Cited by
Opinions in Arizona that cite O'NEILL v. Mangum, 445 P.2d 843.
- Ottaway v. Smith 113 P.3d 1247 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
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Ottaway v. Smith
113 P.3d 1247
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2005
522 , 523 & n. 3, , 193 & n. 3 (1969) ( , 232 P. 893 (1925), but following O'Neill v. Mangum (State), , ).
- Derendal v. Griffith 104 P.3d 147 Ariz. 2005
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Derendal v. Griffith
104 P.3d 147
Ariz. 2005
See O’ (finding that “it can hardly be suggested that one charged or guilty of mere ‘drunk and disorderly’ conduct is a depraved and inherently base person”).
- Raye v. Jones 76 P.3d 863 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
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Raye v. Jones
76 P.3d 863
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2003
Moral Turpitude ¶ 12 A crime of moral turpitude is one that involves behavior that is “depraved and inherently base,” O’ , or that involves actions that “adversely reflect on one’s honesty, integrity, or personal values.” Dolny, 161 Ariz. at 300 n. 3, 778 P.2d at 1196 n. 3.
- Benitez v. Dunevant 7 P.3d 99 Ariz. 2000
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Benitez v. Dunevant
7 P.3d 99
Ariz. 2000
155 , (maximum six-month sentence and $1000 fine in 1980 did not establish severe penalty for disorderly conduct); , (liquor license suspension for selling liquor to minor not jury eligible where the penalty was less than six months and the maximum fine was $300 in 1980); O’ , (maximum penalty of six months and $300 fine for drunk and disorderly conduct in 1968 insufficient for jury eligibility); , (possible six-month prison sentence and $2500 fine did not make false reporting to a
- State Ex Rel. McDougall v. Strohson 945 P.2d 1251 Ariz. 1997
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State Ex Rel. McDougall v. Strohson
945 P.2d 1251
Ariz. 1997
Harking back to an earlier case, O’ , in which the court refused a jury trial for a defendant charged with drunk and disorderly conduct, the Goldman court rejected the argument that simple assault and battery required a jury trial because it involved moral turpitude, stating: “We are not convinced, however, that simple battery invol
- Campbell v. Superior Court 924 P.2d 1045 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
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Campbell v. Superior Court
924 P.2d 1045
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1996
Arizona case law recognizes that “moral turpitude” includes the conduct of a “depraved and inherently base person,” O’ , actions which adversely reflect on the “honesty, integrity or personal values” of the actor, State ex rel.
- State v. Miller 836 P.2d 1004 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1992
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State v. Miller
836 P.2d 1004
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1992
Conducting one’s business and advertising without having obtained the required license are not acts of a “depraved and inherently base person.” O’
- Mungarro v. Riley 826 P.2d 1215 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
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Mungarro v. Riley
826 P.2d 1215
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1991
In discussing the moral quality of an accused’s acts, some cases characterize the conduct as that of a “depraved and inherently base person,” O’
- State v. Harrison 792 P.2d 779 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
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State v. Harrison
792 P.2d 779
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
Such a crime has been defined as one that brands someone as a “depraved and inherently base person.” O’
- Matter of Marquardt 778 P.2d 241 Ariz. 1989
- State Ex Rel. Dean v. Dolny 778 P.2d 1193 Ariz. 1989
- State v. Richey 762 P.2d 585 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
- State v. Richey 762 P.2d 585 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
- State v. Moreno 655 P.2d 23 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
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State v. Moreno
655 P.2d 23
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1982
Baumert v. Superior Court, supra; drunk and disorderly conduct, O’ , or assault and battery, , in all of which the Arizona courts have held that the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial.
- State Ex Rel. Baumert v. SUPERIOR COURT, ETC. 618 P.2d 1078 Ariz. 1980
- State Ex Rel. Baumert v. SUPERIOR COURT, ETC. 618 P.2d 1078 Ariz. 1980
- State v. SUPERIOR COURT, IN AND FOR CTY. OF PIMA 589 P.2d 48 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
- State v. SUPERIOR COURT, IN AND FOR CTY. OF PIMA 589 P.2d 48 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1978
- City of Phoenix v. Jones 542 P.2d 1145 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
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City of Phoenix v. Jones
542 P.2d 1145
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
In our prior decision, this court attempted to reconcile what
- City of Phoenix v. Jones 541 P.2d 424 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
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City of Phoenix v. Jones
541 P.2d 424
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
We now turn to the two Arizona Supreme Court decisions dealing with the right of jury trial for a violation of a state statute in municipal court: , and O’
- Goldman v. Kautz 531 P.2d 1138 Ariz. 1975
- Goldman v. Kautz 531 P.2d 1138 Ariz. 1975
- State v. Stewart 516 P.2d 332 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
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State v. Stewart
516 P.2d 332
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
See, O’ , wherein the factors of the seriousness of the sentence and whether the crime involved moral turpitude were enunciated, and has suggested that the severity of a sentence is the major factor in determining whether a crime is a “petty” or a “serious” offense.
- City Court of City of Tucson v. Lee 494 P.2d 54 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1972
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City Court of City of Tucson v. Lee
494 P.2d 54
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1972
O’ , Du Vall v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra.
- Weiss v. Superior Court of Pima County 480 P.2d 3 Ariz. 1971
- Weiss v. Superior Court of Pima County 480 P.2d 3 Ariz. 1971
- St. Ex Rel. De Concini v. City Ct. of City of Tucson, Pima County 454 P.2d 192 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
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St. Ex Rel. De Concini v. City Ct. of City of Tucson, Pima County
454 P.2d 192
Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
A. Though I am still impressed with the validity of the reasoning employed in Tsipai , I cannot reconcile it with a subsequent decision of our Supreme Court, O’