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“In determining whether a [superior] court has coerced the jury’s verdict, this court views the actions of the judge and the comments made to the jury based on the totality of the circumstances and attempts to determine if the independent judgment of the jury was displaced.” ¶5 (2003).

¶22 When assessing the voluntariness of a confession made by a juvenile, a court must be mindful “that juveniles may be more susceptible to certain police tactics than adults and as such their will may be more easily overborne.” ¶ 57 (2003).

¶ 19 (2003); –19 (App. 1997).

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165-67 (1986); (“[A] confession is involuntary only if it results from coercive activity by the state.”); (defendant must show “coercive police conduct, rather than internal compulsion, induced his confession”).

¶ 54 (2003) (noting that a confession may be obtained by lying about the existence of physical evidence if the suspect’s will has not been overborne) ().

We view “the actions of the judge and the comments made to the jury based on the totality of the circumstances[,] attempt[ing] to determine if the independent judgment of the jury was displaced.” ¶ 5 (2003).

¶42 In determining whether the superior court coerced a jury’s verdict, this court considers “the actions of the judge and the comments made to the jury based on the totality of the circumstances” and whether “the independent judgment of the jury was displaced.” ¶ 5 (2003); (“What conduct amounts to coercion is particularly dependent upon the facts of each case.”).

¶151 Here, we must “determine if the independent judgment of the jury was displaced.” ¶ 5 (2003).

Singling Out a Juror ¶19 Trial courts have been repeatedly cautioned against “any contact between a judge and any member of a deliberating jury.” McCrimmon, 187 Ariz. at 173; see, ¶ 23 (2003); Rodriguez-Rosario, 219 Ariz. at 116, ¶ 14.

But “[p]ermitting testimony related to an entirely separate conversation does nothing to complete the other conversation.” ¶ 38 (2003) (emphasis added).

To determine whether the superior court coerced a jury’s verdict, we consider “the actions of the judge and the comments made to the jury based on the totality of the circumstances[,]” and evaluate whether “the independent judgment of the jury was displaced.” ¶ 5 (2003).

(reviewing motion to suppress); (reviewing voluntariness of statement).

¶¶ 19-20, (noting that a court’s jury instructions and knowledge of jury split are factors in assessing whether a verdict was coerced); STATE V. KOLMANN

“The express purpose of Rule 806 is to allow a party to attack the ‘credibility’ of the hearsay declarant.” ¶ 42, (citation omitted).

“In determining whether a trial court has coerced the jury’s verdict, this court views the actions of the judge and the comments made to the jury based on the totality of the circumstances and attempts to determine if the independent judgment of the jury was displaced.” ¶ 5

¶ 17, 101, ¶ 25, 706 (2003) 4 STATE v. ALES Decision of the Court (reversing on the basis of coercion, in part because the trial court erred in giving an impasse instruction before the jury indic

¶ 54, (stating that tactics such as lying about the strength of the evidence is “permissible so long as the suspect‟s will is not overborne.”).

In determining whether the court abused its discretion and coerced the jury, we consider “the actions of the judge and the comments made to the jury based on the totality of the circumstances and [we] attempt[] to determine if the independent judgment of the jury was displaced.” ¶ 5

Yet, the admission of a document “under a hearsay exception does not negate consideration of the Confrontation Clause.” ¶ 29

801(d)(1)(A); n.9, n.9 (2003).