Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Estabrook v. JC Penney Company, 464 P.2d 325.

35 citing documents.

MAYWALD v. TOYOTA Ariz. 2026
(concluding jury instructions on strict liability were not warranted because there was no evidence that the escalator which injured the plaintiff was defective).
Reyes v. Gilbert 447 P.3d 332 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
Reyes v. Gilbert 447 P.3d 332 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
State of Arizona v. Robert Fischer 392 P.3d 488 Ariz. 2017
State of Arizona v. Robert Fischer 392 P.3d 488 Ariz. 2017
Esplendido Apartments v. Metropolitan Condominium Ass'n 778 P.2d 1221 Ariz. 1989
Esplendido Apartments v. Metropolitan Condominium Ass'n 778 P.2d 1221 Ariz. 1989
Co., , (grant or denial of motion for new trial is within sound discretion of trial court, and reviewing court will not upset trial court’s ruling thereon absent clear showing of abuse of discretion); , (“trial judge has considerable latitude in awarding a new trial, and except in cases where his broad discretion is clearly abused an appellate court will not overturn his action”).
Liberatore v. Thompson 760 P.2d 612 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
Liberatore v. Thompson 760 P.2d 612 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
Penney Co., , he contends that, when the trial court lists both specific and nonspecific reasons for new trial, the nonspecific reasons must be disregarded.
Koepnick v. Sears Roebuck & Co. 762 P.2d 609 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
Koepnick v. Sears Roebuck & Co. 762 P.2d 609 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1988
Reeves v. Markle 579 P.2d 1382 Ariz. 1978
Reeves v. Markle 579 P.2d 1382 Ariz. 1978
Reeves v. Markle 580 P.2d 2 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1977
Reeves v. Markle 580 P.2d 2 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1977
Garcia v. Puchi 537 P.2d 47 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1975
Garcia v. Puchi 537 P.2d 47 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1975
Pinewood Development Company v. Truman 514 P.2d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
Pinewood Development Company v. Truman 514 P.2d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1973
Sweet v. Ybarra, 13 Ariz.App.
State v. Burton 514 P.2d 244 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1973
State v. Burton 514 P.2d 244 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1973
Wetzel v. Commercial Chair Company 500 P.2d 314 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
Wetzel v. Commercial Chair Company 500 P.2d 314 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1972
King v. O'Rielly Motor Company 494 P.2d 718 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1972
King v. O'Rielly Motor Company 494 P.2d 718 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1972
Kord's Ambulance Service, Inc. v. White 482 P.2d 903 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1971
Kord's Ambulance Service, Inc. v. White 482 P.2d 903 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1971
This minute entry order satisfies the specificity requirement of Rule 59 (m), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S.
Brooks v. De La Cruz 473 P.2d 793 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Brooks v. De La Cruz 473 P.2d 793 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Whatever the activating circumstances were, something more than that stated is necessary to enable us to review the matter intelligently Thus, while general grounds have been stated and the order is therefore not a nullity, , we must under Yoo Thun Lim, supra, assume that the verdict was correct and that the trial judge was in error in granting a new trial.
Morrow v. Trailmobile, Inc. 473 P.2d 780 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Morrow v. Trailmobile, Inc. 473 P.2d 780 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Cano v. Neill 473 P.2d 487 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
Cano v. Neill 473 P.2d 487 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1970
While a cryptic order such as the one in Pima County v. Bilby, supra, might be a “nullity” under the Yoo Thun Lim principles implementing Rule 59 (m) , we have not found any decision of our Supreme Court which restricts or alters the “equiponderant” test articulated in Smith v. Moroney, supra, where an order granting a new trial on the basis of the evidence under Rule 59(a) (8) states with particularity how the evidence is contrary to the verdi
Powell v. Klein 464 P.2d 806 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
Powell v. Klein 464 P.2d 806 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1970
Yoo Thun Lim v. Crespin, supra.