Cited by

ALVAREZ BOJORQUEZ Decision of the Court ¶30 Alvarez argues that the court not only erred in failing to find remorse as a mitigating factor but “impermissibly considered” his lack of remorse “as an aggravating factor.” Nothing but speculation supports this assertion, and appellate courts “are unwilling to speculate as a basis for reversal.” ¶ 33 (2002).

The first part of the cruelty inquiry focuses on the “physical and mental suffering of the victim during the murder.” State v. (Doris) Carlson, ¶ 41 (2002).

See Benitez, 198 Ariz. at 94 ¶ 10 (“Arizona operates with a broader jury eligibility standard, providing its citizens with greater access to jury trials than the federal constitution 13 STATE V. MUHAMMAD Opinion of the Court mandates.”); ¶ 18 (2002) (“Arizona’s right to an impartial jury is no broader than the Sixth Amendment.”).

“Mutilation requires a finding of a separate purpose to mutilate.” ¶ 52 (2002).

¶ 27 (2002) (noting that a defendant “must show that the jurors have formed preconceived notions concerning [her] guilt and that they cannot lay those notions aside”) (alteration in original and citation omitted).

Undoubtedly, as Riley argues, the death penalty “should be reserved for cases in which either the manner of the commission of the offense or the background of the defendant places the crime ‘above the norm of first-degree murders.’” ¶ 45 (2002) (quoting Hoskins, 199 Ariz. at 163 ¶ 169); ¶ 43 (2007) (“[J]urors must assess whether the murder was so cruel that it rose above the norm of first degree murders.”).

¶ 36 (2005) ( ¶ 29 (2002)).

¶27 As Hidalgo notes, our Court has “repeatedly held” that “the death penalty should not be imposed in every capital murder case but, rather, it should be reserved for cases in which either the manner of the commission of the offense or the background of the defendant places the crime ‘above the norm of first-degree murders.’” ¶ 45, ( ¶ 169, ).

When “there is a doubt whether the death sentence should be imposed, we will resolve that doubt in favor of a life sentence.” ¶ 70

We have subsequently explained that using the parent- child relationship as “partial support” for an (F)(6) finding, along with 11 STATE V. LETEVE Opinion of the Court helplessness and senselessness, “is constitutionally permissible.” ¶ 55, (observing that Milke approved the use of the parent-child relationship “in partial support of a finding of heinousness or depravity”).

resolve that doubt in favor of a life sentence.’” ¶ 70, ( ).

Although an unexplained sentencing disparity between a defendant and an accomplice may be a mitigating circumstance, ¶ 65, we cannot say the jury abused its discretion by failing to give weight to the disparity here because one did not yet exist.

¶143 We note initially that the expression “should have foreseen” seems simply to have been used in lieu of the proper phrase “should have known.” Nonetheless, ¶ 44, that the tort concept of “foreseeability” is insufficient to support the finding of the aggravating circumstance.

¶ 45, ( ); ¶ 49, (holding the discretion afforded to prosecutors under Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme doe

But under the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, we must apply narrowing constructions of those words, not common understandings, to avoid “serious constitutional problems.” ¶ 55, see also Anderson, 210 Ariz. at 355 ¶¶ 123-24, 111 P.3d at 397.

¶75 “There is no vicarious liability for cruelty in capital cases absent a plan intended or reasonably certain to cause suffering.” ¶ 49

See State v. Carlson, 202 Ariz. 570, 579-80 ¶¶ 31-33, -90 (2002) (rejecting argument that additional voir dire should have been permitted because the Court was “unwilling to speculate as a basis for reversal” of conviction); State v. Doerr, 193 Ariz. 56, 61 ¶ 18, (declini

-84, ¶ 51, -94 (2002) (-53, - 21 - -12 (1983)) (listing factors used to establish heinousness and depravity).

21 ¶49 Andriano relied on a ¶ 45, that “the death penalty should not be imposed in every capital murder case but, rather, it should be reserved for cases in which either the manner of the commission of the offense or the background of the defendant places the crime ‘

¶43 We have held that “the death penalty should not be imposed in every capital murder case but, rather, it should be reserved for cases in which either the manner of the commission of the offense or the background of the defendant places the crime ‘above the norm of first-degree murders.’” ¶ 45, ( ¶ 169, ).

¶ 18 , (“Ari-zona’s right to an impartial jury is no broader than the Sixth Amendment”).