Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Murphey v. Valenzuela, 386 P.2d 78.

33 citing documents.

Steven Sholem v. Hons. gass/contes/melissa Langevin 460 P.3d 273 Ariz. 2020
Steven Sholem v. Hons. gass/contes/melissa Langevin 460 P.3d 273 Ariz. 2020
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. 105 P.3d 1163 Ariz. 2005
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. 105 P.3d 1163 Ariz. 2005
Ritchie v. Grand Canyon Scenic Rides 799 P.2d 801 Ariz. 1990
Ritchie v. Grand Canyon Scenic Rides 799 P.2d 801 Ariz. 1990
See 6 R.S.Civil 1913 § 460; , (“fundamental reason for requiring the plaintiff to exercise due diligence in seeking to have the defendant served with process arises out of the fact that when a suit is commenced the statute of limitations is tolled”).
McKinley v. Bethel 708 P.2d 753 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
McKinley v. Bethel 708 P.2d 753 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1985
The court erred by overlooking Rule 6(f), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S., which requires service of summons and complaint within a minimum of one year after a complaint is timely filed within the statute of limitations, , and longer where good cause is shown.
Lane v. Elco Industries, Inc. 656 P.2d 650 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
Lane v. Elco Industries, Inc. 656 P.2d 650 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
In support of their argument that their complaint was not barred by the statute of limitations, the Lanes urged the following: (1) a defendant whose true name is unknown to the plaintiff may be designated by any name in the pleadings, rule 10(f) 2 ; (2) the statute of limitations is tolled by the commencement of an action, , and a civil action is commenced by the filing of a complaint, rule 3; and (3) an action does not abate if the defendant is served within one year of the date of the filing,
Mohave County v. Mohave-Kingman Estates, Inc. 586 P.2d 978 Ariz. 1978
Mohave County v. Mohave-Kingman Estates, Inc. 586 P.2d 978 Ariz. 1978
Montano v. Scottsdale Baptist Hospital, Inc. 581 P.2d 682 Ariz. 1978
Snow v. Steele 588 P.2d 824 Ariz. 1978
Snow v. Steele 588 P.2d 824 Ariz. 1978
” 105 Ariz. at 579 , 468 P.2d at 938 .
Montano v. Scottsdale Baptist Hospital, Inc. 581 P.2d 682 Ariz. 1978
The presence of the statute definitely fixes the time as one year after the commencement thereof by filing corn-plaint, as the time within which it must be ‘prosecuted’ by issuing summons.” , and Taylor v. Superior Court, 13 Ariz.App.
Riley v. SUPERIOR COURT, ETC. 567 P.2d 1218 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1977
Riley v. SUPERIOR COURT, ETC. 567 P.2d 1218 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1977
Grobe v. McBryde, supra.
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Maricopa County Superior Court 505 P.2d 1383 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Maricopa County Superior Court 505 P.2d 1383 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
Concannon v. Yewell 493 P.2d 122 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1972
Concannon v. Yewell 493 P.2d 122 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1972
Taylor v. SUPERIOR COURT IN & FOR CTY. OF MARICOPA 474 P.2d 59 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Taylor v. SUPERIOR COURT IN & FOR CTY. OF MARICOPA 474 P.2d 59 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
The principles enunciated in Gideon predicate the rule we adopt herein, and, in our opinion
Grobe v. McBryde 468 P.2d 936 Ariz. 1970
Grobe v. McBryde 468 P.2d 936 Ariz. 1970
Wells-Stewart Construction Co. v. General Insurance Co. of America 461 P.2d 98 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
Wells-Stewart Construction Co. v. General Insurance Co. of America 461 P.2d 98 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1969
Garcia v. Frey 442 P.2d 159 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
Garcia v. Frey 442 P.2d 159 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1968
That the undersigned represents interests which would be vitally affected by the outcome of said litigation.” From this, we do not glean an “ * * * intentional relinguishment of a known right.”
Morgan v. Hays 426 P.2d 647 Ariz. 1967
Kammert Bros. Enterprises, Inc. v. Tanque Verde Plaza Co. 420 P.2d 592 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1967
Kammert Bros. Enterprises, Inc. v. Tanque Verde Plaza Co. 420 P.2d 592 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1967
Waiver has often been defined by the courts, and by our own Supreme Court, as being the “ * * * intentional relinquishment of a known right.”