Cited by

“A result is absurd if it is so irrational, unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have been within the intention of persons with ordinary intelligence and discretion.” ¶ 17 (2001) (quoting Perini Land Dev.

¶ 16 (2001) (“[W]e interpret and apply statutory language in a way that will avoid an untenable or irrational result.”).

“[W]e interpret and apply statutory language in a way that will avoid an untenable or irrational result.” ¶ 16 (2001).

(“A result is ‘absurd’ if it is so irrational, unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have been within the intention of persons with ordinary intelligence and discretion.”).

¶ 16 (2001) (“[W]e interpret and apply statutory language in a way that will avoid an untenable or irrational result.”).

does mention marijuana and/or methamphetamine,” but the plea agreement in fact reads, “marijuana or methamphetamine.” 3 STATE v. CISNEROS Opinion of the Court relate to both marijuana and methamphetamine.” We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation, but we review the court’s denial of the petition for an abuse of discretion

See Reed-Kaliher, 237 Ariz. at 122, ¶¶ 6–8; ¶ 16 (2001) (“[W]e interpret and apply statutory language in a way that will avoid an untenable or irrational result.”); ¶ 11 (App. 2001) (“We apply practical, common sense constructions rather than hypertechnical ones that would tend to frustrate legislative intent when we

An interpretation is “absurd if it is so irrational, unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have been within the intention of persons with ordinary intelligence and discretion.” State v. Estrada (Estrada II), ¶ 17 (2001) (quoting Perini Land Dev.

is to place a reasonable interpretation on ‘the intent of the electorate that adopted it.’” ¶ 15 (2001) ( ¶ 3 (2000)).

(quoting State v. Estrada , , 251 ¶ 19, , 360 (2001) ).

" State v. Estrada , , ¶ 17, (quoting Perini Land & Dev.

2013 § 1 (2002) (enacted); State v. Estrada , , ¶ 16

“A result is absurd if it is so irrational, unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have been within the intention of persons with ordinary intelligence and discretion.” ¶ 17 (2001) (internal quotation omitted).

See, ¶17 (2001) (Courts avoid interpreting statutes in a manner leading to an absurd result, meaning one “so irrational, unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have been within the intention of persons with ordinary intelligence and discretion.”).

We must “interpret and apply statutory language in a way that will avoid an untenable or irrational result,” ¶ 16 (2001), and we must also “apply practical, common sense constructions rather than hypertechnical ones that would tend to frustrate legislative intent when we interpret criminal statutes,” ¶ 11 (App. 2001).

(“[W]e interpret and apply statutory language in a way that will avoid an untenable or irrational result.”).

¶ 38, (examining a rule’s policy implications in deciding whether its application would lead to absurd results) ¶ 17, (explaining that a result is “absurd” when “it is so irrational, unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have been within the intention of persons with ordinary intelligence and discretion” (internal quotation omitted)).

5 STATE v. LIWSKI Opinion of the Court ¶12 Gillie further contends, however, that we must interpret § 36-2811(B)(3) to allow him to possess marijuana in excess of 2.5 ounces to avoid an “absurd result.” ¶¶ 16-17

¶ 17, (noting that we seek to avoid absurd results and that a result is absurd only if “so irrational, unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have been within the intention of persons with ordinary intelligence and discretion” (quoting Perini Land Dev.

¶ 3 (2006) ( ¶ 15 (2001)).

¶ 2, disapproved in part on other grounds, P.3d 356 (2001) (appellate court will not upset superior court’s finding of voluntary absence from trial absent abuse of discretion).

¶¶ 16-17, (court must interpret statutory language in way that will avoid absurd result—one that is “‘so irrational, unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have been within the intention of persons with ordinary intelligence and discretion’”), quoting Perini Land Dev.

But legislative history and other means of statutory interpretation are irrelevant and unnecessary when a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, absent a “‘clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary.’” quoting Mail Boxes, Etc., U.S.A.