Cited by

Winegar, 147 Ariz. at 446; -53 (1987) (holding that a police officer conducted “a reasonable investigatory stop” when, upon seeing a hitchhiker who fit the description of the suspect in a recent sexual assault, the officer stopped and talked to him before arresting him).

See, ¶ 48 (2002) (finding identification made within two days of the crime weighed in favor of reliability), superseded on other grounds, –55 (1987) (concluding there was no error in admitting identification where the “time between the crime and the identification was but a few hours”); –32 (1985) (finding an identification made “fifty-three days after the crime” was not unreliable, reasoning “[w]hether the length o

See, (police officer had probable cause to arrest a man who largely matched the suspect’s description, was found near the crime scene and was trying to leave the area).

Gastelo, 111 Ariz. at 461; (identification valid even if a “few hours” passed beforehand); (the passing of 14 days before identification is not “so late as to be per se unreliable”).

“To determine whether a defendant has been denied due process of law because of a pretrial identification procedure, the trial court must first determine whether the pretrial identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive.”

In other words, the circumstances should be ‘“sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious [person] in believing the accused guilty.’ ” , quoting Monroe v. Pape, 221 P.Supp.

One of the primary concerns in the admission of expert testimony is “whether the subject of inquiry is one of such common knowledge that people of ordinary education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the expert witness or whether, on the other hand, the matter is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact.” see also, Ariz. R. Evid.

-55, -65 (1987) (finding inaccuracy in estimating height of assailant did not render subsequent identification unreliable).

(holding that probable cause to arrest exists if the arresting officer possesses “reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it”).

These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’” quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).

Cf., , (witness identification reliable after a “few hours”); , (ten days between witness and subsequent identification of defendant does not necessarily render identification unreliable).

“Whether a witness possesses sufficient qualifications to testify as an expert is a matter within the trial court’s discretion and that determination will not be upset on appeal in the absence of clear abuse.” , ( , ); , cert, denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct.

1058 , 122 L.Ed.2d 364 (1993) (no abuse of discretion in admitting expert testimony by accident re-constructionist, who admitted he was not a “paint expert,” that there was a “perfect paint match” between the paint smear on defendant’s bumper and the color of the paint on the victim’s bike); , (tracker properly testified that appellant’s shoes matched tracks left in dirt at crime scene); , (ballistic expert properly testified that fatal shots were fired from rifle that appellant had borrowed day

“Whether a witness is competent to testify as an expert is a matter primarily for the trial court and largely within its discretion.” , ( , ).

citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct.

(shoe prints compared to tracks); , (hair identity); , cert.

this court upheld the imposition of seven consecutive life sentences.