Cited by

Co. v. D’Ascoli, –34 (1955); –36 (1963).

“[D]oubts as to the extent of the injury should be resolved in favor of the innocent plaintiff and against the wrongdoer.”

Corp., (affirming summary judgment where "the damages sought in this suit do not have the requisite certainty of existence in order to allow their recovery"); see also Coury Bros. Ranches, (stating "[d]amages that are speculative, remote or uncertain may not form the basis of a judgment"); -37 (1963) (recognizing a plaintiff must "supply some reasonable basis for computing the amount of damage and must do so with such precision as, from the nature of his claim and the available evidence, is poss

(requiring a plaintiff provide a “reasonable basis” for computing damages with such precision as is possible).

¶28 Appellants also contend Appellees did not prove their damages with “reasonable certainty,”

In an action for breach of contract, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove damages “with reasonable certainty.”

(stating a plaintiff “should supply some reasonable basis for computing the amount of damage and must do so with such precision as, from the nature of his claim and the available evidence, is possible”).

with such precision as, from the nature of [their] claim and the available evidence, [wa]s possible,”

This showing included “some basis for estimating [her] loss.” (emphasis added; citations omitted).

(“[T]here must be a reasonable basis in the evidence for the trier of fact to fix compensation when a dollar loss is claimed.”).

-37 (1963) (holding the plaintiffs’ testimony, without supporting business and tax records, was insufficient to overcome summary judgment); Desert Palm Surgical Grp., P.L.C.

(holding the plaintiffs’ testimony, without supporting business and tax records, was insufficient to overcome summary judgment); Desert Palm Surgical Grp., P.L.C.

[Although] ‘certainty in amount’ of damages is not essential to recovery when the fact of damage is proven.” (citations omitted).

as the standard to determine whether judgment as a matter of law on damages was proper.

(citing Story Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 272 U.S. 555, 563-64 (1931); and Brear v. Klinker Sand & Gravel Co., (Wash.

See Coury Bros. Ranches, (“Proof of the fact of damages must be of a higher order than proof of the amount of damages.”); (“conjecture or speculation cannot provide the basis for an award of damages”).

20 -37, -83 (1963) (recognizing in a breach of contract case that “the plaintiff in every case should supply some reasonable basis for computing the amount of damage and must do so with such precision as, from the nature of his claim and the available evidence, is possible” (citations omitted)).

A “plaintiff's evidence [should] provide some basis for estimating his loss,” and “conjecture or speculation cannot provide the basis for an award of damages.” (internal citations omitted); see Cnty.

¶ 53 Once Yakima proved the fact of damages, it was required to demonstrate the amount of damages with “reasonable certainty.”