Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite McDowell v. Davis, 448 P.2d 869.

49 citing documents.

Pompeneo v. Verde Valley Guidance Clinic 249 P.3d 1112 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Pompeneo v. Verde Valley Guidance Clinic 249 P.3d 1112 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2011
Braillard v. Maricopa County, Maricopa County Sheriff's Office Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
Braillard v. Maricopa County, Maricopa County Sheriff's Office Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
sclose her diabetes was “an intervening and superseding cause, and therefore the proximate cause of her own death, excusing any defendant from liability.” ¶50 “The proximate cause of an injury is that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces an injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred.”
Hamblin v. State 143 P.3d 388 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Hamblin v. State 143 P.3d 388 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Barrett v. Harris 86 P.3d 954 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
Barrett v. Harris 86 P.3d 954 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
7 ¶ 25 -72 , -72 (1968), the supreme court disapproved a jury instruction informing jurors that proximate cause is demonstrated if the negligent act was a substantial factor, rather than a slight or possible factor, in producing the injury.
Millar v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 804 P.2d 822 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
Millar v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 804 P.2d 822 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1990
Potomac Insurance v. McIntosh 804 P.2d 759 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1990
Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of America, Inc. 789 P.2d 1040 Ariz. 1990
Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of America, Inc. 789 P.2d 1040 Ariz. 1990
Law v. Superior Court of State of Ariz. 755 P.2d 1135 Ariz. 1988
Law v. Superior Court of State of Ariz. 755 P.2d 1135 Ariz. 1988
Koory v. Western Casualty & Surety Co. 737 P.2d 388 Ariz. 1987
Koory v. Western Casualty & Surety Co. 737 P.2d 388 Ariz. 1987
Lucchesi v. Frederic N. Stimmell, M.D., Ltd. 716 P.2d 1022 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
Lucchesi v. Frederic N. Stimmell, M.D., Ltd. 716 P.2d 1022 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1985
Cheney v. ARIZ. SUPER. COURT FOR MARICOPA CTY. 698 P.2d 691 Ariz. 1985
Cheney v. ARIZ. SUPER. COURT FOR MARICOPA CTY. 698 P.2d 691 Ariz. 1985
Ontiveros v. Borak 667 P.2d 200 Ariz. 1983
Ontiveros v. Borak 667 P.2d 200 Ariz. 1983
Flowers v. K-Mart Corp. 616 P.2d 955 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
Flowers v. K-Mart Corp. 616 P.2d 955 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980
Markiewicz v. SALT RIVER VALLEY, ETC. 576 P.2d 517 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
Markiewicz v. SALT RIVER VALLEY, ETC. 576 P.2d 517 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1978
Shaner v. Tucson Airport Authority, Inc. 573 P.2d 518 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1977
Shaner v. Tucson Airport Authority, Inc. 573 P.2d 518 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1977
Smith v. Chapman 564 P.2d 900 Ariz. 1977
Smith v. Chapman 564 P.2d 900 Ariz. 1977
that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces an injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred.”
Briscoe v. United Metro Materials & Concrete Co. 536 P.2d 1057 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
Briscoe v. United Metro Materials & Concrete Co. 536 P.2d 1057 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1975
Porterie v. Peters 532 P.2d 514 Ariz. 1975
Porterie v. Peters 532 P.2d 514 Ariz. 1975
Purcell v. Zimbelman 500 P.2d 335 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1972
Purcell v. Zimbelman 500 P.2d 335 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1972
Goslin v. Bacome 489 P.2d 242 Ariz. 1971
Goslin v. Bacome 489 P.2d 242 Ariz. 1971
He first states that it was reversible error for the court to give the following instruction on proximate cause: “An act or omission is a proximate cause of an accident or injury if it was a substantial factor in bringing about the accident or injury.”
State Ex Rel. Herman v. Mestas 469 P.2d 855 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
State Ex Rel. Herman v. Mestas 469 P.2d 855 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
33 , rev’d on other grounds
Zelman v. Stauder 466 P.2d 766 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Zelman v. Stauder 466 P.2d 766 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
This definition, for our purposes here, tends to be confusing, for it introduces by its own terms the question of what constitutes an “efficient intervening cause.” Arizona has specifically rejected the Restatement’s “substantial factor” test as a definition of “proximate cause.” , 448 P.2d *550 869 (1968); Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec.
Moore v. Maricopa County 466 P.2d 56 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Moore v. Maricopa County 466 P.2d 56 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Baker v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. 464 P.2d 974 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Baker v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. 464 P.2d 974 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
handled by the same law firm representing appellant here, our Supreme Court held a nearly identical instruction was “prejudicially erroneous”, we believe a timely objection is necessary to preserve the matter for review.
Wade v. Seguin 462 P.2d 100 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
Wade v. Seguin 462 P.2d 100 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1969
the court committed fundamental error in giving the following instruction, although there was no objection on the part of the plaintiff to the instruction at the time: “Another test of proximate cause recognized by our law may be helpful to you: Was the negligent act of the party under considera