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Opinions in Arizona that cite State v. Thompson, 27 P.3d 796.

40 citing documents.

State v. Williams Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
State v. Williams Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2023
¶ 4 (App. 2010) ( ¶ 6 (2001)).
State v. Gwen Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
State v. Gwen Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
State v. Shoemaker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Shoemaker Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
State v. Lieser Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
State v. Lieser Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
¶¶ 6, 8, (“Offenses committed on the same occasion cannot be historical prior felony convictions, because the offenses that are the subject of the prior conviction must have been committed before the present offense.”).
State of Arizona v. Daniel Andrew Snider 311 P.3d 656 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
State of Arizona v. Daniel Andrew Snider 311 P.3d 656 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2013
But as Snider correctly points out, § 13-706(A) applies only if the defendant “previously [has] been convicted of two or more serious offenses.” “If offenses are consolidated for trial, the conviction on the prior offense cannot precede the conviction for the subsequent offense.”
State of Arizona v. Kyle Evan Smith Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
State of Arizona v. Kyle Evan Smith Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
(recognizing enhancement for “„prior felony conviction‟” means “the conviction on the prior offense must precede the conviction on the present offense”); see also § 13-105(22)(c) (defining “„[h]istorical prior felony conviction‟” as one committed before “present offense”).
State of Arizona v. Joseph Michael Goddard Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
State of Arizona v. Joseph Michael Goddard Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2011
„[d]angerous crime against children‟ means any of the following that is Ariz. 372, 374, (“One is convicted when there has been a determination of guilt by .
State of Arizona v. Steven D. Szpyrka Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
State of Arizona v. Steven D. Szpyrka Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
To constitute a prior conviction for sentence enhancement purposes, “the conviction on the prior offense must precede the conviction on the present offense.”
State v. Thomas 194 P.3d 394 Ariz. 2008
State v. Thomas 194 P.3d 394 Ariz. 2008
In Re Reymundo F. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
In Re Reymundo F. Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
Cf. State v. Thompson, 200 Ariz. 439, ¶ 7, (“One is convicted when there has been a determination of guilt by verdict, finding, or the acceptance of a plea.”).
State v. Thomas 175 P.3d 71 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Thomas 175 P.3d 71 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
State v. Brown 115 P.3d 128 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
State v. Brown 115 P.3d 128 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2005
Virgo, 190 Ariz. at 354 , 947 P.2d at 928 ; , (“One is convicted when there has been a determina *542 tion of guilt by verdict, finding, or the acceptance of a plea.”).
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Hauser 105 P.3d 1158 Ariz. 2005
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Hauser 105 P.3d 1158 Ariz. 2005
gger the sentencing enhancement provisions of § 13-702.02: (1) those that “were not committed on the same occasion” but “are consolidated for trial purposes” and (2) those that “were not committed on the same occasion” and “are not historical prior felony convictions as defined in section 13-604.” ¶ 9
State of Arizona v. Daniel James Alexander Barnett Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State of Arizona v. Daniel James Alexander Barnett Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
See State v.Thompson, (“[o]ne is convicted when there has been a determination of guilt by verdict, finding, or the acceptance of a plea.”).
State of Arizona v. Virginia L. Ofstedahl Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
State of Arizona v. Virginia L. Ofstedahl Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2004
§ 13-604 P.3d 796 (2001).
State v. Vogel 85 P.3d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
State v. Vogel 85 P.3d 497 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2004
¶ 6 , (“When the language of a statute is clear, it is determinative of the statute’s construction.”).
State v. Christian 66 P.3d 1241 Ariz. 2003
State v. Christian 66 P.3d 1241 Ariz. 2003
Laws, ch. 255, § 7; ¶ 9, (finding sentencing enhancement for multiple felony convictions entered at the same time now controlled by A.R.S.
Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court 57 P.3d 379 Ariz. 2002
Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court 57 P.3d 379 Ariz. 2002
1 ¶ 3 To determine whether subsection (C) authorizes this Court to require attorneys to act as arbitrators, “[i]n the absence of ambiguous statutory language or manifest legislative intent to the contrary, [we] should look to the plain meaning of the words as enacted.” Ariz. Dep’t ¶ 9 , ¶ 6 , (when statutory language is clear, “it is determinative” of construction); ¶ 7 , (best indication of a statute’s meaning is its language); , (st
State v. Benenati 52 P.3d 804 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
State v. Benenati 52 P.3d 804 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
(§ 13-604 enhancement applies when commission of prior offense precedes commission of present offense and when conviction on prior offense precedes conviction on present offense).
State v. Siddle 47 P.3d 1150 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
State v. Siddle 47 P.3d 1150 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002

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