, A.R.S.; , .
  • Krek v. Briel 412 P.2d 301 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
    and that this Court is under a
  • Di Orio v. City of Scottsdale 408 P.2d 849 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
  • Di Orio v. City of Scottsdale 408 P.2d 849 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
    City of Scottsdale, and that the jury under the Arizona decision of Wolfswinkel v. Southern Pacific Company, 81 Ariz.. 302, ( , [1962]), could conceivably fail to apply the doctrine of contributory negligence in the Nicholson case as applied to Nicholson, and also fail to apply the doctrine of contributory negligence as it might apply to Di Orio in the second case,, and therefore find Nicholson was negligent and Di Orio not.
  • Robledo v. Kopp 409 P.2d 288 Ariz. 1965
  • Robledo v. Kopp 409 P.2d 288 Ariz. 1965
  • Boies v. Cole 407 P.2d 917 Ariz. 1965
  • Boies v. Cole 407 P.2d 917 Ariz. 1965
    In Arizona contributory negligence of the slightest degree if it is a proximate cause of the accident "may" or "should" defeat recovery by a , ; , .
  • City of Phoenix v. Schroeder 405 P.2d 301 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965