Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Bateman v. McDonald, 385 P.2d 208.

72 citing documents.

  • Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Lane and Bird Advertising, Inc. 426 P.2d 395 Ariz. 1967
  • Sahlin v. AMERICAN CASUALTY CO. OF READING, PA. 423 P.2d 897 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
  • Sahlin v. AMERICAN CASUALTY CO. OF READING, PA. 423 P.2d 897 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1967
    Although our Supreme Court has stated that an order granting a motion setting aside a default judgment is an appealable order ( , [1963]), which presumably must be reduced to written form before it can be effective and an appeal taken therefrom ( , [1964]), our Supreme Court has also ruled that an order denying a motion to set aside default was not a “final judgment” and therefore “not
  • C. Meisel Music Company v. Perl 415 P.2d 575 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
  • C. Meisel Music Company v. Perl 415 P.2d 575 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
    Coconino Pulp and Paper Company v. Marvin, supra
  • Kohlbeck v. Handley 415 P.2d 483 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
  • Kohlbeck v. Handley 415 P.2d 483 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
    r opportunity to litigate a disputed obligation and also require that a plaintiff, who has, according to regular and legal proceedings, secured a judgment be protected against a violation of the rule which requires the sanctity and security of a valid judgment.”
  • Bolon v. Pennington 415 P.2d 148 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
  • Bolon v. Pennington 415 P.2d 148 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
    the Supreme Court said: “In determining this question, cases from California and Minnesota are persuasive, particularly because our statute was adopted in part from those jurisdictions.
  • Knight v. Mewszel 413 P.2d 861 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
  • Knight v. Mewszel 413 P.2d 861 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
    The court below, upon hearing oral argument on the matter, ordered that: “The default and default judgment heretofore entered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants be in the same or hereby vacated.” The order setting aside the default judgment is appealable as a special order made after final judgment within the meaning of the statutes, , and may be distinguished from Searles v. Haldiman, 3 Ariz.App.
  • Riggs v. HUACHUCA INVESTMENT COMPANY 410 P.2d 149 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
  • Riggs v. HUACHUCA INVESTMENT COMPANY 410 P.2d 149 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1966
    contrary to the appellee’s contention, so that the sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the evidence was sufficient to support the Court’s order setting aside the default.
  • Mann v. Hennessey 409 P.2d 597 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1966
  • Husky v. Lee 406 P.2d 847 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
  • Husky v. Lee 406 P.2d 847 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
  • Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation & Drainage District v. McDonald 405 P.2d 299 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
  • Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation & Drainage District v. McDonald 405 P.2d 299 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1965
    Bateman v. Mc *510 Donald
  • Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Ramirez 400 P.2d 125 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
  • Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Ramirez 400 P.2d 125 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1965
    Our Supreme Court has held that the test of whether one is entitled to relief under this rule is “whether his conduct might be the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances.”
  • Gray v. Dillon 396 P.2d 251 Ariz. 1964
  • Gray v. Dillon 396 P.2d 251 Ariz. 1964
    Overson v. Martin, 90 * P.2d.