Cited by

at 176 ¶ 63; ¶ 9 (2003) (we presume jurors follow instructions).

We presume that juries follow curative instructions, ¶ 48 (2003), and limiting instructions, ¶¶ 7–9 (2003).

¶ 9 (2003) (citation omitted).

¶ 9 (2003); ¶ 48 (2003).

We assume the jurors followed those instructions, ¶ 9 (2003), and did not consider the questions to which objections were sustained, see Payne, 233 Ariz. at 513 ¶ 120.

P. 13.3(a)(2); ¶¶ 14-15, 17 (2003) (charges properly joined under Rule 13.3(a)(2) “where separate 5Although Romero’s oral motion to sever was untimely, the trial court does not appear to have rejected it on that basis.

–60, ¶¶ 9–10, 17 (2003) (holding a defendant is not prejudiced if the jury is properly instructed on the limited use of other-act evidence and that they must consider each offense separately).

State v. Prince (Prince I), ¶ 13 (2003); see also State v. (Robert W.) Murray, (“A clear abuse of discretion is established only when a defendant shows that, at the time he made his motion to sever, he had proved that his defense would be prejudiced absent severance.”).

¶ 17 (citation omitted).

§§ 13-2810, -3601.02 (2010); ¶ 17 (2003).

Because we presume that jurors follow their instructions, ¶ 9 (2003), and the undisputed evidence reflects that the victim was unconscious at the time Winiker used physical force against him, any misstatement of the law did not contribute to or affect the verdict in this case, and was therefore harmless.

¶ 17 (App. 2015); ¶ 9 (2003).

ant’s own conduct and from the evidence which applies to that defendant as if that defendant were being tried alone.” This proper jury instruction “effectively cured any potential prejudice due to rub-off.” Tucker, 231 Ariz. at 142, ¶ 43; see also Murray, 184 Ariz. at 25 (A properly instructed jury “is presumed to have considered the evidence against each defendant separately.”); ¶ 9 (2003) (“We .

¶ 13 (2003) (citation omitted).