Cited by

(balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect “begins with a proper assessment of the ‘probative value of the evidence on the issue for which it is offered’” ()).

When a defendant seeks to admit third-party culpability evidence, “the proffered evidence must first be relevant; that is, it must ‘tend to create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.’” ¶ 163 (2016) ( ¶ 16 (2002)).

“A proper Rule 403 balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect begins with a proper assessment of the ‘probative value of the evidence with respect to the issue for which it is offered.’” ¶ 34 (2004) ( ¶ 17 (2002)).

This may occur if, for example, “in attempting to dispute or explain away the evidence thus offered, new issues will arise” requiring new witnesses “whose cross-examination and impeachment may lead to further issues; and that thus the trial will be unduly prolonged,” such that the “multiplicity of minor issues” will cause a jury to “lose sight of the main issue.” (quoting 1 Joseph M. Livermore et al., Arizona Practice: Law of Evidence § 403, at 82-86 (4th ed. 2000)).

At a minimum, such evidence must “create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.” ¶ 16 (2002).

¶ 17 (2002) (“Because [Rule 403 entails] a weighing of factors that cannot easily be quantified, substantial discretion is accorded the trial judge.”) (citation omitted).

¶ 17 (2002) (“The greater the probative value .

¶33 Despite Parker, for the proposition that the third-party culpability instruction was required.

¶ 17 (2002) (“[T]he multiplicity of minor issues will be such that the jury will lose sight of the main issue, and the whole evidence will be only a mass of confused data from which it will be difficult to extract the kernel of controversy.”) (citing 1 Joseph M. Livermore, Robert Bartels, & Anne Holt Hameroff, A

at 284 n. 2, ¶ 16 ( ¶ 16 (2002)).

Airlines, Co., ¶ 13 (App. 2009) ( ¶ 17 2 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s current version.

¶14 Arizona Rules of Evidence 401, 402, and 403 “set forth the proper test for determining the admissibility of third-party culpability evidence.” ¶ 19 (2002).

In 7 STATE v. WOOTEN Decision of the Court conducting a Rule 403 analysis, the superior court should first “assess the probative value of the evidence on the issue for which it is offered.” ¶ 17 (2002).

¶ 17 (“If the issue is not in 8 STATE v. QUIROZ Decision of the Court dispute, or if other evidence is available of equal probative value but without the attendant risks of the offered evidence, then a greater p

The superior court has considerable discretion when weighing these factors, ¶ 17 (2002), and we will not disturb its ruling absent an abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice.

To be relevant, third-party culpability evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to its proponent, “need only tend to create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.” ¶ 16 (2002) (emphasis omitted); ¶ 42 (App. 2011).

Airlines, Co., ¶ 13 (App. 2009) (noting “‘probative value’ and ‘the danger of unfair prejudice’ are not easily quantifiable factors”) ( ¶ 17 (2002)).

Under those rules, the proffered evidence must first be relevant; that is, it must “tend to create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt,” ¶ 16

SOURCES: [, 193] (2002); [, 1003] (2002); [People] v. Henderson, 110 Cal.

To be relevant, third-party culpability evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to its proponent, must tend “to create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.” ¶ 16, ¶ 42

To be relevant under Arizona Rule of Evidence 401, third-party culpability evidence “need only tend to create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.” ¶ 16, (emphasis omitted).

¶55 In arguing that a third-party culpability instruction was required, P.3d 1001 (2002), P.3d 189 (2002).

State v. Gibson, 202 * ¶¶ 12-13